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Using a range of archival, oral, and textual sources, this dissertation
explores the history of how American “common sense” has conferred adolescent
status selectively since World War II, when the teenager first emerged as a widely
accepted cultural idea. It focuses especially on the prominent role of scientific
experts in popularizing causes and solutions for teenage troubles, many of which
continue to shape popular understanding. As historians have demonstrated,
sociologists and psychologists achieved unprecedented prominence in the 1950s,
often by publishing influential studies of “maladjusted” teenagers, alienated
families, and “delinquent subcultures.” The dissertation illustrates the interplay of
these dominant national narratives with local and regional reform efforts that have
gone largely ignored by scholars. Not only were public debates over “youth
troubles” more fierce at the local level, they sometimes wielded a surprising
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influence over state and national policymakers always eager to find models for
new policies. Texas presents an especially representative setting for my study.
Situated in the heart of the Sun Belt and “borderlands” regions, Texas’ growing
political and economic clout, and racial and ethnic diversity, caused national
observers to pay heed to homespun interpretations of juvenile delinquency. The
state attracted top experts from the fields of sociology, psychology, and social
work, who built up nationally and internationally known academic programs,
research foundations, settlement house agencies, and juvenile justice institutions.
Texas experts functioned as public intellectuals, circulating a series of narratives
and images purporting to explain delinquency. Throughout the postwar era, they
engaged multiple publics in discussions of troubled teenagers that prefigured
today’s debates over the treatment of violent juvenile offenders and the
disproportionate numbers of black and Latino youth in trouble. I demonstrate that
research on adolescence and delinquency often sparked larger national arguments
about race, poverty, family, and community. The dissertation’s close studies of
big-city community youth programs, juvenile justice institutions, and grassroots
activism on behalf of incarcerated juveniles seek to relocate teenagers from the
periphery to the center of major trends in twentieth century American history.
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Introduction: Death of a Teenager: “Adultified” Adolescents and
the Contested Meanings of the American Delinquent
In the spring and summer of 2002, people from Alaska to Australia
became aware that the state of Texas was in the process of executing three young
black men barely out of their teens. Citizens of nations that had abolished capital
punishment, as well as many Americans, winced at these latest additions to the
state’s already record-setting number of executions. The subject of the death
penalty provokes strong emotions, always on display in the hours surrounding an
execution. Each time, reporters descend upon the Huntsville State Prison in
southeast Texas, hoping to document yet another drama of “closure” and protest.
Anti-death penalty activists hold candlelight vigils, reciting for anyone who will
listen a litany of well-known facts about assembly-line trials and racial inequities.
But the executions that took place in the summer of 2002 occasioned a very
different debate, because the convicts in question were all not only black but also
juvenile offenders; each had received a death sentence at the age of seventeen.
“Teenagers are redeemable and able to be rehabilitated,” protested one
editorialist, because of “social and physiological differences between adolescents
and adults.”1 This statement referred to the latest research on brain development
in adolescents, in which scientists using Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
have discovered significant cell activity in the “teenage brain” in the areas thought
to govern rationality, long-term planning, resistance to the influence of others, and

1

Alberta Phillips, “We Must Draw the Line at Executing Juvenile Offenders,” Austin AmericanStatesman, September 1, 2002, p.H3.
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awareness of consequences, which may help explain troubling teenage behaviors.2
Was it logical, let alone moral, to subject “kids who kill” to the most irreversible
adult punishment? Had these teenagers forfeited social protections built up over a
hundred years in American justice, as well as American culture?3
These questions troubled few Texans when Napoleon Beazley, T.J. Jones,
and Toronto Patterson committed their crimes. It was the mid-1990s, and the
national television and print media were awash in gory anecdotes of “thrill kills,”
drive-by shootings, and carjackings.4 Locally and nationally, the juvenile justice
system became perceived as a “recycling bin” for a more violent generation of
youth.5 Even more worrisome, well-known criminologists such as James Q.
Wilson and John J. DiIulio warned of a coming wave of “super-predators.” The
combination of an impending demographic bulge in the adolescent age cohort
with a youth culture suffering from what DiIulio called “moral poverty” added up
to serious social disorder in the immediate future.6 Feeding this perception was a
series of controversies over hip hop culture, which produced Congressional
hearings denouncing “gangsta rap” music and films charged with glamorizing

2

Jay Giedd, a neuroscientist at the National Institute for Mental Health, has demonstrated for the
first time the existence of major growth and change in the adolescent brain. For a brief summary,
see Giedd et al., “Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal Study,”
Nature Neuroscience (Oct 1999), 861-864. Giedd and several other scientists appeared in the
documentary film “Inside the Teenage Brain,” which aired on the PBS Frontline series in 2002.
3 For the latest in a series of articles to pose such questions, see Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence
Steinberg, “Blaming Youth,” Texas Law Review 81:3 (Feb 2003), 799-841.
4 “Wild in the Streets,” Newsweek, August 2, 1993 (cover story).
5 Penelope Lemov, “The Assault on Juvenile Justice,” Congressional Quarterly Governing
Magazine 8:3 (Dec 1994), 26.
6 John J. DiIulio, Jr., “The Coming of the Super-Predators,” The Weekly Standard (Nov 27, 1995),
23.
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violence.7 What was to be done? In a characteristic appearance before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, DiIulio recounted his search for answers with “lifers” –
prisoners who were serving life sentences. “[T]hese hardened men,” he noted,
“did not voice the conventional explanations such as economic poverty or
joblessness;” instead, they cited the lack of “family, adults, teachers, preachers,
coaches.”8 This “role model” theory, which focused on individual adult-child
relationships, co-existed with and fed into the more widespread response of
punishing adolescents as adults. Both “solutions” blissfully ignored the intense
social and economic pressures that could and often did undermine potential role
models, even as they portrayed contradictory images of the juvenile delinquent as
both a rudderless adolescent and an incipient adult.
DiIulio’s proclamations came against the backdrop of the 1994 mid-term
Congressional elections. The notion of “moral poverty,” rather than actual
poverty, proved attractive to neoconservative politicians, who ran “law and order”
campaigns across the nation promising “adult time for adult crime.” Tough on
crime slogans helped Republicans win control of both houses of Congress, and
spawned competition between the two major political parties. Eager to prove that
they too could punish “super-predators,” Democrats increasingly embraced the
rhetoric and policy proposals of their opponents. President Bill Clinton promoted
and eventually signed a crime bill that included over one billion dollars for
7

George Lipsitz, “The Hip Hop Hearings: Censorship, Social Memory, and Intergenerational
Tensions Among African Americans,” Joe Austin and Michael Nevin Willard eds., Generations of
Youth: Youth Cultures and History in Twentieth Century America (New York: NYU Press, 1998),
395-411. See also Henry A. Giroux, Fugitive Cultures: Race, Violence, and Youth (New York:
Routledge, 1996).
8 “Fill Churches, Not Jails: Youth Crime and Superpredators,” Prepared Statement of John J.
DiIulio, Jr. Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, February 28, 1996. (Federal News Service)

3

juvenile boot camps, a form of “shock incarceration” glamorized on daytime talk
shows where harried parents called upon Army drill sergeants to rein in their “out
of control teens.”9 In Texas, juvenile crime became the central issue during one of
the most-watched elections of 1994-95, which pitted Democratic Governor Ann
Richards against Republican challenger George W. Bush. In his first campaign
speech, Bush followed his announcement of candidacy with a declaration that
violent teenagers formed the “most important problem in the state.” One of his
first television commercials featured an image of a gun followed by Bush
declaring that sentencing juveniles as adults represented “Texas values” of
“personal responsibility.”10 Echoing talk-show remedies, he proposed “tough love
academies” run “not by some idealistic twenty-two year old teacher just out of
teacher’s college but maybe a sergeant out of the Marine Corps.”11 In calling for
the transformation of a large, cutting-edge substance abuse center into a locked
facility for juveniles, Bush insisted “we ought to forget about rehabilitation and
worry about incarceration.”12 These promises helped Bush win a narrow election,
one that eventually catapulted him to the presidency of the United States. During
a 1999 youth conference, as Bush prepared for his presidential run, he reflected
on his earlier crusade against juvenile crime. Juvenile boot camps, more waivers
to adult court, and tougher mandatory minimum sentences, all had helped lower
the juvenile crime rate, in his view. But the combined effect of these procedural
9

Peter Katel, “The Bust in Boot Camps,” Newsweek, Febuary 21,1994, p.26.
Ronald Brownstein, “Call To Bring Back Orphanages is Bid to Ease Kid Crime,” Los Angeles
Times, Oct 16, 1994.
11 “Bush Campaign’s First Pitch,” Austin American-Statesman, November 9, 1993.
12 David Eliot, “Emphasis on Rehabilitation Puts State on Cutting Edge of Corrections Theory,”
Austin American-Statesman, Jan 16, 1994.
10
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and policy changes was more important. Bush’s juvenile justice reforms
represented the centerpiece of his larger agenda to promote what he called “a
cultural shift” from post-Sixties self-indulgence and immorality toward “the
responsibility era.”13
In April 1995, in the midst of public furor over juvenile crime, a Texas
jury was sentencing Napoleon Beazley to death for capital murder. Seven years
later, as the appeals process wound down and Beazley’s execution became
imminent, people began having second thoughts. In the national media, as well as
the highest levels of government, an often emotional debate erupted around
whether Beazley “deserved” the death penalty. His biography became the subject
of profiles in glossy magazines and television specials. Straddling the categories
of adolescent and delinquent, teenager and “super-predator,” Beazley’s story
exemplifies the contested meanings of the juvenile delinquent in our current
moment. Despite a century of “scientific” study and social progress, we are no
closer to certainty in understanding the causes or appropriate responses to
troubling teenage behaviors than our Progressive forbears. Social science has
generated a set of narratives and images for public consumption intended to
clarify a range of behaviors usually lumped into the category “juvenile
delinquency,” but they have created as many problems as they have attempted to
solve. Despite the universality implied by the developmental and biological
models of adolescence, the topic of delinquency has produced a sharply divided
set of discourses rather than a single, unified, or linear field of social thought.
13

Ken Herman, “Bush Pushes ‘Personal Responsibility’ Message in Conference on Youth,”
Austin American-Statesman, March 31, 1999, p.B1.

5

More often, we have portrayed and treated working-class white, black, and Latino
adolescents as incipient adult criminals, tacitly conferring “teenage” status upon
the sons and daughters of the middle and upper classes. Napoleon Beazley’s
crime forced an uncomfortable collision of these separate and unequal discursive
worlds.
At a glance, Beazley might have appeared to be another statistic in the
ledger of crimes committed by “super-predators.” He was, after all, an African
American teenager from a poor neighborhood who had murdered in the course of
a random carjacking. By 2002, however, a growing number of observers peeled
away these superficial layers to discover a complex and disturbing story. Beazley
had lived a generally exemplary life until the day of his crime. In fact, his had
been the kind of success story routinely celebrated by white Americans eager to
put racial inequality behind them. Beazley hailed from Grapeland, Texas, a small
town in East Texas where the races lived separately and mingled infrequently. He
lived in a two-parent, middle-class household. As his parents had overcome
economic discrimination, Beazley would achieve a first in the history of
interpersonal relationships between blacks and whites. According to a lengthy
profile in Texas Monthly, Beazley was “the first black kid ever to be accepted by
whites” and “a bright teenager with a loose-limbed confidence and a dazzling
smile.” An honors student, star athlete, and president of his senior class, Beazley
dreamed of attending Stanford Law School.14

14

Pamela Colloff, “Does Napoleon Beazley Deserve to Die?” Texas Monthly (April 2002).
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His many successes, however, came at a price: Beazley was resented and
ostracized by his peers in “the Quarters,” the historically black neighborhood
where he had grown up. He later complained of experiencing worse racial taunts
from “other black kids” than whites. Soon he fell in with an older cousin, a midlevel drug dealer who commanded respect on the streets of the Quarters. Beazley
began to lead a double life, selling and using drugs by night while winning school
accolades by day. After several months of this charade, on a fateful night in April
1994, Beazley and two accomplices committed a carjacking. They followed an
older white couple in a Mercedes to their garage, where the runner-up for “Mr.
Grapeland High” shot an unarmed husband and father in cold blood, and in so
doing threw away his promising future.15
The crime stirred unusual racial passions. Beazley’s victim, John Luttig,
was not only a prominent white citizen but also the father of a Republican federal
judge. Surprisingly, though, several influential whites called for clemency in
Beazley’s case, including his former high school teachers, the prosecutor from his
home county, and the judge who had presided over his trial. As Beazley’s
execution loomed in early 2002, Texas Governor Rick Perry fielded requests for
clemency from Amnesty International and South African Archbishop Desmond
Tutu. The story made news across the globe, whereas the other two executions
scheduled for that summer did not. Much of the discussion centered on Beazley’s
adolescent status. Even at age seventeen, claimed his defenders, he had been
impressionable, confused, and emotional. This argument departed from almost all

15

Ibid.
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other portrayals of Beazley as unusually mature, self-assured, and rational,
suggesting that his upstanding past had exonerated him from being placed in the
category of remorseless “super-predator.” Beazley’s public statements after his
arrest unintentionally garnered him further sympathy. Beazley openly admitted
his guilt and showed unswerving remorse for his crime. He derided all attempts to
explain his crime by way of his age or his race: “I was old enough to know what I
was doing,” he insisted. “Any explanation I tried to give would sound like an
excuse, and there’s no excuse for what I’ve done.”16 Beazley maintained this
position until his final statement, given the day before his death by lethal
injection, in which he lamented his “senseless” and “heinous” crime.17
The media narrative of Beazley’s rise and fall cast his as a “normal”
coming of age that had been defeated by his desire for authentic “blackness.”
Given the public hype about “super-predators,” it was all too easy for white
audiences to blame “deviant” African American youth culture. Moreover, the
conflicted response to Beazley exhibited the lack of clarity about who qualified as
either an adolescent or an adult. Contemporary American culture less often
accords “teenage” status to adolescents of working-class or nonwhite background,
creating a set of assumptions that even shape the way individual working-class
white, black or Latino adults respond to children in their care. A recent
ethnographic study of an integrated junior high school in California, Ann Arnett
16

The above quotes come from the transcript of “CNN Presents,” Saturday, May 25, 2002. A
Lexis-Nexis search for “Napoleon Beazley” yielded hundreds of articles from newspapers all over
the world, as well as transcripts from national television programs. Similar searches for “Toronto
Patterson” and “T.J. Jones” brought only a dozen or so hits from Texas newspapers.
17 Coloff, “Does Napoleon Beazley,” Texas Monthly; Bob Ray Sanders, “Condemned Man’s Own
Words Best Condemn Capital Punishment,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, June 8, 2002.
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Ferguson’s Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity (2002),
brings this point home with devastating clarity. Time and time again, Ferguson
describes teachers and school officials who are quicker to punish black students
than white ones, and to subject them to longer and more severe forms of
punishment. Indeed, the school maintains a “punishing room” where black
students sit for hours in enforced silence for even the most minor of
transgressions. She argues that black children are less often seen as children,
citing adult conversations about them that take on “a sinister, intentional, fully
conscious tone that is stripped of any element of childish naivete.”18 In
Ferguson’s view, the school has “adultified” its black pupils, tracking them not
into a vocational occupation, as educational reformers have charged for
generations, but toward the routines of another institution – the prison.
Civil libertarians and children’s advocates tend to view this brand of
“adultification” as a relatively new phenomenon. They complain that we have
abandoned the ideals embodied in institutions created a century ago, such as the
modern age-graded school, the juvenile court, and the child guidance clinic, each
of which sought to treat children and adolescents according to their specific level
of emotional and intellectual maturity. But we have never truly embraced such
distinctions, at least not in our institutions that deal with troubled and troubling
young people. Recent historians have demonstrated that the spread of juvenile
courts in the first decades of the twentieth century, for example, did not hinder

18

Ann Arnett Ferguson, Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 83.
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authorities from trying adolescents as adults for a number of offenses.19 As this
dissertation shows, even within institutions and programs designed to offer agespecific “treatment” to teenagers in trouble, “adultification” proceeded unchecked
through much of the post-World War II era, affecting disproportionate numbers of
working-class whites, African Americans, and Latinos. Moreover, this process
seeped into social thought and policy on delinquent youth, creating a selfperpetuating cycle that helped to inoculate “adultifying” institutions from critical
scrutiny until recent decades. Rather than search out the historical moment when
Americans gave up on the idea of a separate adolescence, this dissertation
examines how we have cordoned off certain social groups from the protections
and privileges of being young, confused, immature, and impressionable.
Battles over who qualified as an adolescent or “teenager” rocked the state
of Texas in the postwar era. They involved scientific experts, elected officials,
children’s advocates, social reformers, concerned parents, and sometimes young
“delinquents” themselves. Among these groups were transplanted Northerners
and native-born Texans; racial liberals and social conservatives; reformers and
defenders of the status quo. In a public sphere increasingly shaped by media
technology and mass communication, these actors participated in a series of
debates that decided how the state should respond to – and therefore define - the
growing problem of juvenile delinquency. Ultimately, juvenile courts and training
schools won out over community-based programs such as children’s clinics,
recreation centers, settlement houses, and vocational programs, each of which was
19

David S. Tanenhaus, “The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court,” Jeffrey Fagan and
Franklin E. Zimring, eds., The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to
the Criminal Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 13-43.
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forced to rely largely upon private funding for survival. This outcome, which took
place over several decades, reflected the success of juvenile justice advocates in
convincing Texans that they alone could ensure public safety from delinquents
while also offering therapeutic “rehabilitation” – a combination that communitybased competitors could not match. Texas juvenile justice after World War II thus
embodied what historian David Rothman has called “conscience and
convenience;” it took the children of “undesirable” populations off the streets
while purporting to make them into good American citizens.
At the center of these unfolding struggles was the endeavor of
“representing” the juvenile delinquent to specific audiences as well as a wider
public. Well-meaning adults spoke for young people in a variety of ways. They
argued for social reforms and policies assumed to be “in the best interest of the
child;” created narratives for film, television, radio, and print; and carefully chose
the words of actual delinquents to lend authenticity to favored positions. The
dominant image of the juvenile delinquent was thus the product of a multi-layered
process of mediation that was firmly in the hands of adults: scientific experts,
professional reformers, and elected officials. Even audiences, whose own
expectations and prejudices undoubtedly gave form to their interpretations of
delinquency, participated in this process. Meanwhile, young people themselves
wielded comparatively little power over their own portrayals even as
representation departed starkly from reality. By the 1950s, the typical juvenile
delinquent in Texas was a working-class teenage boy from an urban area, most
likely black or Latino. It seems hardly a coincidence that this changing

11

demography of delinquency occurred as Americans embraced psychological over
environmental explanations for why adolescents “went wrong,” which helped
downplay meaningful discussions of the range of social inequalities that most
delinquents grew up with. Representations of the juvenile delinquent steadfastly
portrayed white, middle-class “teenagers” suffering from emotional disorders
rooted in the self or the family.
The changing meaning of delinquency in Texas reflected larger currents in
American thought and culture. However, it also set the stage for today’s
uncertainty about adolescent status. Decades before the emergence of the socalled “super-predator,” Texas experts drew discursive boundaries between
troubled adolescents and adult-like delinquents. Modern and “scientific” though
they may be, childhood and adolescence have never been settled concepts, and so
have contributed to historical confusion over the definitions of delinquency, all of
which are explored in Chapter One. This bibliographic essay describes the
emergence of the cultural ideas of child, adolescent, delinquent, and teenager,
each of which has preoccupied social scientists, and later, historians. In our
postmodern society, coming of age is organized in specific tiers by a myriad of
experts. Educators long ago devised grade levels; psychologists, inspired by such
pioneers as Jean Piaget and Erik Erikson, chart developmental stages; and
advertisers concoct sophisticated marketing campaigns targeting children, preteens, “tweenagers,” high school students, and college-age young adults. Nearly
erased from our collective memory is a time when we viewed children as “little
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adults” rather than developmentally unique beings, and lumped the age range
from early childhood to young adulthood into the all-purpose category of “youth.”
Chapter Two explores the persistence of this understanding of “youth”
alongside the emerging notion of adolescence as a special time of “storm and
stress.” It focuses on a national “youth crisis” during the Great Depression, and
follows a group of scientific experts from the offices of New Deal think tanks and
agencies to the relative backwaters of the University of Texas at Austin on the eve
of World War II. Children and youth were symbolic figures in an emerging
national movement for mental health services, led in Texas by the Hogg
Foundation for Mental Health. Led by Northern social scientists who had
pioneered the study of black adolescents, the Hogg Foundation popularized the
idea of mental health in Texas, trained a generation of professionals, and
sponsored research on white, black, and Latino youth. The chapter tracks the
replacement of sociopolitical explanations for delinquency with psychological and
“cultural” ones. Where once social psychologists inveighed against racial
inequality for wreaking emotional harm upon black youth, psychiatry-oriented
experts by the 1950s focused instead upon the “deviant subculture” and the
“culture of poverty” as generators of delinquency.
The testing grounds for such theories were the streets and neighborhoods
of big cities, where the vast majority of juvenile delinquents could be found.
Nowhere was this more apparent than in Houston, the state’s fastest growing city
and single largest source of inmates in the Texas juvenile training schools.
Chapter Three explores various responses to “youth problems” in Houston,
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focusing on the Houston settlement house movement. In the 1950s and 60s, the
Houston Settlement Association gained national and international recognition for
its work with troubled youth in working-class white and Latino neighborhoods. In
Chapter Three, I examine the representations of juvenile delinquency that
emanated from settlement house advocacy, as well as its successor, Houston
Action for Youth, a 1960s’ “community action” project. While the settlements
tended to offer sympathetic views of Latino teenagers, the academic experts who
ran HAY launched a media campaign that utterly misrepresented the typical
juvenile delinquent as extremely wealthy or poor and suffering from bad
parenting.
While significant, these community-based responses to youth troubles
paled in breadth and depth to the expanding system of juvenile justice. Chapter
Four describes how Hogg-trained experts founded the Texas Youth Council in
1949. This state agency, one of the first of its kind in the nation, had an ambitious
mission. Its architects hoped to expand community-based prevention programs,
standardize juvenile court procedures, and reform prison-like training schools into
therapeutic centers of rehabilitation. Although the Youth Council became a
trusted source of information on the causes and cures of delinquency, it received
little financial support from state policymakers. Longtime director James Turman,
a clinical psychiatrist, transformed the Youth Council’s mandate from
rehabilitation to incarceration. By the mid-1960s, the Youth Council’s
responsibility centered almost exclusively on large custodial institutions for
delinquent youth, a choice that led to the agency’s fall into disgrace by 1970.
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Chapter Five examines Morales v. Turman (1974), a major civil rights lawsuit
that was the culmination of local and national media exposes of the Texas training
schools. Largely on the strength of teenage testimony, the case revealed
widespread abuses of juvenile inmates starkly at odds with the ideal of
rehabilitation. A lightning rod for an emerging social movement for children’s
rights, Morales v. Turman defined juvenile “rehabilitation” as the nurturing of a
“healthy” adolescent identity. It mandated that institutions for delinquents
recognize adolescents as adolescents, and extend the discursive privileges of the
“teenager” to even the most downtrodden outsiders in society. The case resulted
in the closing of the state’s largest and most notorious training schools, the
resignation of top Youth Council officials, and the release of hundreds of juvenile
delinquents.
By the time the Youth Council settled the case, in 1988, a pendulum shift
had begun to take place. Once again, the nation was gripped by panic over
teenage behavior. Unlike the recent past, however, the juvenile justice system
proved unable to offer reassurances. Decades of scandals had nurtured the
perception that juvenile courts were ineffective guardians of public safety, and
that juvenile training schools were stepping stones to prison. States began revising
their sentencing guidelines, making it easier to charge juveniles as adults for a
variety of violent and drug-related crimes. Figuratively and literally “adultified,”
juvenile offenders seemed to have come full circle since World War II. Once
again, adolescent or adult status closely reflected race, class, and urban or rural
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location. The early 1970s appeared as an oasis of treatment in a historical desert
of adult-like punishment.
But the legacy of the children’s rights movement persists in unlikely
places. I met with officials in the Travis County (Austin) Juvenile Court and
Juvenile Detention Center, and observed practices in those facilities, all of which
are described in Chapter Six. Juvenile judges, probation officers, attorneys, social
workers, and other staff workers who spend their days with young people in
trouble clearly grapple with the range of issues surrounding juvenile justice today.
It is clear that “adultification” has formed a central dividing line in the
cultural history of American teenagers that is just beginning to be understood by
scholars. Too often, we have celebrated the twentieth-century idea of the
“teenager” solely as a harbinger of social progress. The history of American youth
sometimes has read like a tale of gradual and inevitable liberation from the hoary
strictures of Victorian schoolmarms, self-appointed protectors of children, and
blue-nosed censors of popular culture. Young people today accept this fallacy as
fact; in my class on the “Cultural History of American Teenagers,” students
initially view their nineteenth-century forbears as victims of history, unlucky
enough to be born into a society too primitive to comprehend their latent wants
and needs. Endowed with transcendent qualities, the “teenager” has papered over
historically unequal coming of age experiences that have persisted despite
innovations designed to protect what were once called “wayward youth”: the
child guidance clinic, the recreation center, the juvenile court, and the juvenile
training school. Today’s “superpredator” is, in many respects, a descendant of the
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“teen-age terrorist” who stalked the pages of newspapers in the 1950s, the “jackroller” who preoccupied interwar sociologists, and the “dangerous classes” that
plagued nineteenth century New York City. Today, Americans rush like they have
not in over a century to imbue adolescent misbehavior with adult intent. As the
historian Joan Jacobs Brumberg observes: “Our children not only dress like adults
and know what we know about sex and human brutality, they are being punished
like adults, especially when they are poor and black.”20 My goal here is to
illustrate how we got so inured to these habits of mind and practice. We must
move beyond the tired categories and debates with which we apprehend youth
problems, and stop seeing “other people’s children” as irredeemable monsters.
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Chapter 1: The Hidden Adolescent: Representing Youth in
American Cultural History

Any treatment of adolescents as if they were adults, whether in the
criminal justice system or elsewhere, marks a significant historical reversal.
According to a range of scholars, the last century and a half has witnessed an
increasingly clear separation of childhood, adolescence, and adulthood in both the
United States and Western Europe. The earliest histories of youth highlighted
what Joseph Kett has called a shift from “independence” to “semi-dependence”
on adults, which occurred gradually and unevenly over several generations.21
Historians generally agree on the series of events that have shaped modern ideas
about childhood and adolescence but disagree about the sequence of cause and
effect. Did lived experiences give rise to cultural ideas, or did emerging theories
of child nurture and psychological stages of development shape everyday
practices of childrearing? Such questions provide an entry point into the crucial
discourses and practices that have framed categories of “normal” and
“delinquent” youth. They also force an examination of how scholars from a
variety of academic disciplines have depicted young people over the past century.
Although a constant presence in American society, children and adolescents
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present the historian with unique methodological problems, which I address in
this chapter’s conclusion.
Today’s stereotypical expectations of adolescence did not exist in the early
years of the American republic. At the dawn of the nineteenth century, when the
United States was still a largely agrarian society, children proceeded on a path to
adulthood that was less routinely conflict-ridden than in our own time. According
to historians of early America, coming of age was not without difficulties that we
would recognize as adolescent “storm and stress:” religious conversion, courtship
and marriage, or parent-child conflicts over family property.22 It is even possible
to detect hints of adolescent rebellion in the famous tales of American icons. At
the age of seventeen, Benjamin Franklin fled to Philadelphia, in defiance of his
father and older brother. In his autobiography, the adolescent Franklin’s “saucy
and provoking” mannerisms and writings smack ever so slightly of youthful
nonconformity, even though such behaviors were hardly normative expectations.
Still, when Franklin credits his brother’s “harsh and tyrannical treatment” of him
with instilling an “aversion to arbitrary power that has stuck to me my whole
life,” he seems to be not only interpreting his youth in the light of the American
Revolution but also offering a somewhat familiar portrait of restless
adolescence.23 Examples of such extreme rebellions were most likely aberrations
in an overall pattern of gradual assumption of expected adult roles in
22
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environments that presented few choices to young people. At the same time, it is
important to note that historians often have based such claims on fragmentary
evidence. Few children possessed the means or the abilities to leave behind
extensive written records of their experiences; by and large, institutions centered
on young people existed on a haphazard basis through much of the nineteenth
century.24
In fact, current historical knowledge about children and adolescents seems
to have grown proportionate to the gradual “discovery” of childhood and
adolescence in the past. The spread of advice literature to the emerging middleclass has provided scholars with a window into changing ideas about childrearing.
A “nurturing” model of parenting, characterized by “sparing the rod” in favor of
instilling a sense of guilt into a wayward child, reflected a growing recognition of
the unique needs of children.25 It also reflected emerging demographic realities;
families headed by a male breadwinner relied less on their children to help
support the household economy, and so began to limit childbirth. Moreover, the
years of schooling became extended as parents sought to position their children to
compete for the new plethora of professional occupations that emerged alongside
industrialization.26
24
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However, the vast majority of nineteenth century children experienced few
of these changes. Family farms continued to rely on their offspring for seasonal
work; migrant families provided too unsettled a life for regular school attendance;
and working-class immigrant families often depended on their children’s wages to
make ends meet in industrial cities. That these practices persisted alongside new
ideals of childhood difference – usually characterized as innocence, vulnerability,
and impressionability – suggests the reasons for the “child saving” reform
movements that swept the nation with growing force toward the end of the
century. In large cities, the disjunction between the lived experiences of workingclass families and new concepts of child nurture and childhood development
appeared in stark relief at the settlement houses. Immigrant families often sought
to keep their children in school even when their wages would have helped support
the household; Jane Addams, who witnessed these daily sacrifices, marveled at
the “wonderful devotion to the child... in the midst of our stupid social and
industrial arrangements.”27 Parents who worked long hours, however, left their
children vulnerable to the many dangers and lures of the streets. At settlements
such as Chicago’s Hull-House and New York’s Henry Street Settlement,
recreational activities attempted to fill the void. Their experiences turned
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settlement workers, most of whom came from middle- or upper-class
backgrounds, into leading agitators for protective legislation for children.
Campaigns to raise the age of consent, abolish child labor, curb child abuse, and
compel school attendance expressed fears that the lures of the industrial city were
ruining children primarily by forcing them into adult situations prematurely.28
Even as the distinction between childhood and adulthood was becoming
clearer, a generation of scientific experts and social reformers were defining
another developmental stage in the life course – adolescence. The arena for this
“discovery” was the juvenile court, an institution that came to embody the ideals
of the Progressive child savers. It offered a solution to the social problem of
juvenile delinquency that was at once orderly, scientific, and compassionate. In its
earliest incarnations, in Chicago (1899) and Denver (1901), the juvenile court
heard cases that included not only violations of criminal law, but also “status”
offenses such as “sexual delinquency,” truancy, and “incorrigibility” – a nebulous
term referring to all manner of disobedient behaviors. Reformers viewed the court
as a much-needed remedy of previous practices, in which youthful offenders were
subjected to trials in adult courts as well as incarceration with hardened criminals
in county jails and state prisons. The juvenile court operated under a unique set of
rules revolving around the idea of diagnosing and treating young people on an
individual basis. Instead of attorneys questioning witnesses before a jury for the
purpose of proving a crime, juvenile judges talked directly to children in court
about the reasons for his or her actions. Social workers produced “life histories”
28
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that assisted the judge in the disposition of cases; ideally, wayward youth could be
kept with their families rather than sent away to a juvenile training school. The
idea was so popular that within twenty-five years, all but two states had
established some form of a juvenile court. Perhaps no other institution besides the
modern high school did more to solidify the distinction between adolescence and
adulthood.29
In Chicago, the juvenile court became an object of study for the first
generation of American sociologists to study the industrial city. Graduate students
at the University of Chicago produced dozens of theses and dissertations
analyzing the characteristics of the juvenile delinquents who passed through the
court.30 In The Gang (1927), sociologist Frederic Thrasher studied the
“disorganized” neighborhoods that nurtured the Americanized children of
European immigrants. Thrasher argued that delinquency was a product of cultural
conflict and the breakdown of traditional authority under the pressure of the
modern city. His colleague Clifford Shaw went further, using juvenile arrest
records to map patterns of delinquency. Shaw worked in the worlds of academia
and juvenile justice; as a juvenile probation officer, he met a Polish teenager
named Stanley who became the subject of his landmark case study, The Jack
Roller (1930). Based on extensive interviews with Stanley, as well as other
personal and court-related documents, Shaw constructed a “life history” told
29

A multitude of histories exist on the juvenile court, some of which will be discussed in this
chapter. The first scholarly history was Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of
Juvenile Delinquency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).
30 Victoria Getis, “Experts and Juvenile Delinquency, 1900-1935,” Joe Austin and Michael Nevin
Willard, eds., Generations of Youth: Youth Cultures and History in Twentieth Century America
(New York: NYU Press, 1998), 20-33.

23

largely in the boy’s own words. The value of this approach, according to Shaw,
consisted of three things:
(1) the point of view of the delinquent; (2) the social and cultural situation
to which the delinquent is responsive; and (3) the sequence of past
experiences and situations in the life of the delinquent.31
Shaw sought Stanley’s “definition of the situation,” a phrase coined by
fellow sociologist William I. Thomas to describe something that could only be
gained by a genuine attempt to understand people whose cultural background,
material circumstances, and individual worldview differed wildly with one’s own.
This ambitious task was not without its share of problems. Stanley not only
misled Shaw on occasion, but also seemed to deceive himself about his own role
in getting in trouble. Nevertheless, Shaw was in the vanguard of social
psychological approaches to the juvenile delinquent, which demanded serious
attention to the lives of individual youth.
Chicago sociologists were among the first scholars to take advantage of
the juvenile court, which provided some of the best documentation of the words
and experiences of young people. Sociologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and
social workers worked both as academics and as social reformers; many of them,
like Shaw, participated in the actual work of the juvenile court. Generations later,
the first scholarly histories of juvenile justice operated under greater constraints.
Scholarly histories of the juvenile court, juvenile justice, and juvenile delinquency
have labored under some of the same difficulties with sources that bedevil
children’s historians. It is relatively easy to gain access to the archived records of
31
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public (and most private) youth agencies, which afford the historian some entry
into the minds of the adults who ran them. Likewise, official meetings, policy
papers, and correspondence seem generally available for researchers. However,
due to rules protecting the privacy of juveniles, it can be virtually impossible to
gain access to individual case files, which often contain notes and transcriptions
from interviews with young people. Some scholars have managed to see such
documents, and so have been able to describe the daily experiences of institutions
through the eyes of children and adolescents. In a broad sense, then, it is possible
to divide the vast body of scholarship on the juvenile court, juvenile justice, and
juvenile delinquency between those who tell the story from a “top down” versus a
“bottom up” perspective.
Published in the late 1960s and 70s, the first histories of juvenile justice
relied almost entirely on official sources. And yet it is clear that they shared
inspiration with the “new social history,” which captivated a generation of
historians raised on the New Left’s valorization of outgroups traditionally
rendered invisible in American history and culture. To describe juvenile
delinquency as an “invention,” as Anthony Platt did in 1969, was to suggest that
juvenile delinquents comprised another historically victimized and ignored social
group. At the same time, he investigated the ideas and theories of Progressive era
experts, in a manner that combined the writerly roles of historian and muckraker.
The flood of scholarship that followed Platt’s book took a similar approach.
Despite its title, Robert Mennel’s Thorns and Thistles: Juvenile Delinquents in the
United States, 1825-1940 (1973) tells us little about juvenile delinquents but a
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great deal about intellectual and institutional responses to delinquency, beginning
with the New York House of Refuge, established in 1825 as the first American
reform school, and ending with the Chicago school of sociology’s published
studies of urban delinquents in the 1920s and 30s. By juxtaposing statistics on
juvenile delinquents with the writings and statements of policy intellectuals,
Mennel is able to draw some conclusions about the changing meaning of the term
“juvenile delinquency.” For generations, it functioned as “a euphemism for the
crimes and conditions of poor children;” by the post-World War II era, however,
the word came to include the petty and drug-related offenses of middle-class
teenagers.32
This more recent usage reflected anxieties about the postwar generation’s
consumption of mass culture, which forms the central premise for James Gilbert’s
study A Cycle of Outrage: America’s Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the
1950s (1986). Focusing not on the workings of juvenile justice but on popular,
expert, and governmental attacks against the culture industry, Gilbert suggests
that public fears were based on a perceived rather than actual rise in delinquency.
Serious juvenile offenses actually rose after the panic of the mid-1950s, while
most of the concern seemed to focus on “status crimes” such as underage
drinking, truancy, breaking curfew, or sexual activity.33 Clearly, the postwar panic
over delinquency stemmed from general anxieties about the decline of traditional
32

Robert M. Mennel, Thorns and Thistles: Juvenile Delinquents in the United States, 1825-1940
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1973), xxvi. Mennel’s book was a summary of his
research for a massive multi-volume anthology of primary documents on the history of children
and youth. See Robert H. Bremner ed., Children and Youth in America: A Documentary History (4
vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970-74).
33 James A. Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America’s Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the
1950s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 68-70.

26

sources of adult authority – “the home, the church, and the school,” as Senator
Estes Kefauver put it in his 1955 report on “comic books and juvenile
delinquency.”34 Mass culture, in Gilbert’s view, became a scapegoat for new and
startling youthful behaviors, tastes, and activities. Gilbert’s study is valuable for
its ability to convey widely shared concerns; however, its broad scope also tends
to smooth over differences in the American population. One wonders if specific
social groups such as African Americans or Southern whites shared in the national
mood about teenagers. Moreover, Gilbert never examines the cultural “texts” that
so outraged defenders of tradition in the 1950s; we generally see them as their
critics did.
Nevertheless, Gilbert’s book broke new ground ploughed further in later
survey-like studies of American youth written for both academic and nonacademic readers. Grace Palladino’s Teenagers: An American History (1996)
celebrates the invention of the “teenager” after World War II. Using largely
commercial and published sources, she argues that increased adolescent autonomy
helped spur larger freedoms, in the realm of both personal choices and civil rights.
Much of the story is told through the lens of market research, as enterprising
advertisers such as Eugene Gilbert, author of Advertising and Marketing to Young
People (1957), discovered legions of young consumers eager to buy products and
leisure experiences that spoke to their special wants and needs.35 A contrasting
interpretation appears in Thomas Hine’s The Rise and Fall of the American
34
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Teenager (1999). Hine uses similar source materials as Palladino to conclude that
the teenager has infantilized young people more than it has liberated them. He
insists that teenagers have chafed at overprotective adults and confining
institutions such as the high school, both of which limit them from realizing their
true intellectual, artistic, and physical potentials. For Hine, a little bit of
“adultification” might be desirable, if not necessary.36
An exception to the scholarship on postwar youth is William S.
Graebner’s Coming of Age in Buffalo (1990), a social and cultural history that is
both theoretically sophisticated and methodologically precise. Relying on
extensive oral interviews with adults who grew up during the 1950s, as well as a
treasure trove of material culture, Graebner captures how teenagers carved out
their own identities through music, fashion, style, and leisure. Teenagers reshaped
the “youth culture” handed to them by national marketers and local community
leaders. In response, city leaders launched campaigns to “engineer” youthful
behavior through sanctioned recreation activities, high school dress codes, and the
use of academic and vocational schools to separate “good” from “bad” kids. In a
study not focused exclusively on juvenile delinquency, Graebner nevertheless
offers one of the more nuanced portraits of it. Teenagers from various social
classes engaged in “dangerous” behavior, but working-class kids received an
inordinate amount of attention.37
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This conclusion mirrors those of histories of juvenile justice that have
managed to gain access to case files. One of the earliest such works, Steven
Schlossman’s study of the Milwaukee juvenile court, argues for the existence of a
“dual system of juvenile justice” as early as the Progressive era.38 A “literal
dumping ground” for youth unable to fit into child guidance clinics, settlement
recreation programs, or supervised probation, the Milwaukee juvenile court
subjected working-class children of immigrants especially to “arbitrary and
punitive authority.”39 The departure of theory from reality, he claims, provided an
illusion that punishment had been abolished. Written in 1977, the book reflects
the influence of court-ordered reforms of juvenile courts and training schools,
striking a muckraking tone that tells us little about how adolescents might have
been “constructed” as adults.
More recently, Mary Odem’s Delinquent Daughters (1995) and Anne
Meis Knupfer’s Reform and Resistance (2002) offer the most complex renderings
yet of Progressive era juvenile justice. Odem uses case files from the Oakland and
Los Angeles juvenile courts to explore battles over sexual behavior between
working-class parents and their daughters. Thanks to age of consent laws, parents
often used the courts to control daughters and punish male partners. Girls told
social workers and juvenile judges a host of reasons for their desire to have sex,
including love, pleasure, a desire to marry, or escape from an undesirable

38

Steven L. Schlossman, Love and the American Delinquent: The Theory and Practice of
“Progressive” Juvenile Justice, 1825-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 3.
39 Ibid., 58.

29

(sometimes abusive) home life.40 Knupfer’s study add an intriguing layer to the
testimonies of adolescent girls, by arguing that they were often “scripted”
according to individual desires. In the 1910s and 20s, girls often unintentionally
framed their “own stories” according to narratives found in story-papers, or
consciously distorted them “to protect a boyfriend, to seek revenge, or to outboast
another girl.”41 Thus it becomes impossible to be certain of the veracity of any
particular narrative of an individual delinquent. Nevertheless, Knupfer finds a
disproportionate number of African American girls in the juvenile court system
from its early years, suggesting a pattern of criminalization still debated today.
Getting at the voices and experiences of young people in past eras, then, is
no easy task. Even case files and archived interviews present challenges, because
they are mediated documents that must be interpreted with caution. Often, private
child-serving institutions kept records in haphazard fashion. For example, during
my research, I discovered that the Houston Child Guidance Clinic regularly had
destroyed its case files as a space-saving policy. Like countless historians, I ran
into several legal barriers erected to protect the privacy of children, which made it
difficult to reconstruct their experiences – my original ambition for this project.
To a certain extent, regardless of sources, historians find themselves taking on the
role of “representing” children and youth.
Lacking the kinds of first-person sources needed to explore the outlooks
and experiences of living, breathing young people, I have instead attempted here
40 Mary E. Odem, Delinquent Daughters: Protecting and Policing Adolescent Female Sexuality in
the United States, 1885-1920 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 38-62.
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to combine some of the approaches described above. The dissertation draws
connections between subjects usually studied separately: scientific theories,
juvenile institutions and programs, and American culture writ large; national,
regional, and local debates about the juvenile delinquent; and the political
economy of juvenile justice with the popular representation of the social problem
of delinquency. Rather than settle for the obvious conclusion that “the” juvenile
delinquent has been a cultural construction, I explore the creation of those images
and narratives, and the social and political purposes they served.
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Chapter 2: Child Mental Health and the Shifting Borders of the
American “Youth Problem,” 1933-1969
In the months after September 11, 2001, one of the few topics unrelated to
international terrorism to elicit significant media coverage was juvenile justice.
Specifically, reporters joined in a growing debate over the propriety of sentencing
children and adolescents as adults for certain crimes. A thoughtful entry into the
discussion appeared in the New York Times Magazine in September 2002.
Alongside a graphic cataloguing the various ages at which states tried juveniles as
adults, novelist Ann Patchett observes that contemporary boundaries of American
adolescence contain “a certain elasticity.” While all manner of commentators now
condemn twelve-year-olds in adult courtrooms, they generally condone
adolescent behaviors exhibited by “grown-ups” as old as forty. “Gone are the
days when we all kept getting older,” she muses trenchantly; “the bar for youth is
now raised with every birthday.”42 Intent on admonishing her adult readers for
their double standard of judgment, Patchett’s essay also suggests that
conventional wisdom increasingly has come to view the life stages of childhood
and adolescence as cultural constructions capable of transcending even the age
categories that long had confined them.
While the seeming certitude of legalistic definitions of “adult” and
“juvenile” has come into question, the distinction between appropriate and
“delinquent” teenage behaviors has become equally unclear. Today, teenagers
find their way into juvenile courts for a number of infractions, the lesser of which
42
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fall into the category of “acting out:” fighting at school, talking about doing
violence, wearing gang colors, possessing illegal substances, and, most often,
violating a probation sentence on an earlier charge. A shorthand for behaviors
ranging from everyday tantrums to violent assaults, the phrase “acting out”
belongs to the jargon of psychiatry and psychology, and highlights their historic
role in defining “normal” and “delinquent” adolescence. Two of the three leading
academic journals devoted to teenagers are dominated by psychological theory; in
the third, the Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, sociologists and
criminologists typically measure or correlate psychologically defined behaviors
against variables such as class, race, gender, or neighborhood.43
To point out the historical importance of psychiatry and psychology is to
echo a long-standing but still growing body of critical scholarship, much of which
studies the broader cultural influences of the sciences of the mind since World
War II. Among historians, the most recent treatment traces the impact of
psychologists and psychological concepts upon national defense strategies, race
relations, and various forms of popular culture.44 Anne Scott MacLeod, a literary
scholar, uncovers traditional gender ideologies modified for teenage girls in the
pages of popular fiction. Cold War era narratives, aimed squarely at a female
“young adult” readership, glorified marriage and motherhood as the most
43
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“healthy” of ambitions.45 Teaching an appropriate gender identity was integral to
the broader notion that identity formation represented the central task of the
adolescent life stage. Even this basic understanding has come under fire in recent
scholarship, particularly cultural studies, which views with skepticism universal
categories of experience such as that of the developmental model of adolescence.
For example, the cultural geographer Stuart Aitken deems childhood and
adolescence “placeless and abstract nouns” that erase the lived experiences of
actual “children and young people.” For Aitken, the association of innocence with
childhood, and wrenching self-discovery with adolescence, represent “moral”
models that skew interpretations of violent incidents such as the Columbine
school shootings. The shocked reaction, he maintains, rested mainly upon the
episode’s setting in a white, upper-middle-class suburb; surely teenagers from this
location could never carry out the ultraviolence generally associated with
nonwhite “superpredators” from the equally stereotyped inner city.46 The value of
these insights lies in their insistence upon subjecting expert claims about young
people to critical scrutiny. Transcendent narratives of adolescent “storm and
stress” flatter the coming of age memories of concerned citizens, often at the price
of clear understanding about the causes and meanings of inscrutable yet
threatening teenage behaviors.
This chapter follows the line of inquiry recently put forth by historian
Kathleen Jones, in her study of the child guidance movement from 1900-1950.
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The words “child guidance” represented both a form of clinical treatment of
troubled youth, and a set of ideas about child development that called for reforms
in childrearing and education. Starting in the 1920s, major foundations and
universities sponsored the opening of child guidance clinics in several American
cities, published an array of childrearing manuals and pamphlets, and dispatched
experts to train child-serving professionals in the recognition and treatment of
various problem behaviors. Jones illustrates the path to professional authority that
began with the focus on “predelinquent” working-class children and ended with
“the everyday child,” who was often middle-class and at less risk for trouble with
law-enforcement. This change in clientele represented a process of popularization
that was more or less complete after World War II. To uncover how child
guidance experts “saturate[d] the culture with notions of child mental hygiene,”
Jones relies on both national publications and a close study of the influential
Judge Baker Clinic in Boston. In the process, she discovers professionals
motivated by both ambition and humanitarianism; parents confounded by and
protective of their children; and descriptions of the “modern child” in need of
carefully managed parenting and education.47
Like Jones’ study, this chapter examines both specific child guidance
institutions and their attempts to popularize a psychological coming of age. The
story’s setting, however, takes place light years away from the usual centers of
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social thought on childhood and youth. It revolves around the establishment of an
unlikely but key hub of “child mental health” for the south and southwestern
United States located at the University of Texas at Austin. The observation that
child guidance came to focus upon nonserious disorders in middle-class young
people was borne out in Texas even as that state became a key site in the struggle
for racial equality. The experts who led the movements for child guidance and
mental health in Texas were former New Dealers who submerged their politics in
well-crafted popularization campaigns that achieved notable successes. To their
work these intellectuals brought a brand of racial liberalism whose limits would
be exposed by the late 1960s but whose place in World War II-era Texas was on
the margins of mainstream political discourse. Mental health reformers engaged
in activities that carried political meanings beyond the therapeutic management of
individual equilibrium, eventually drawing them into that period’s culture wars
over desegregation and the meaning of Americanism.
Where this chapter differs from Jones and like-minded historians is in
their somewhat neat distinction between the discourses surrounding young people
from urban delinquency areas and those from the burgeoning ranks of the postwar
middle-class. Too often the relationship between disparately constructed groups
of young people has received only passing scholarly mention. To Jones’
investigation of the effects upon “normal” middle-class children of psychological
models designed for delinquents and predelinquents, this study asks the reverse
question: What happened to “actual” juvenile delinquents when child guidance
techniques of delinquency prevention left behind the harder-to-treat working-class
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young people of the inner cities for the greener pastures of more manageable
“everyday children?” Did therapeutic innovations penetrate the institutions of the
juvenile justice system, and if so, what did they look like? Subsequent chapters
explore the role of UT-trained adherents of mental health in reshaping juvenile
justice, as well as the work of UT-supported “community action” programs to
curb juvenile delinquency. Such endeavors often popularized an image of the
average delinquent that evoked compassion and sympathy yet stood sharply at
odds with the demography of juvenile offenders. The work of mental health and
child guidance advocates, often unintentionally, enabled the misrepresentation of
juvenile delinquency as a preventable bane of white, middle-class, misbehaving
teenagers. As the variables of class, race, ethnicity, and neighborhood melted
away before a more psychologically constructed teenager, and as the typical faces
in courtrooms and training schools became brown and black, “juvenile
delinquency” and juvenile justice drifted apart. At the sunset of Jim Crow, the
discursive and institutional landscapes surrounding teenagers in trouble became
increasingly separate and unequal.

I. Caste and Class: The Teenage Prism
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“I have moments of real terror,” confided Eleanor Roosevelt in a 1935
essay, “when I think we may be losing this generation.”48 Widely shared, her fears
centered on young males who were both out of school and out of work. The
seriousness of the problem can be gauged in the responses of the New Deal
administration and the growing network of philanthropic foundations, particularly
those that had sponsored the interwar child guidance movement. Through their
combined efforts came the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth
Administration, federal agencies that provided vocational and educational
opportunities for desperate young people and “social laboratories” for academic
intellectuals. Among the most significant research projects were those sponsored
by the American Youth Commission, a creation of the Rockefeller Foundation.
The AYC provided formative political and scholarly experiences for the
intellectuals who went on to revolutionize social thought on young people in
Texas after World War II.
The setting for these experiences was the Depression decade, when young
people – particularly boys - “dropped out” of their prescribed social roles in
numbers that later might have made Timothy Leary envious. Nearly half of the
ten million high school age youth were both out of school and unemployed. Of
that number, a quarter to a half million rode the rails. Government surveys
described a youthful hobo population with a median age of nineteen for white
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males and seventeen for black males.49 Official estimates, often given in broad
ranges, only compounded the perceived danger posed by a large population of
jobless, homeless, uneducated young men.50 Observers commonly imagined them
as an ideal constituency for homegrown fascists. “It is often the depressed,
embittered, or unstable youth who most quickly follows the demagogue,” warned
Homer P. Rainey, who served as the first director of the American Youth
Commission before accepting the presidency of the University of Texas in 1939.
“[H]is maladjustment often leads to delinquency and crime.”51 In the eyes of
several commentators, a “Youth Problem” had emerged with international
dimensions. Wracked by economic depression, most industrial nations contained
a simmering “army of the unemployed” comprised largely of young people. The
military metaphor seemed a likely reality, as American officials nervously eyed
the flocks of young soldiers in emerging fascist states. “In Italy and Germany
youth marches in uniform to martial music,” warned W. Thatcher Winslow, the
assistant director of the National Youth Administration.52 American fears of
violent revolution at home imagined young faces leading the charge.
The association of social disorder with idle young men was hardly
confined to this particular historical moment, nor was it a uniquely American
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phenomenon.53 Consider, for instance, the young troublemakers described in
Edmund Morgan’s now-classic study of colonial Virginia. There, indentured
servitude had served the express purpose of siphoning off an unwanted population
of “masterless men,” mostly young, from England. Soon Virginia too faced a
youth problem of sorts; upon attaining their freedom, servants found themselves
with neither land nor economic opportunity. In Morgan’s hands, these eager
participants in petty crime, frontier violence, and most spectacularly, political
rebellion, appear as incipient juvenile delinquents:
So here they are again, the terrible young men. In old England they slept
in the sun when they should have been cutting... wheat. They bowled in
the streets of Jamestown when they should have been planting corn.
England poured them into Virginia by the thousands, and good riddance.
... [T]hey often offended the community by more than idleness and tax
dodging. They enticed servants to steal hogs with them and feast in the
forest. ... And they gathered at the polls at election time and so upset their
former masters that in 1670 the assembly decided it was unsafe to allow
them to vote.54
In contrast to the frontier’s longtime reputation for lawlessness, the
domesticated countryside became the main site for the rehabilitation of delinquent
youth by the time of the Civil War. The most significant programs aimed to instill
virtuous citizenship in “wayward youth” by placing them with farm families, a
strategy influenced by the Jeffersonian celebration of the yeoman farmer as the
ideal citizen of a democratic republic.55 Scant decades after Jefferson’s death, his
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prophecy about the ills of the industrial city seemed borne out by the young men
who roamed its streets unchecked. Charles Loring Brace, who founded the
Children’s Aid Society in 1852, called them the “ignorant, destitute, untrained,
and abandoned youth... the outcast street-children grown up to be voters, to be the
implements of demagogues, the ‘feeders’ of the criminals, and the sources of
domestic outbreaks and violations of law.”56 Along with his sometime
collaborator Horatio Alger, Brace intervened in the lives of so-called “streetArabs” in a number of ways, notably by sending them to live with farm families.
In “the farmer’s home” were “solid and intelligent” and “naturally generous”
mentors schooled in the virtues of honest work and democratic citizenship.57
Brace’s experiment preceded a series of child saving projects sponsored
by private charities or local governments; until the New Deal, the most significant
federal intervention was the creation of the Children’s Bureau in the Progressive
era. In the forestry camps of the Civilian Conservation Corps, the Roosevelt
administration created a spiritual successor to the Children’s Aid Society.
Thousands of young men aged 16-25 worked on projects of natural conservation,
park maintenance, and monument construction that combined yeoman labor with
scientific training. Enormously popular, the CCC harkened to older associations
of wilderness, hard work, and good citizenship.
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By contrast, the New Deal’s other major youth program, the National
Youth Administration (NYA), sought to change hearts and minds in a more
programmatic fashion. Remembered as a “junior WPA,” the NYA in fact put
forth an early version of the college work-study program. Offering “civil
scholarships” in which vocational labor paid for tuition, the NYA envisioned its
work in the context of an expansive definition of citizenship. The NYA
introduced vocational and citizenship courses to the high school and college
curriculum, and forced reluctant educators at a number of institutions to admit
nonwhite and poor white students.58 One of the more “radical” New Deal
programs, the NYA openly portrayed its mission as “the moral equivalent of
war,” a phrase that recalled the Progressives’ association of citizenship with
service.59 The antidote to the youth problem, NYA planners felt, lay in the
cultivation of a sense of shared sacrifice; to do less was to court disaster. “[A]ny
nation interested in self-preservation,” instructed one pamphlet characteristically,
“must see to it that the young have a proper chance to grow into useful citizens.”60
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The
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productively to inculcating a vague feeling of belonging to America created a
demand for scientific experts versed in the latest theories of childhood and
adolescence. In response, the Rockefeller Fund’s American Council on Education
created the American Youth Commission in 1935. Its mandate was to appraise the
“needs of youth and... the facilities and resources for serving those needs; plan
experiments and programs...; [and] popularize and promote desirable plans of
action through publications, conferences, and demonstrations.”61 The AYC’s
earliest studies continued the centuries-old practice of lumping together
adolescents and young adults as “youth.” For example, an influential monograph
on “the conditions and attitudes of young people in Maryland” identified the lack
of “educational opportunity,” a living wage, and “proper recreation and leisure,”
as problems equally applicable to young adults and adolescents.62 Another study,
which gave a detailed analysis of educational inequality by region, class, and to a
lesser extent race, similarly lacks specific reference to the psychologically defined
adolescent.63 Not until the AYC turned its attention specifically to young African
Americans did it begin to articulate psychological models of adolescent
development.
The inspiration for the AYC’s “Negro Project,” which began early in
1938, seems to have been twofold. In one of the first studies sponsored by the
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AYC, educator Kenneth Holland had discovered “satisfactory” race relations in
integrated CCC work camps. Black youth workers received “the same food,
quarters, clothing, and general privileges” as whites, with little or no protest; like
juvenile delinquency, prejudice seemed a product of a specific environment rather
than an immutable clause in the natural law.64 Integrationist in outlook, the AYC
was sympathetic to constructivist analyses of race, many of which emerged from
Robert E. Park’s sociology department at the University of Chicago.
Interdisciplinary openness encouraged Chicago sociologists to favor cultural
rather than hereditarian analyses of ethnic and racial groups, an approach soon
embraced across the spectrum of social sciences and universities. By the late
1930s, “culture and personality” scholars such as Harry Stack Sullivan, Edward
Sapir, and Karen Horney had demonstrated the utility of a concept of “culture”
that united the fields of cultural anthropology, Freudian psychiatry, and social
psychology.65 Significantly, professors or graduates of the University of Chicago
authored all four major monographs in the AYC series on race. The storied
program also counted among its alumni the AYC director, Homer Price Rainey,
and the associate director for the race project, Robert Lee Sutherland.66
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The AYC books form a substantial portion of what have become known as
the “caste and class” studies of African American culture. Controversial when
published for their sympathetic view of the plight of blacks, these studies left a
controversial legacy that continues to provoke vitriolic debate among scholars.
They were among the earliest scholarly statements of the “damage thesis,” which
described individual blacks as psychologically mutilated and black culture as
pathological. Popularized by Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, the
damage thesis became part of the moral basis for the legal dismantling of
segregation and the creation of remedial social programs. Over the years,
however, the idea proved fluid enough to accommodate enemies of equality.
Political conservatives later would invoke a version of the damage thesis – the
“culture of poverty” – as a rationale for public disinvestment from those same
social programs. By the late twentieth century, social thought had come full
circle; in the recent words of one historian, culture and psychology “had come to
replace biology as a basis for scientific racism.”67
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The historical debate over the caste and class studies has overlooked their
immediate context – the youth crisis of the 1930s. AYC planning documents
suggest an intent to expand the reach of future youth programs rather than to
promulgate a bold new theory of black culture. Indeed, the initial meeting of the
AYC “Negro committee” specified adolescence as “a crucial period for a
study.”68 Robert Sutherland’s preliminary notes described race as a secondary
variable, an “added problem” complicating the presumably universal experience
of adolescent turmoil.69 Sutherland likened young blacks to the children of
European immigrants who had been the subjects of seminal sociological studies
of cultural conflict.70 As the modern city undermined parental controls over
immigrant youth, it hampered the efforts of black families seeking to shield their
children from racist encounters with exclusionary institutions and individual
whites. From this observation, Sutherland hypothesized that myriad forms of
racism distorted adolescence, and envisioned studies of large cities and small
towns situated in different regions of the United States. He hoped a composite
picture would demonstrate a shared “maladjustment from family and peer
relationships, of doing well in school, of finding a balance between work and
play, [and] of working out a personal philosophy that guides their development
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and provides security in time of crisis.”71 Sutherland’s expectations proceeded
directly from his doctoral thesis on Chicago’s black churches, which included an
analysis of the generation gap between black parents from the rural South and
their more streetwise children. Nowhere in the thesis can be found descriptions of
psychological damage or deviant culture; instead, Sutherland details black
neighborhoods ranging from “disorganized” to cohesive, all bounded by “points
of stress” with hostile whites. Keenly aware of variables such as racial succession,
diversity in religious expression, and discrimination, Sutherland sought to expand
the borders of his approach from the city to the nation.72
The AYC monographs eschewed Sutherland’s social psychological
approach in favor of a focus on individual and group psychology. Itself a
developmental concept, the subject of adolescence spurred researchers to view
African Americans of all ages through the lens of pathology. Each book presents
lengthy life histories of individual black teenagers from different class
backgrounds, drawn largely from interviews, field notes, and regional social
survey data. Individual researchers sought to reconstruct the consciousness of
their subjects. E. Franklin Frazier’s research on young blacks in the Mid-Atlantic
States proposed “to discover in the experiences of Negro youth those influences
which have determined their conceptions of themselves as Negroes, their attitudes
toward other Negroes and toward whites, and their attitudes toward the world
71
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about them.”73 In his study of the rural Deep South, sociologist Charles S.
Johnson described “adjustment devices” that helped young blacks function in the
Jim Crow environment. “Masking” tactics, he found, concealed true feelings from
whites while subtly nurturing lowered expectations in young blacks themselves.
Johnson identified a matrix of self-censoring behaviors with “important
implications for the shaping of personality, and for that wholesome integration of
personality and the social world which gives one a sense of adequacy.”74
Emblematic of the effects of public coping mechanisms were private deviant
behaviors, which provided conclusive evidence of the researchers’ shared
hypothesis: Racism inflicted its worst psychological damage during childhood
and adolescence. While this general conclusion still finds support today, it has
been obscured by the monographs’ cartoonish obsession with so-called “deviant”
behaviors. In an oft-repeated example, Allison Davis and John Dollard
characterized the verbal play-jousting known as “the dozens” as “part of the
pattern of free aggressive expression which is characteristic of the lowest
stratum.”75
However misguided were such readings, their authors elsewhere gave
stark illustrations that young blacks in the Jim Crow era faced troubles far beyond
the scope of adolescent “storm and stress.” Children and teenagers consistently
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described low expectations for family, education, employment, and housing.
Some readers concluded that young blacks represented an extreme example of the
social ills that had inspired the New Deal youth programs in the first place.
Dorothy Canfield Fisher, an editor at the Book-of-the-Month Club and a member
of the AYC executive committee, stated as much in her preface to the first edition
of Richard Wright’s Native Son. “Our society puts Negro youth in the situation of
the animal in the psychological laboratory,” she wrote, “in which a neurosis is to
be caused, by making it impossible for him to try to live up to... never-to-be
questioned national ideals, as other young Americans do.”76 Wright’s literary
creation Bigger Thomas represented the fearsome result of a childhood and
adolescence distorted by a racist environment. In fact, it is possible to interpret
much of Wright’s best-known work as a literary mirror of the American Youth
Commission’s studies, particularly in his portrayals of “damaged” black
masculinity. The AYC’s “area studies” drew contrasts between the rural South
and the urban North that complemented Wright’s Uncle Tom’s Children (1938)
and Black Boy: A Study of Childhood and Youth (1945), both set in the rural
South, as well as the Chicago backdrop of Native Son (1940). Moreover, Wright
himself compared the “deep sense of exclusion” felt by African Americans with
the resentments of Russian revolutionaries and Nazi insurgents, much as New
Deal administrators had likened dispossessed youth to incipient political rabble.
These otherwise disparate groups shared a visceral cynicism about the respective
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societies in which they had grown up, suggested Wright, which made violence
seem attractive, even necessary.77
Echoing Wright’s sentiments, Sutherland wrote Color, Class, and
Personality, a summary of the AYC race studies. “From his earliest days,” he
noted, “[the black child] is made to feel different and often inferior.”78 Departing
from the detached scientific prose of his colleagues, Sutherland offered
impressionistic anecdotes that inveighed forcefully against the depredations of
racism. More arresting than the text were the numerous photographs of young
blacks that appeared throughout the book. The presentation style was that of the
“ensemble of words and images,” pioneered by reformist photojournalists such as
Jacob Riis and Lewis Hine, in which photos served a social purpose.79 A leading
anti-child labor activist, Hine had envisioned his work as “social photography,”
an interactive medium in which his photos confronted middle- and upper-class
viewers with the essential humanity of their subjects: child laborers, tenement
families, or steelworkers. Displayed not in galleries but in social reform
publications, his photos appeared alongside text explaining the causes and
solutions to social ills.80 Such was the function of the photographs in Sutherland’s
Color, Class, and Personality, which presented the AYC studies in a shorter
format and rephrased their guarded conclusions in dramatic calls for social action.
Like the Progressive era pamphlets, magazine articles, and books in which Hine’s
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work appeared, Sutherland’s book retained some of the authoritative language of
social science while couching its appeals in terms of individual morality and the
nation’s traditional promise of equality. Color, Class, and Personality thus
anticipated Myrdal’s core argument that the Jim Crow system contradicted the
“American creed” of equal citizenship. Furthermore, the book appealed as much
to the emotions as the intellect by its use of photography.
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Figure 1: Looking inward at a segregated Civilian Conservation Corps work
camp, circa 1938.

Race experts argued that black adolescents suffered self-esteem problems
magnified far beyond those of their white counterparts. Intended to evoke pity,
this photo also suggests a stoic unwillingness to reveal anything for the camera.
Photo: Untitled, Farm Securities Administration (1938). Reprinted in Sutherland,
Color, Class, and Personality (1942).
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Figure 2: “Learning to be Black in a White World” (undated, circa 1940)

The American Youth Commission warned that Jim Crow racism was creating a
generation of angry young black men such as Bigger Thomas, depicted in Richard
Wright’s Native Son (1940). Photo: Untitled, Farm Securities Administration.
Reprinted in Sutherland, Color, Class, and Personality (1942).
Figure 3: Chemistry lab, Howard University, circa 1940

During the Depression, the perception of a “youth problem” prompted
government assistance for higher education. The National Youth Administration
sponsored college work-study programs for white, Latino, Native American, and
African American students. Photo: Untitled. Reprinted in Sutherland, Color,
Class, and Personality (1942).
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Selected from the files of the Works Progress Administration and black
colleges like Howard University and the Tuskegee Institute, the photographs
appear to complement Sutherland’s text. To the contemporary eye, however, they
convey ambiguous messages. Consider, for example, the image of the black
teenager reclining on a CCC cot (figure 1). Facing the title page, this photo
greeted the reader, who was likely an academic, a public official, a philanthropist,
or a journalist. The inclusion of the word “personality” in the title, opposite from
the photo, encourages us to notice the teenager’s pessimistic downward gaze. His
slouched shoulders and the dirt stains on his clothes suggest that at a tender age,
he has grown up “too soon.” Like a grizzled laborer, he can anticipate little in the
way of the self-discovery and identity formation that psychologists and
sociologists already were beginning to associate with adolescence. However, it is
equally possible that this young man’s expression reflects his awareness, even
discomfort, at the fact that he was being photographed. Today it is all too typical
to see teenagers demonstrate their self-conscious angst by refusing to cooperate
with an adult photographer. In this case, the photographer’s status as an “expert”
observer might have injected additional elements of pity or objectification,
exacerbating the desire to maintain a stoic demeanor.
The “tough” exterior becomes a reflection of coping in a later section,
entitled “Learning How to be Black in a White World” (figure 2). Like other
photos, this one shows a black teenager gazing into the distance and away from
the camera. His grimace plays to the reader’s sympathy, far more than might a
photo whose subject confronted the viewer with a direct, angry stare. A more
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optimistic scene appears in the photo of Howard University students working in a
chemistry lab (figure 3). Too engrossed in their studies to pose for the camera,
they seem well on the path to professional careers and “assimilation” to bourgeois
norms. Here was visual evidence for most of the claims of liberal psychologists
and social scientists about black adolescents, as well as youth in general. The
photos illustrate the viewpoints of the New Deal youth programs and the AYC
“race studies,” highlighting the vulnerability and precariousness of adolescence
alongside the “damage” wrought upon young people by racism.
Beginning with cultural and environmental models of juvenile
delinquency, then, the Chicago-trained caste and class scholars arrived at largely
psychological conclusions. They outlined in embryo the tenets that would guide
postwar theories of delinquent subcultures and “deviant” communities of color,
whose characteristics increasingly came to transcend regional and cultural
differences. The flaws of the caste and class project were byproducts of an effort
to discredit lingering hereditarian notions of ethnic and racial inferiority. In
children and adolescents, liberal experts found ideal repositories of a shared
human nature, subject to the whims of culture.81 Here the influence of “culture
and personality” scholars stamped the studies’ reliance upon a theoretical model
of adolescence called “personality development.” The phrase appears in the titles
of three of the four major caste and class monographs.82 Anticipating postwar
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theories of adolescence, personality development marked the ascent of ego
psychiatry over the strict Freudian mode that had guided the field for decades.
Where Freudians studied the conscience (“ego”) torn between an individual’s
inner drives (“id”) and society’s prescribed behaviors (“superego”), ego
psychiatrists sought to manage a smoother adaptation to existing social norms. In
postwar America, the psychology of personality became synonymous with mental
health; avowed practitioners of both fields often measured emotional disorder by
levels of nonconformity. Certain that they had identified unhealthy or maladjusted
young people, AYC personality experts nevertheless labored through problems of
definition – exemplified by the project’s director, Robert Sutherland. In his
summary of the race studies, he described personality as “the organization of the
individual’s traits, habits, and attitudes which determine his social role.”83
Elsewhere, in a sociology textbook that went through several editions in
subsequent decades, he defined the “normal” personality as “one that is not
abnormal.”84
The Jim Crow system was not only unjust; it was pathological, and thus
required psychological solutions. Researchers blamed widespread personality
disorders in the South, among whites as well as blacks, upon the lack of adequate
child guidance and mental health services. In spring 1940, Robert Sutherland
seized an opportunity to address these deficiencies directly. His former supervisor
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and mentor, Homer Rainey, had recommended him to a wealthy Texas
philanthropist interested in launching a major mental health center that could
spread the therapeutic gospel throughout the state. Attracted by the opportunity to
put theory into action, Sutherland migrated to the University of Texas at Austin.
II. Advocacy and Reform of Mental Health Services in Texas
The UT Hogg Foundation for Mental Health was something of an
anomaly: an advocate for psychology and liberal political reform in a state ruled
by a conservative business elite that viewed both as pillars of Communist
subversion. Expatriates from the American Youth Commission helped shape the
early mission of the Hogg Foundation to educate both laypersons and youthserving professionals in the principles of “child mental health.” They often
incorporated specific therapeutic services – clinics, visiting teachers, and
guidance counselors - into “community action” demonstration programs that
mobilized citizens behind general civic improvements. Recreation programs,
family counseling services, even road construction and sewage maintenance
projects, all fell within the rubric of community mental health. Like their
counterparts elsewhere, Hogg Foundation professionals lumped the treatment of
troubled children and adolescents into a more general curbing of social disorder.
The reasons were partly strategic; scientific experts ensconced in northern and
northeastern academies produced findings that supported controversial social
reforms, most notably school desegregation. In Texas, such conclusions provided
ammunition for right-wing activists, who spun far-fetched conspiracy theories
about the subversive intentions of mental health experts. Their primary offense,
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however, was not open advocacy for racial integration, but an implicit suggestion
that middle and upper class white children also suffered personality disorders
caused by bad parenting, second-rate teaching, and collective hypocrisy.85
The Hogg Foundation was born amidst bitter political conflict in Austin.
UT president Rainey’s input into the fledgling foundation’s direction came
between trading salvos with the conservative tycoons and managers who sat on
the board of regents. The regents had demanded that Rainey fire professors for
such offenses as teaching the works of John Dos Passos or attending labor union
rallies. His staunch defense of academic freedom resulted in Rainey’s dismissal in
1944. Several “liberal” professors also were fired; one regent complained that
“the teaching of social work at UT... would make socialists.”86 Sutherland and
another former AYC staffer, folklorist Harry Estill Moore, escaped this fate but
surely learned to tread carefully around touchy social and political subjects. There
would be no open denunciations of racial inequality forthcoming from the pens of
Hogg Foundation researchers.
Robert Sutherland was both a skilled diplomat and an unconventionally
down-to-earth intellectual. Potential adversaries found themselves quickly
disarmed by his “folksy” and “friendly” manner. A typical day for Sutherland
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began before dawn with a visit to Maudie’s Cafe, where he would pore over notes
from various ongoing research projects. Immediately after sunrise, Sutherland
would retreat to “The Hill,” an acre of forest he had purchased in west Austin.
There he would dictate and write in a small work space dubbed his “outhouse.”
Lengthy discussions with colleagues on the issues of the day took place while
Sutherland cooked bacon and eggs over a campfire. If not an outright bohemian,
then, Sutherland adapted well to the laid-back atmosphere of Austin and proved
“able to interact with all kinds.”87
That Sutherland and Moore endured at all was due in no small measure to
the patronage of the prominent Hogg family, which counted among its ancestors a
Confederate captain and an admired state governor. By the late 1930s, the
family’s oldest daughter Ima administered an estate that had been enlarged
considerably by an oil strike on family property. Their newfound wealth enabled
the Hoggs to become philanthropists. “Miss Ima’s” choice to endow a major
mental health initiative stemmed in part from her own emotional breakdown over
a decade earlier. The vogue of psychoanalysis that had swept through the elite
circles of several American cities had missed Texas, forcing her to seek treatment
elsewhere. In Philadelphia, she discovered the virtues of clinical therapy and met
activist professionals from the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, a group
advocating the replacement of large custodial institutions for the incurably insane
with community-based clinics for “treatable” patients.88 In the 1920s, the NCMH
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launched a series of demonstration child guidance clinics, including one in Dallas
that opened in 1927. Impressed by the project’s results, Hogg launched the state’s
second child guidance clinic two years later in her hometown of Houston.89
Throughout the 1930s, the clinic struggled to stay afloat financially,
forcing Hogg to mount perpetual fundraising drives. Prospects dimmed not only
due to the Great Depression but because likely donors did not share Hogg’s
enthusiasm for child guidance. Worse yet, the clinic served poor and traditionally
despised populations; about half of its initial referrals came from settlement
homes, orphanages, and juvenile courts.90 Fundraising appeals quickly adapted to
this situation by replacing abstract neo-Darwinian language with more specific
claims of contributing to social order. For example, an early fundraising letter
described the clinic’s mission as one of “making the rising generation more fit;”
subsequent letters simply described the clinic’s business with the shorthand
phrase “delinquency prevention.”91 The irony of this rhetorical shift is that it
accompanied a sharp drop in the number of referrals from the local juvenile
court.92 In child guidance literature, prevention meant less the treatment of actual
juvenile delinquents than therapeutic intervention before adolescence. The
treatment of “predelinquents” merely shifted the logic of the juvenile court
movement down the developmental ladder; if adolescents were more “curable”
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than adults, perhaps children might be reached even more readily.93 In any case,
the clinic’s initial impact on the city appears to have been negligible, as was its
effect upon statewide awareness of child guidance and mental health.
Along with the advent of the Hogg Foundation, the coming of World War
II injected new life into the Houston child guidance project. An oft-described
watershed moment for psychology and psychiatry, the war years afforded clinics
the opportunity to expand their client base to include traumatized soldiers and
their families. Shellshocked war veterans, work-weary factory laborers, and
unsupervised children began to share space on the Houston clinic’s increasingly
crowded docket. By spring 1943, the clinic and the Hogg Foundation had
contracted with the Army to study 211 Texas soldiers discharged with
“neuropsychiatric disorders;” in Dallas’ Highland Park Methodist Church, Hogg
Foundation experts gave preventive counseling seminars to military chaplains.94
Long waiting lists and perennial staff shortages, overlooked before the war, now
galvanized efforts to improve upon the state’s paucity of trained specialists in
psychiatry, psychology, and social work. No graduate school of social work
existed in the state’s public universities until the University of Texas at Austin
opened one in 1950, culminating a decade and a half of agitation by the Texas
Conference of Social Welfare, a group comprising those social workers who
either lacked proper training or had obtained their academic degrees elsewhere.95
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Armed with the more official-sounding title of “Bureau of Mental
Hygiene,” the Houston clinic contributed to the professionalization effort. It cosponsored and provided internship opportunities for a professional development
program in mental health that was designed by the Hogg Foundation and
conducted at the University of Houston (UH). In the fall semester of 1944,
Houston-area schoolteachers began what amounted to educational psychology
classes, accredited by both UT and UH.96 Lecturers from as far away as
Sutherland’s alma mater, the University of Chicago, introduced students to the
concept of personality development and detailed the signs of emotional
disturbances. In the course entitled “Mental Health Skills of the Teacher,”
educators practiced responding to hypothetical “classroom situations” ranging
from mild disobedience to serious violence. A theoretically oriented course, “The
Mental Health of Human Development,” explored the four developmental stages
encompassing the years of one’s education: preschool, childhood, adolescence,
and young adulthood. Other courses devoted to the “exceptional child,” teacher,
family, and returning soldier, seemed to anticipate the postwar expansion of
American education, from primary and secondary schools to undergraduate and
graduate programs at universities.
The Houston program was one of many inaugurated by the Hogg
Foundation, which by war’s end articulated its mission in expansive terms.
“Everywhere,” wrote Sutherland in 1945, “there are basic problems of human
the Lake College in San Antonio offered an MSW degree before 1950, and Sutherland had helped
initiate that program.
96 The subsequent discussion draws from two curriculum guides, both dated 1944-1945: “InService Training Courses for Teachers” and “Educational Courses.” Hogg Papers.
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relationship. They appear in the growing-up difficulties of children, in the quest
for harmony within families, in the conflict between social and economic groups,
and in the personal failure and maladjustment of some adults.”97 So intent on
spreading this message was Sutherland that he became “a circuit-riding preacher
for mental health,” crisscrossing the state by automobile for several years to
deliver talks to audiences large and small.98 Under the Hogg Foundation banner,
Sutherland sent UT professors into small towns and cities throughout the state to
lecture on mental health to local chapters of the Rotary Club, the Junior League,
the Chamber of Commerce, the Parent-Teacher Association, and the Young
Men’s and Women’s Christian Associations. A “demonstration program” brought
guidance counselors to El Paso’s junior and senior high schools. Another project
trained counselors for North Texas State College. The foundation sponsored
mental health workshops for teachers in San Antonio, Houston, Alpine, San
Marcos, Kingsville, Denton, and Austin. Renowned speakers occasionally gave
these presentations. E. Franklin Frazier addressed black collegiate audiences in
Galveston and Austin in 1946; Margaret Mead lectured on the state of the
American family to the Dallas Council of Social Agencies and the Houston
Family Service Bureau in 1948.99 In its first decade and a half of existence, the
foundation sponsored over two hundred lecturers and reached “well over a million
people.”100
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Occasionally such endeavors forged unlikely interracial and inter-ethnic
cooperation, suggesting an inclusive model of “community mental health” that
undoubtedly reflected Sutherland’s racial liberalism. The Hogg Foundation
became closely involved with the program of the West Side Community House, a
settlement house opened in Austin’s black Clarksville neighborhood in 1945. Run
by and for African Americans, the house offered marriage and parenting classes, a
well-baby clinic, daycare, a preschool, an afterschool program, and job training
for teenagers. Photos from its 1949-1950 program emphasized “inter-racial
goodwill,” displaying white UT volunteer workers, Hogg Foundation consultants,
and day-to-day activities of various programs.101 Another intriguing program sent
UT speech therapist Jesse J. Villereal to Houston and Beaumont several times
between 1944-1954. There he led clinics for special education teachers, health
officials, and parents on speech and hearing disorders.102 His impact on largely
Anglo audiences seems to have been profound. “Now I can see that there is
something to this speech correction work and that it needs a trained person,”
admitted an impressed Houston assistant superintendent to reporters. Villereal
“opened the eyes of many,” effused one parent in a letter to Sutherland.103
By the late 1940s, the foundation’s public relations campaign began to
give way to institution building activity. In 1948, Sutherland founded the
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Conference of Texas Foundations and Trust Funds, an umbrella organization that
facilitated communication between professionals and philanthropists. Its main
event was an annual meeting of representatives from government agencies,
national foundations, community groups, and research universities. Federal
agency heads, renowned experts, and state governors regularly delivered keynote
addresses and held sessions on public policy. Programs featured interdisciplinary
panels, often with physical and biological scientists alongside their counterparts in
the “soft” sciences, discussing the politics and uses of foundation monies. By
1956, the organization had grown large enough to become the Conference of
Southwest Foundations, a reflection of both the increasing number of
philanthropic foundations in the region and Sutherland’s ability to unite them in a
network of professional reform.
Sutherland envisioned the Hogg Foundation as a regional version of the
Rockefeller or Carnegie foundations. Accordingly, its educational priorities
shifted from small community-based workshops to graduate research and
education at UT. To attract top students, the foundation supported research with
modest “seed” grants that ideally would attract much larger funds from national
foundations. By 1958, the foundation devoted half of its budget to academic
research, fellowships, salary supplements to attract “outstanding” faculty to UT,
and travel scholarships. That same year, Hogg grant recipients parlayed $80,000
in startup funds into over a million dollars worth of grants from the Department of
Education, the National Science Foundation, and the National Institute of Mental
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Health. The strategy yielded seventeen full fellowships from the National
Institutes of Health that year, compared to none only a few years earlier.104
On the public policy front, the Hogg Foundation played a leading role in
statewide mental health reforms. It lobbied on behalf of the first bill to allocate
state funds to community mental health clinics (1957), and another that created
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (1964). A key
moment in the political debate over the 1957 bill was the appearance of
psychiatrist William Menninger before a joint session of the Texas legislature.
Menninger was a personal friend of Robert Sutherland and had served on the
Hogg Foundation advisory board. More importantly, he was probably the most
well known American psychiatrist in the 1950s and a leading advocate for the
replacement of large institutions with outpatient clinics in the treatment of the
mentally ill. Menninger’s speech, entitled “Brains Before Bricks,” was nearly
identical to one he had given two years earlier at a Conference of the Southwest
Foundations meeting.105 Increase the number of trained psychiatric social
workers, he urged legislators, rather than build annexes on crumbling asylums,
and Texas could offer cheaper, efficient, and more humane treatment to the
mentally ill.106 His speech garnered “wild applause” from legislators and
newspaper editors.107
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This success story implies a general departure from the issues of children
and adolescents, the original client base and justification for the field of mental
health. In the postwar era, young people became symbols for the problems with
existing institutions as well as the hopes of reformers. Only in the pages of
research monographs did the Hogg Foundation direct attention specifically to
“youth problems.” In a series of studies executed in the late 1950s and early
1960s, Hogg researchers combined the quantitative methods of postwar sociology
with the theories of ego psychiatry. Studies of “normal” children provoked
controversy among parents uncomfortable with methods normally reserved for
“deviant” groups. Meanwhile, a major study of Mexican, Mexican American, and
Anglo teenage boys attempted but failed to live up to its ambitions to be a truly
“cross-cultural” comparison. Both endeavors grappled with Cold War politics and
the all-encompassing standard of the “normal” middle-class white teenager.
III. Constructing the “Normal” and “Deviant” Teenager
During World War II, the Hogg Foundation had functioned as a state
clearinghouse for published materials on juvenile delinquency. It had
disseminated pamphlets with titles like “Preventing Wartime Delinquency,” “Our
Kids Are In Trouble,” and “Schools to the Front – In Delinquency Prevention.”108
Echoing the Depression-era youth problem, the wartime delinquency scare
highlighted troubled teenagers who would otherwise be middle-class. While
government officials warned of ever-increasing teenage crime, mental health
experts more optimistically described it as a temporary problem easily solved
108
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with psychologically informed social engineering. By the end of the war,
Sutherland stated as much, calling delinquency a “periodic” concern and implying
that faddish worries about teenagers would fade with expected postwar prosperity.
Furthermore, the inclusion of mental health principles in schools, recreation
programs, marriage and parenting classes, and community clinics represented
long-term delinquency prevention. “[G]eneral mental health knowledge and
education” stood a better chance of effecting change, sniffed Sutherland, than “a
passing interest” in juvenile delinquency.109
The study of personality development further drew the Hogg Foundation
toward the internal dynamics of adolescence rather than the social and
interpersonal conflicts that “damaged” young people. In a singular example of this
emphasis, UT professor of human relations and sometime Hogg Foundation
researcher Carson McGuire joined Erik Erikson on a panel entitled “Crucial
Conflicts in Personality Development in Youth and Young Adulthood” at the
Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth. The occasion
marked Erikson’s first significant public statement of his influential concepts of
identity formation and diffusion, which McGuire built upon by describing the
“positive psychological independence” that teenagers drew from peer groups.110
McGuire went on to advise the foundation’s first major research project on young
people, the Texas Cooperative Youth Study, which involved nearly thirteen
thousand high school students and a team of thirty researchers. The study’s
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principal investigator, Bernice Milburn Moore, was a longtime advisor for
community projects funded by the Hogg Foundation. Moore and UT psychologist
Wayne Holtzman designed attitude scale tests in which questions were broken
into fourteen categories measuring young people’s feelings about American
society, schoolteachers, parents, and peers. Additionally, the scales attempted to
tease out personal characteristics such as authoritarianism, conformity, level of
self-esteem, and resentment of “dependency” upon adults. Moore then correlated
the results with social survey data on the family and household, a method
common in postwar social scientific research. To quantify shared attitudes and
psychological traits into a composite portrait, thought leading academic experts,
was to explain the workings of the “social structure.” Often this approach yielded
self-evident conclusions celebrating the behaviors of successful groups and
individuals as “well-adjusted,” and characterizing the resentments and pessimistic
outlooks of others as signs of psychological “maladjustment.”111
Such unexamined assumptions saturated the Texas youth study. Its main
thesis was that families “remain the major agents in the socialization of the young
and... the paramount institution in society for the transmission of culture.”112
While this statement was hardly controversial in a society that relentlessly
valorized the nuclear family, it was accompanied by data tables that suggested
children with two working parents suffered no less than those headed by a male
breadwinner.

However, this qualification squared easily with the study’s
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conclusion that the most “healthy” teenagers came from families in which both
parents had achieved high levels of education and occupational status. The
substitution of “status” and “income” for “class” expressed an aversion to social
conflict, even in a chapter devoted to the outlooks of African American and
Mexican American teenagers. Overly optimistic descriptions of the eradication of
racial inequality “well under way” not only belied the bitter persistence of school
segregation but also encouraged pathologizing analyses of data from teenagers of
color, as well as working-class whites.113 Here the contrast with the American
Youth Commission caste and class studies is instructive. Where pessimistic
expectations for adulthood, negative views of “society,” and suspicions of adult
authority once had inspired criticisms of social inequality, here they simply
reflected individual and group “maladjustment” to easily attainable and
presumably desirable middle-class and implicitly white norms. Thus high
delinquency rates among these groups reflected not structural racism or class
inequality but families “broken” by divorced or poorly educated parents.114
However much the study seemed to comport with the dominant consensus
on the causes of racial inequality in Texas, it nevertheless provoked angry
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reaction in at least one major city. The controversy that erupted in May and June
1959 over the Houston Youth Study was largely an artifact of ultraconservative
politics. By the late 1950s, Houston had become a center for an “anti-mental
health movement” led by John Birchers and self-described “Christian
anticommunists.” The local far right controlled a majority of seats on the Houston
school board, where massive resistance to school integration competed for
attention with purges of “reducators” and “subversive” textbooks. Against this
backdrop, a survey questionnaire circulated among high school students that
asked pointed questions about taboo subjects such as sex, race relations, social
class, adult authority, and patriotism. Additionally, the study’s authorship bore the
twin stigmas of the outside agitator and the large, yet shadowy, liberal
bureaucracy.115
The official sponsors of the Houston Youth Study were the American
Institute of Research, the Hogg Foundation, and the Child Welfare Section of the
Houston Community Council.116 These three agencies later became easy targets
for ultraconservatives. Housed at the University of Pittsburgh, the AIR fit neatly
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into conspiracy theories about Northern liberal intellectuals scheming to turn the
South’s white children against their parents. Similarly, at least one far-right
newsletter dubbed the Hogg Foundation “an institution noted for its assistance to
left-wing movements.”117 The Houston Community Council, meanwhile, was torn
with factional struggle after the controversy broke out. Its wealthy benefactors
and their wives (some of whom sat on the school board) opposed the release of
the test data, which had been collected by the social workers, academics, and
clinicians who served on the Council’s Child Welfare Section. Further angering
conservatives, the committee that coordinated the survey seemed a false veneer of
local control concealing puppet-masters from afar.
The study committee’s statement of purpose indirectly evoked the national
crisis in education that had surfaced after the 1957 Soviet launch of Sputnik. It
cited “the great loss to society of the countless thousands of youth who fail... to
realize their full capacities for learning and achievement.” Lest critics think the
investigators sought to isolate the South or invoke regional stereotypes, the
statement included “national and regional” borders, and both “gifted youth” and
“delinquents.” Furthermore, the study “combat[ed] juvenile delinquency on a
community-wide level.” Student test-takers found in their booklets repeated
assurances of anonymity whose conspicuousness suggested an awareness that
researchers had ventured in politically treacherous territory.
The survey included only one section testing scholarly aptitude: a
vocabulary quiz. The AIR contributed two sections, one in which students listed
117
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their preferred occupations and leisure activities, and another that measured
personality scales for desirable traits like assertiveness, sociability, and selfreliance. None of this material drew public criticism. The Youth Attitude Scales
section, lifted nearly verbatim from the Texas Cooperative Youth Study, drew the
lion’s share of attention. Researchers had viewed this section as potentially
shedding unique light on student struggles to make good grades, while opponents
singled out the intrusiveness of the questions. Defenders of the study explained
the ten attitude scales based on student responses to “personal” statements as
responding to “the urgent need for more scientifically sound information dealing
with how youth feel about themselves, their families, schools, and associates.”118
The objections to the test were both more numerous and expressed in
common sense language. For one thing, the booklet required significant school
time to complete; indeed, the vocabulary section alone included over three
hundred multiple-choice questions. The student information section asked for
schedule data on family income, school attendance, religion, housing, gender, age,
household size, race and ethnicity, health, and future plans for education. The
Youth Attitude Scales section asked students to agree or disagree with a series of
statements, a sampling of which appears below:
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Most teachers are too rigid and narrow-minded.
A person should insist on his rights no matter what.
In spite of what some people say, life for the average person is getting
worse, not better.
We ought to worry about our own country and let the rest of the world
take care of itself.
Housekeeping in our house is disorderly.
My parents rarely go to church.
I am never able to discuss problems confidentially with either of my
parents.119
Such interrogatories outraged conservative parents and school activists.
They imagined ninth-graders as existing somewhere between childhood
innocence and adolescent awareness, unsuitable subjects for suggestions more
likely to appear in film noir than a school survey. So impressionable were their
children, insisted some parents, that the barest exposure to critical viewpoints was
more likely to encourage rather than forestall delinquency. But the strongest
objections were to the survey’s perceived invasion of privacy. “It seems that no
family skeleton is safe from the sociologists anymore,” sighed an editorial in the
Houston Chronicle.120 Opposition along these lines reached a boiling point shortly
after the testing took place, when several dozen parents organized against the
release of the test data. They appeared at a televised session of the school board,
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where they joined right-wing members in denouncing the study and demanding
the destruction of its results.121
The anger perhaps reflected resentment at intrusive social scientists, an
inappropriate waste of school time, or the parading of adult cynicism before
vulnerable young minds. But another explanation obtains, one that went unstated
throughout the controversy: The youth attitude scales section included a set of
questions about prejudice, which surely touched a nerve, given that integration
had galvanized bitter resistance from Houston whites. These entries asked
students to describe their feelings toward “Anglos and Latins,” the elderly, and
the mentally ill. Mentioned specifically in neither official reports nor mainstream
newspaper articles, the questions appear only in the test booklet retained in the
Hogg Foundation’s historical archives.122 It seems unlikely that the Houston
school board could have been unaware of the expert consensus holding prejudice
as a psychological disorder, given the prominent support for desegregation among
mental health experts. Indeed, the lone board member to cast a vote in support of
the study, Hattie Mae White, was also its only African American member. Several
times in the late 1950s and early 1960s, White dissented from school board plans
to delay integration. In an unexpected irony, a study whose results papered over
ugly desegregation battles had incited anger for its perceived integrationist
sympathies, with its only defender an eyewitness to massive resistance tactics.123
Indeed, the Houston brouhaha seems a likely explanation for the evasive
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discussion of race in Tomorrow’s Parents. Experts who viewed prejudice as a
psychological component of a backward “authoritarian personality” surely felt
vindicated when the Houston Youth Study’s local chairperson bowed to pressure
by burning the test data in front of reporters. When one child welfare expert
characterized the incident as “book burning” by anti-intellectual zealots, he likely
spoke for most of the study’s architects.124
A quite different reaction greeted the 1969 publication of Delinquency in
Three Cultures, a study of teenage boys in Monterrey, Mexico, and San Antonio,
Texas. An advertisement touted the book as a pioneering cross-cultural study that
promised to explain the causes of delinquency among teenagers from the “culture
of poverty.” Indeed, its authors included American professors of psychology and
sociology, and a lawyer and sociologist from Mexico City. But Delinquency in
Three Cultures attracted almost no critical attention within the relevant
disciplines, and seems to have made no discernable impact on social policy. A
lone review in the American Journal of Sociology panned it as a disorganized
mess; to its concluding suggestion for “multi-factor approaches” to delinquency,
the reviewer replied: “One hopes this call will be resisted.”125
Delinquency in Three Cultures was based on data gathered in 1959-1961,
from teenage boys aged 13-17. The boys were broken into three ethnic groups,
hence the “three cultures:” Mexican boys in Monterrey; Mexican American boys
in San Antonio; and Anglo boys in San Antonio. All of the boys came from
working-class neighborhoods. Researchers located half of the boys through the
124
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local juvenile court, the other half through the neighborhood high school.126
Rosenquist, who was the principal investigator, decided early on that individual
interviews were “too difficult.” He lacked an adequate number of Mexican
American research assistants, and in any case, he felt that the boys’ “lack of
verbal facility,” short attention span, and “natural” defensiveness and dishonesty
rendered interviews too expensive and time-consuming.127 Instead, he substituted
standardized intelligence and psychological tests that could yield “objective,
readily quantifiable sets of data” cheaply, efficiently, and consistently.128
Compounding this curbing of methodology to suit existing skills and
expectations, the tests were administered by bilingual Anglo students from UT –
hardly a formula for inspiring trust in Mexican and Mexican American informants
given the fractured history of Anglo-Mexican relations in Texas.
Rosenquist’s shortcuts around language barriers undermined the validity
of even these tests.129 For example, the research design included the use of
Wechsler intelligence scales for children (ages 11-15) and adults (ages 16-up);
however, only the children’s version was available in Spanish. Rather than simply
pay someone to translate the adult scales, Rosenquist used the Spanish children’s
test and the English age-graded tests, which inevitably resulted in skewed
comparisons between the “cultures.” A similar problem surfaced during
administration of the Card Sort Test, in which boys read statements printed on
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140 cards, then wrote either “true” or “false” on the reverse side. Some of the
boys could not read in either language, and so research assistants read each
statement aloud and dutifully took down responses, a practice that defeated the
aim of eliciting the boys’ unfiltered views by having them complete the exercise
alone. A majority of the Mexican and Mexican American “delinquent” boys
expressed a general disrespect for adult authority, particularly their fathers. That
the study deemed these “expected” results of “disorganized families” only added
to the sense of a set of premises comprising a self-fulfilling prophecy.130
Given the above circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Cartoon
Test received extensive use (see figure 4). Here the boys viewed cartoon images
gauging their impressions of how their parents might react to troubling teenage
behaviors. For example, one cartoon features a faceless boy holding a burning
cigarette behind his back while confronting his father; the caption reads “What
Does the Father Say?” The boys filled in an empty word balloon above the father.
A separate panel offered an identical exercise for boys to relate or speculate on
their mothers’ reactions. Overlooking the possibility that visual cues as well as
language might provoke distinct readings from the boys apart from their
“delinquent” qualities, Rosenquist thought this test “well-suited to cross-cultural
studies.”131 This test yielded the uncontroversial claim that fathers were “crucial
agents of socialization” for boys across cultural boundaries.132 It further found
that the parents of nondelinquent boys were more likely to explain the reasons for

130

Ibid., 304-307.
Ibid.; the book reproduces the cartoon tests on pp. 310-328.
132 Ibid., 331-333.
131

78

household rules, while the fathers of delinquent boys (especially Mexicans and
Mexican Americans) meted out immediate and harsh punishments without
explanation.
Figure 4: Cartoon Test, Delinquency in Three Cultures (1969)
The Hogg Foundation sponsored this study in the hopes of publishing a
groundbreaking intervention in cross-cultural comparisons of juvenile
delinquents. However, the study relied on standardized tests such as this one,
limiting it to well-worn results.

As if these conceptual problems were not enough, Rosenquist further
compromised the study by losing much of his data – the “individual protocols” during a move from Texas to California. The Hogg Foundation was left with only
aggregate responses and no certainty of publishable results. Years later, the
foundation hired UT psychology professor Edwin Megargee to finish the
manuscript. Megargee’s credentials included a stint as a clinical psychologist at
79

the California Youth Authority, a state agency that worked with juvenile
delinquents. The remaining data limited Megargee to comparisons of the
aggregate results for the “delinquent” and “non-delinquent” groups from each of
the prospective “three cultures,” rendering the study “correlational” rather than
cross-cultural.133 Forced to draw comparisons of faceless numbers that he did not
compile himself, Megargee struggled to locate the study in the academic literature
of delinquency. Indeed, the book’s literature review and conclusion sections offer
a hodgepodge of existing theories without clearly connecting them to the “three
cultures.”
Megargee contended that the “northeastern” bias of scholarly models had
constructed universal theories that overlooked differences between “the punk in
Boston... pachuco in Phoenix... Teddy Boy in London... Thunder Boy in Tokyo...
Halbstorken in Berlin... Stiryagi in Moscow.”134 This list implied an intent to
borrow from the “area study” and its emphasis on regional cultures; however,
“culture,” in the hands of this essentially cliometric study, meant only the fact of
ethnicity, residence, and national identity. It hypothesized that the Anglo boys
would resemble “typical” white teenagers elsewhere; “Latin” boys would fit
Chicago-school models of cultural conflict, most recently updated in Albert
Cohen’s “delinquent subculture” and Robert Merton’s “anomie;” and Mexican
boys would present a brand new paradigm.135 Yet this premise was nowhere in
evidence in Megargee’s analyses of even the available data. For example, he
133
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found that lower socioeconomic status correlated with higher delinquency among
Anglos but not the other two groups. In fact, the opposite obtained for Mexican
American and Mexican delinquent boys, whose parents tended to be better
educated and hold “higher status” occupations. But Megargee made nothing of
this information except to note its “inconsistency” with other studies.136
Instead of highlighting such anomalies, Megargee resorted to the brand of
universal theorizing that he earlier had purported to contest. He found the
“delinquents” from all three groups to be products of the pathological “culture of
poverty,” and even claimed to discover a near-identical “culture of delinquency.”
Megargee cited the inability to defer gratification, the lack of “an intact home or
parents,”

and

lowered

expectations

for

the

future,

as

overlapping

characteristics.137 These conclusions were based upon suspect and even
contradictory data, but they comported closely with the prevailing opinion of
social scientists and national policymakers.
Another important consequence of the missing data was the absence of
significant qualitative evidence; compelling anecdotes were relegated to a single
appendix section hundreds of pages into the book. This feature proved a
shortcoming that rendered the study out of date by the time of its publication.
During the extended period between the research and publishing phases of the
study, social scientists had begun to emphasize more ethnographic methods over
strictly quantitative approaches to the human condition. By the late 1960s, selfstyled “urban anthropologists” were producing monographs based upon lengthy
136
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participant-observation in ghettos and barrios, much as cultural anthropologists
studied so-called “primitive” tribal cultures in Third World countries. Although
theories of pathology distorted their interpretations, they signaled a return to the
ethnographic methods of interwar social science, as well as a growing desire to let
their subjects speak for themselves. In this intellectual climate, Delinquency in
Three Cultures was a relic of a discarded methodological past.
Conclusion: “Personality” and Historical Change
During the Great Depression, the nation was swept by a fear of young
people displaced by economic disaster. Policymakers defined a “youth problem”
by the lack of educational and economic opportunity afforded to working- and
middle-class, as well as African American adolescents. At the same time, social
scientists at the American Youth Commission discovered that adolescents were
especially vulnerable to emotional damage, illustrating this point by looking at the
most extreme examples available – young blacks in the American South. They
isolated adolescence as a time of “personality development,” a time of maturation
into the rational adult citizen. Unintentionally, the “caste and class” studies
introduced a scientific discourse of “development” that linked childhood with
impoverishment and adulthood with modernity, resulting in decades of inquiry in
which entire communities, ethnic and racial groups, and even nations were
portrayed as childlike. Only expert guidance could lead them from the premodern
wilderness of their collective childhoods. This connection was made clearer in
community efforts to “end” delinquency and poverty, the subject of the next
chapter.
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After studying the South from a distance, Robert Sutherland decided to
take an active role in modernizing social services in the region. At the Hogg
Foundation for Mental Health in Texas, he popularized the idea of “community
mental health,” helped legitimize academic departments of social work, and
expanded the financial resources for social services and related research. Mental
health built much of its reputation on the movement for child guidance clinics and
their shared claim to prevent juvenile delinquency. The presumed innocence of
children made the vulnerability of adolescents seem all the more urgent,
especially with the expansion of the middle-class and the baby boom after World
War II. These social changes heralded important shifts in the ways mental health
experts defined youth problems. Where once Robert Sutherland had detailed how
economic distress or Jim Crow racism could disrupt an individual’s coming of
age, or “personality development,” the Hogg Foundation’s study of Texas high
schoolers in the 1950s located adolescent unhappiness in the turbulence of the life
stage itself, or in family dysfunctionality. Even this seemingly quintessential
Fifties analysis produced controversy; middle-class parents in Houston disliked
the implication that they and their children might suffer from symptoms of
pathology, and embraced right-wing conspiracy theories about the field of mental
health.
The Hogg Foundation’s two major studies of youth reflected the growing
national obsession with psychological explanations for teenage misbehavior. In
the guise of “culture,” similar modes of analysis categorized working-class and
nonwhite young people as “pathological” – a logical but hardly inevitable
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descendant of earlier diagnoses of the “damage” wrought by racism. Where
Sutherland earlier had blamed society, postwar analysts blamed the “victims” and
their families. Like their national counterparts, they separated the perpetrators of
less serious “teenage” antics from presumably hardened juvenile delinquents. As
social science moved away from telling the teenagers’ “own story” in the name of
social reform, it embraced psychological categories and quantitative analyses of
so-called “normal” young people – often defined negatively by what they were
not. Postwar studies rarely took a compassionate interest in their subjects; it is
difficult to imagine a quantitative sociologist finding much value in the
documentary photographs that appeared in Color, Class, and Personality. And yet
even humanistic researchers were affected by the methodological changes in their
disciplines, which encouraged the potential for generalization in the concept of
“personality.” Too often, researchers measured a healthy coming of age as a kind
of photographic negative; the well-adjusted adolescent conformed to values and
ambitions that were themselves rarely, if ever, subjected to interrogation. Texas
experts personified the path by which psychological categories overshadowed
environmental ones, even within social scientific disciplines and in the thought of
individual intellectuals whose careers spanned the heydays of both the Chicago
school of sociology and the postwar community mental health movement.
The borders of “youth problems” thus shifted dramatically after the Great
Depression. They expanded to include young people from practically every social
background, yet tightened around increasingly standardized explanations.
Furthermore, etiology became tethered to class and race in ways that were buried
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deeply beneath scientific discourses. Troubled teenagers came from “good
families” in need of minor repair; hardcore juvenile delinquents, on the other
hand, were trapped in a “delinquent subculture” from which only a massive
institution such as the federal government or the juvenile justice system might
salvage them.
The advent of “child mental health” thus proved a mixed blessing. Only a
hardened ideologue would deny the benefits that have accrued from expanded
access to clinical treatment, heightened sensitivity to the needs of mentally ill
schoolchildren, and increased knowledge of emotional disorders. Undeniably,
however, psychologically informed experts at times have shown a tendency to
analyze teenage troubles – including those clearly affected by the political
allocation of social resources – solely as products of individual and family
disorders. Political economy was hardly unknown to mental health professionals,
who spent a large part of their own time scraping together funds for their disparate
endeavors. As the contours of American youth problems expanded, however,
attention to the individual waned in favor of mass diagnoses. Their broader lens
left experts to “fix” teenage troubles rather than question the reasons for them.
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Chapter 3: The Urban Ghetto as a Reform School: From Settlement
House to Community Action in Houston, 1943-1967
On 21 August 1944, the Houston Post editorial page featured the latest in
what had been a series of diatribes against Mexican American youth gangs. The
feature editorial condemned “swarthy mobsters” for leading an “outbreak of
shooting, knifing and slugging.”138 It lamented the seemingly tepid police
response, particularly the creation of a “Latin American” squad comprised of
“four or five policemen” whose assignment was to police some “25,000 to
30,000” Mexicans and Mexican Americans. Reminding readers of a series of
reported murders and assaults emanating from Houston’s barrios, the editorial
warned that “Mexican” youth gangs had increased their activities in the previous
year.139 Statistics suggest a somewhat misplaced focus on Mexican American
teenagers; in 1943, Anglo and African American juvenile crime led in sheer
numbers, while Anglo and Mexican American crimes each had roughly tripled
from the previous year.140 In fact, the media hysteria was a response not only to
local violence, but also to national reports of the zoot suit “riots” in southern
California in May and June of 1943. At the time, the Post had run feature stories
replete with photographs of California’s young would-be “gangsters” in oversized
suits.141 So concerned were the local police that they conducted mass arrests of
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young black and Latino men, in what we would now recognize as gang sweeps.142
As it reported raids on honky-tonk bars and dance halls, the Post clearly
enunciated the “otherness” of police targets: “Such alien hoodlums must not be
permitted to drive up and down the streets of Houston, like imitation Chicago wop
gangsters, shooting, cutting, and beating people.”143 Like-minded readers surely
saw these views confirmed when, a month later, a “gang” of Mexican American
teenagers was charged with stabbing an “attractive blonde” teenage girl and
assaulting her boyfriend on a city bus. Later, an attorney for the presumed
gangbangers told a judge that ethnic slurs and a dispute over seats had provoked
the incident. It is easy to imagine the scene: a crowded bus, a history of Anglo
privilege, a hissed insult or two, and a violent response.144
Although the Post ventured no specific explanation for this supposed
crime surge, its reportage implied, if not openly advocated, some sort of “racial”
deficiency of character. During World War II, the Post routinely noted the race or
ethnicity of accused offenders – particularly if they were not white - in reports of
juvenile crime. While black newspapers such as the Houston Defender refuted the
stereotyping of young people of color as inherently criminal, individual citizens
occasionally vented their disagreement on the letters page of a mainstream
newspaper like the Post. One incensed respondent, who identified herself as a
“citizen of Mexican extraction,” recast the boys’ actions as assertions of dignity:
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We also realize, and wish others would too, why these boys have become
a problem. It is a pent-up disgust against discrimination that has been with
us for years. Have you ever been made to wait while a salesgirl waits on
others when you were there first? Have you ever been at a restaurant and
have the same thing happen? Do you know that there is at least one
company that will employ those of Mexican extraction only as laborers
and with no opportunity for promotion? I could fill page after page with
such incidents that happen much too often to be accidents. What would
you do on such occasions? Walking out is pretty good but it does not
satisfy one’s pride.145
This letter, as well as the bus incident that preceded it, expressed what
historian Luis Alvarez has called the “politics of dignity” behind pachuco culture
and even more “mainstream” Mexican American assertions of citizenship.146
While the media consistently portrayed “Mexican” teenagers as incipient
criminals, Mexican Americans and some white liberals countered with
indictments of discrimination and inequality. The letter’s author made the
connection explicit. Should Mexican American soldiers fighting the Axis return to
something other than second-class citizenship, she suggested, “their children
won’t have a reason to become hoodlums.” This statement, of course, echoed the
African American civil rights claims of the national Double V Campaign, which
called for victory against fascism abroad and racism at home. More specifically, it
reiterated the public assertions of Mexican American citizenship rights advanced
by the G.I. Forum, and later the League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC), throughout the American Southwest.147
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Most of the white liberals who articulated this alternative interpretation of
Mexican American teenagers, and “delinquents” in general, were affiliated in
some way with the local settlement homes and recreational clubs. These sites of
social reform and social uplift drew their funds from the Houston Community
Chest, whose director, Elwood Street, criticized the media’s depictions of
“delinquent youth and delinquent families.” Street’s monthly newsletter, Our
Community, touted the “training in character, responsibility and citizenship”
offered at Houston’s growing number of community centers.148 The Community
Chest coordinated clubs operated by Christian and Jewish organizations, YMCA
and YWCA, Boy and Girl Scouts, and civic groups like the local Optimists’ Club
and Chamber of Commerce. Additionally, the Chest supported Houston’s
participation in the federal program sponsoring “teen canteens,” which resulted in
over 3,000 such clubs opening across the nation between 1943-1945.149 Through
these various endeavors, the Community Chest sought to create wholesome
alternatives to delinquency as well as more positive images of young people for
public consumption. Like-minded organizations insisted that citizens had a
patriotic duty to support youth programs. As one pamphlet put it, “leadership of
youth in wartime” represented “a fighting line in this total war.”150
Elwood Street broadcast these views over the radio airwaves in a weekly
program called “Little Journeys to the Homes of the Great War-Time Services.”
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In April 1944, he introduced listeners to the Second Ward, a dilapidated industrial
neighborhood just northeast of downtown Houston that was inhabited by Mexican
immigrant families. Amid “an island of small unpainted, ramshackle wooden
houses, unpaved streets and alleys,” and “rutted channels” filled with “bluishgreen, noisesome sewage from kitchen drains,” sat the Rusk Settlement Home
(see figure 1). Street described Rusk’s playground and park spaces, arts and crafts
workshops, Boy and Girl Scout meetings, teen dances, day care services, medical
and dental check-ups, and academic classes. He pointedly reminded his presumed
Anglo listeners that Rusk’s neighbors, who helped govern the home, were “good
Americans all.” Bilingual teachers from the local Mexican American middle class
taught English and “life skills” in classrooms adorned with traditional decor
provided by the Mexican consulate, while Anglo social workers extolled the
“great value in living here and making common cause with the people of the
neighborhood.” Rusk also schooled adult residents in the nuances of petitioning
for city services such as paved streets, working sewers, adequate streetlights, and
police protection. The broadcast concluded with Street urging his listeners to
reflect upon Rusk’s “inescapable connection with our great community.” Building
“the worthy citizenship of the future,” Rusk’s labors were important “not only in
war but in peace.”151
In Houston, then, the settlement home offered alternative constructions of
inner-city youth that competed with negative images in the news media.
Furthermore, it promoted solutions to the problem of juvenile delinquency beyond
151
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the usual calls for ratcheted up law enforcement. This role was hardly unique to
the Rusk Settlement Home; one historian of the settlements calls them “among the
first to make explicit the connection between juvenile delinquency and
poverty.”152 “Child-saving” had been among the primary tasks of the first
settlement homes in the United States. Jane Addams, founder of Chicago’s HullHouse, wrote often of the intergenerational struggles she observed among
immigrant families. She envisioned the settlement home as a place for supervised
recreation to counter the commercial and illicit lures of the streets. “Recreation is
stronger than vice,” wrote Addams in her 1909 treatise The Spirit of Youth and the
City Streets; “recreation alone can stifle the lust for vice.”153 Supervised
recreation became integral to the programs of settlement houses, not only for its
presumed ability to curb delinquency, but because it won the support and trust of
anxious parents. Addams often enlisted residents to fight for reforms beyond
preserving the innocence of children; she and other reformers were instrumental
in campaigns for mothers’ pensions, compulsory school attendance, and the
juvenile court, each of which relied significantly on sympathetic portrayals of
young people.154 The Rusk Settlement Home and its allies thus drew upon a

152 Judith Ann Trolander, Professionalism and Social Change: From the Settlement House
Movement to Neighborhood Centers, 1886 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press,
1987), 162.
153 Jane Addams, The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1909),
20.
154 For her description of “many pathetic cases of child labor,” see Jane Addams, Twenty Years at
Hull-House (New York: Penguin Books, 1961 [1910]), 148-168. Reformers in and around the
U.S. Children’s Bureau agitated for mother’s pension laws in several states, culminating in the
creation of the federal Aid for Families with Dependent Children program in 1935. See Linda
Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (New
York: The Free Press, 1994).

91

tradition of reforming both public images of urban youth and the young people
themselves.
To describe Mexican immigrants as “good Americans” even as the media
was demonizing them as “alien gangsters” was to echo the New Deal experts who
had engineered and studied the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National
Youth Administration (see chapter 2). Young people comprised an important
constituency for changing, and more inclusive, definitions of citizenship during
the depression and war years. Historians have studied how the arts, the social
sciences, and the labor movement articulated a vision of “social citizenship”
during the New Deal years.155 Defined largely by its populist appeal and its
emphasis on equality of opportunity, social citizenship was central to progressive
legislation that granted the right to organize and the right to collective bargaining
to a multiethnic, multiracial working-class. A national climate of unprecedented
though limited racial liberalism fostered a similar outlook among urban reformers
working with the children of soldiers and defense plant workers. Thus an Elwood
Street could gaze toward the barrios and ghettos and see not a “deviant
subculture” (as social scientists would in subsequent decades) but potential
citizens whose children lacked only access to the boons of the American dream.
They were children of crisis, reared during public and personal upheavals that
attended immigration to a city that was growing rapidly, clinging to Jim Crow
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segregation, and reeling under the economic and demographic impacts of
depression and war.
Even as they extended the hand of citizenship, wartime reformers already
had begun to divide their attention between teenagers from underprivileged and
privileged backgrounds. In 1939, Rusk’s parent organization, the Houston
Settlement Association (HSA), opened a second settlement in southeast Houston
that came to serve largely white, middle-class teenagers from the growing
suburbs. Thus the HSA became well-acquainted with teenagers from virtually
every social class in the city. Its continuing work in the barrio, however,
illustrates the relationship between discourses of delinquency from the inner-city
and the suburbs. Part One of this chapter explores the HSA as a window into the
changing public perceptions of urban and suburban teenagers, relying on the
personal papers and correspondence of its director, Franklin Israel Harbach. A
transplant from New York’s famed Henry Street Settlement, Harbach brought
expertise in social work and skill in facilitating interclass cooperation. Acclaimed
by the national settlement movement, Harbach redirected its attention toward
Southwestern and Latin American populations. By the early 1960s, Houston had
become a geographic center for a revamped American settlement movement
expanding south of the border and away from its traditional roots in the physical
neighborhood. Fueling this shift, in part, were psychologically derived ideas about
adolescence and delinquency that transcended historical and cultural boundaries.
At the same time, Rusk relied increasingly upon psychological theories to inform
its work with barrio residents, constructing a “therapeutic community” as a
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meliorative solution to a supposed “culture of poverty.” Directly and at times by
evocation, models of adolescent “development” measured urban teenagers and
communities, and at times entire nations, by a normative standard based on the
postwar American middle-class.
In the early 1960s, Rusk seemed poised to receive funds under historic
federal initiatives to “end” juvenile delinquency and urban poverty. Instead, one
of the first federal grants of this kind went to academics at the University of
Houston and social workers from the Houston Community Council. Together they
created Greater Houston Action for Youth (GHAY), an organization that further
illustrated the growing gap between the representation and reality of juvenile
delinquency. In 1962-1963, GHAY conceived a major media campaign to raise
public awareness of teenage troubles. Part Two of this chapter analyzes the
campaign’s centerpiece, a film entitled “The Lonely Ones” that was based on
actual juvenile probation cases. Although the film depicted teenagers from a
variety of social backgrounds, it overwhelmingly emphasized the main cause of
delinquency as psychological disorders rooted in the family. Over the subsequent
three years, GHAY offered service coordination to residents of its chosen
demonstration area in the guise of community action. Moreover, its central
theoretical premise held that in order to transform the ghetto into a therapeutic
community, a place where rehabilitation could take place, poverty warriors were
best advised to view the neighborhood as a kind of juvenile reform school.
The choice to reform residents rather than institutions, and to portray
teenagers through the lens of white middle-class norms, brought severe
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consequences that are discussed in the conclusion. In 1966, GHAY transformed
into an antipoverty agency, and simultaneously became embroiled in African
American political protest centered at Texas Southern University (TSU), located
in the heart of GHAY’s demonstration area. Black students issued a number of
demands related to discrimination in schooling; allocation of city resources;
reform of the police department; and what has come to be known as
environmental racism. Predisposed to view African American youth through the
lens of individual and group psychology, poverty warriors proved unable to
address what boiled down to political problems. City officials, too, couched their
public statements about black protest in terms of psychological and cultural
“deviance,” as well as law and order. These tendencies were most apparent after
an armed standoff in May 1967 between Houston police and TSU students
resulted in the death of a white police officer. While city newspapers and elected
officials raged at lawless black students, the mayor’s expert advisors produced
reports that described the protestors almost entirely in psychological terms. In
books, reports, press conferences, and testimonials before the United States
Senate investigation of race riots, Houston officials classified young blacks as
“rebels without a cause” or “college revolutionaries.” By then it was evident that
the juvenile delinquent had become a metaphor guiding descriptions of entire
communities, a way of mystifying what were often very material problems of
social inequality. This invisible habit of mind gave rise to a group psychology that
cast material inequality as a product of “cultural” immaturity, and political
grievances as personal and group pathologies.
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I. Making the Therapeutic Community: The Houston Settlement Association
On a cold winter night just before Christmas 1937, a group of people
gathered for dinner at the Rusk Settlement Home in Houston’s Second Ward. The
occasion was the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Houston Settlement
Association (HSA), commemorated annually with a modest banquet for Rusk
employees and neighborhood residents. As Mexican American families, Anglo
settlement workers, and local philanthropists sat down to dinner, they temporarily
put behind them a bitter argument that had preceded the event. Members of
Rusk’s board of directors had argued that the time had come to “throw off the
charity complex of the depression years” and charge a fee for the annual meal.
“[T]he incubus of invariable charity,” recalled one board member years later,
sapped the principles of “self-help” and “neighborly cooperation” central to the
“Settlement philosophy.”156 In a compromise solution, the board settled for the
collection of voluntary donations, largely due to the protest of Rusk director Nolie
Bailey. A former missionary teacher in Mexico and schoolteacher in El Paso
before coming to Rusk in 1927, Bailey apparently sympathized with the area’s
families, who were mostly poor immigrants recently arrived from Mexico.
Having festered for decades, this type of conflict between professionals
and financiers of Houston’s social service agencies worsened with the coming of
World War II. A “free enterprise city,” Houston long had lacked publicly funded
social services, leaving them to private nonprofits that relied heavily upon the
local Community Chest. These relatively small-scale operations were
156
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overwhelmed by wartime demand. As a major port city and home to oil and
petrochemical industries, Houston became a center for defense plants and military
bases. Job-seeking migrants flooded Houston during the war, to the tune of over
ten thousand a month, according to the Texas office of the U.S. Census.157 The
city’s rapid growth continued unabated after the war; between 1940 and 1960,
Houston moved from twentieth to fifth on the Census Bureau’s list of largest
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Twice the city doubled its size through
the annexation of burgeoning suburbs, in 1949 and 1956. Houston’s physical
expansion was not matched by a sea change in the attitudes of its political
leadership toward social services. Faced with housing shortages, city fathers
blocked public housing projects; enamored with unrestricted growth, they
abhorred zoning as “socialistic;” suspicious of tax-financed social services, they
merely tolerated private agencies dependent upon inadequate allowances from
local charities; saddled with the one of the nation’s highest murder rates, they
steadfastly maintained the smallest police force of any big city in the nation.158 If,
as local journalist George Fuermann once noted, Houston represented an updated
version of frontier capitalism, its underbelly revealed Gilded Age disparities
between rich and poor. The “big rich” resided in exclusive subdivisions such as
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the tony River Oaks, while a largely nonwhite underclass languished in
ramshackle industrial neighborhoods deserted long ago by “white ethnics” for the
greener pastures of planned subdivisions.159
Competing with laissez-faire ideology for sway over public policy was a
broader notion of the common good. A noteworthy variant of the New Deal
emphasis on “social citizenship” was what historian Robert Fairbanks describes as
the idea of “the city as a whole.”160 In his study of public housing in Dallas,
Houston, and San Antonio, Fairbanks argues that urban reformers convinced
skeptical publics of the interconnectedness of neighborhoods. They portrayed
social ills such as delinquency and crime as contagions easily spread across the
city and insisted that public housing was one of many infrastructural
improvements that could stop such “diseases” in their tracks. In this spirit, the
Houston Housing Authority was created in 1938 with the support of both the city
council and mayor’s office. It completed two housing projects each for black and
white residents, but ran into tough opposition after the war. Realtors and builders
led a campaign that resulted in a 1951 ordinance effectively halting any further
public housing. According to Fairbanks, this action marked the redefinition of the
city’s traditional mission, replacing a shared social good with individual and
group rights.
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The Houston Settlement Association long had been an outpost of the “city
as a whole” philosophy, beginning with a single apocryphal incident in 1903. One
morning Sybil Campbell, a teacher at the Rusk Day School, found a small child
sleeping on the schoolhouse steps. The child told Campbell that her mother was at
work and she had to wait for her older siblings to come home from school. Long
concerned for the “health hazards, moral laxness, and drab lives” of her students
in Houston’s East End, Campbell convinced the local branch of the Texas
Federation of Women’s Clubs to finance a day care and kindergarten.161 Once “a
fashionable neighborhood with good homes, fine gardens, and shady streets,” the
Second Ward had fallen into disrepair as European Jewish immigrants largely
replaced old-stock Anglos who had moved to the city’s west side, thus beginning
a spatial pattern dividing upper- and middle-class whites from working-class
whites and nonwhites on the east side.162 Campbell wanted to bridge this growing
divide by opening a settlement house along the lines of Hull-House, about which
she was well aware. In February 1907, Campbell and a dozen of Houston’s most
influential women founded the Houston Settlement Association. They
transformed Rusk into a “socialized school” that offered health care, child care,
night school, and recreation, in addition to education, while enlisting local
residents to “clean up” their neighborhood.163 Despite these early successes, Rusk
struggled to stay afloat in succeeding decades, particularly as Mexican
161
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immigrants began to displace European Jews in the 1920s. In 1926, the city razed
a large part of the neighborhood to make way for a large railway, a depot, and a
gas tank. This further degraded already crowded and dilapidated housing, and
resulted in the creation of “Shrimp Alley,” a notorious slum hemmed in between
industrial sites and Buffalo Bayou. Worse, Rusk now found itself separated from
its client population by the railway and a suddenly busy thoroughfare. “Children
have to dodge twelve to thirteen cars a minute,” complained one Rusk area survey
in 1936.164
The Depression brought discriminatory spending cuts that put further
pressures on Rusk. Starved for funds, the local Community Chest cut Rusk’s
annual allotment significantly. Another blow came when E.E. Oberholtzer,
superintendent of the Houston Independent School District, rescinded the
settlement’s free use of the Rusk facility for afterschool programs, over the bitter
objections of Rusk’s principal. Other schools offered their facilities but only if the
programs segregated Anglo and Mexican participants, which the settlement
rejected. The repatriation campaigns of the era deported much of Rusk’s client
base to Mexico. Attempts to open new facilities for Mexican American children
in other neighborhoods met with resistance from city officials, who condemned
one chosen structure as unsafe, and from white citizens, who rioted to prevent the
opening of another house situated on the edge of an Anglo neighborhood. When
city officials subsequently criticized the HSA for failing to contain juvenile
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delinquency in its settlement areas, its president shot back with complaints that its
facilities were “understaffed, under-equipped, and badly housed.”165
Relief came from the Edith and John Ripley Foundation, created in 1938
with a multimillion-dollar endowment to help “women and children.” Influenced
by a visit to the Peckham Center, an experimental program that offered health,
education, and recreation services to working-class families in an industrial
suburb of London, the Ripley trustees decided to fund a similar endeavor in east
Houston. One proposal called for three new settlements, each located in a black,
Mexican American, and Anglo neighborhood. Instead, the HSA chose to build
one large facility on the Anglo site, but ostensibly “a center for the entire
industrial section of Houston’s East End.” The Ripley project caught the attention
of Lillie Peck, president of the National Federation of Settlements, the umbrella
organization of American settlement houses. At Peck’s invitation, the HSA
president toured Northern settlements in summer 1938. On a visit to Ripley the
following year, Peck advised the trustees to secure leadership that would work
“with” rather than “for” people. The HSA board seems to have interpreted this
instruction as a rationale for forcing the spring 1943 resignation of Rusk director
Bailey, who was deemed unfit to work in the “different social environment” of
Ripley. This decision exacerbated the simmering resentment of long-suffering
Rusk staff toward the comparative largesse at Ripley. Several Rusk workers quit
in protest, and Bailey’s successor would find it necessary to engage Ripley’s
children in fundraising activities for Rusk.166
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In 1943, the HSA replaced Bailey with Peck’s longtime colleague
Franklin Israel Harbach, who was working at the time as assistant director of the
Henry Street Settlement in New York’s Lower East Side. In her history of Henry
Street, former director Helen Hall recalled Harbach’s “downright practicality
along with a zest for new ideas.”167 Before becoming assistant director in 1933,
Harbach had obtained a law degree (from where?), married, and worked as a
“Boys Worker” for four years. His work with the street-corner sons of Eastern and
Southern European immigrants had schooled Harbach in the cultural conflicts
experienced by young people growing up “American” in Old World
households.168 He consciously sought experiences that would help him empathize
with his working-class neighbors, including a summer job at Bethlehem Steel in
his youth, which he later described thusly:

I always was very happy I had this experience when I was young because I
had an opportunity to work with people who were living a different life
than I was accustomed to. You can read about them, you can be sorry for
them, you can be concerned about them, but until you really know what’s
going through their mind as they work at a tiresome job you do not know
them.169
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Under Harbach’s leadership, the HSA cultivated working relationships
with several members of Houston’s power elite. Once dominated by upper-class
women reformers, the composition of the board of directors increasingly included
business executives, academics, professionals, mayors, and city councilpersons.
Public schools opened their doors for recreational activities; city officials agreed
to residents’ demands for police protection, the construction of playgrounds, and
the installation of streetlights.170 So friendly was Harbach with the business sector
that the Houston Chamber of Commerce awarded him a full membership in
1948.171 Harbach’s navigation of local politics, along with his management of the
Ripley endowment, ushered in a period of growth for the HSA. In 1943, the HSA
managed two settlement houses and a day care center; twenty years later, it
boasted seven neighborhood centers, two boys’ programs, and a community
action program. This growth reflected unprecedented financial solvency. Most
settlement homes struggled to remain afloat in the 1950s, as their “white ethnic”
client base moved to the suburbs, to be replaced by African Americans and
Latinos. Meanwhile, the National Federation of Settlements regularly listed the
Houston Settlement Association as its top dues-payer to the national treasury.172
Harbach’s apparent skills in social work administration helped elevate him to the
presidency of the National Federation of Settlements (1947-1950) and a seat on
the national committee of the Community Chests of America (1949), the latter at
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the personal invitation of its chairman Henry Ford II, heir to the Ford Motor
Company.173 Additionally, Harbach earned the respect of his professional peers,
serving as a consultant to both UT’s social work program and the social work
journal The Survey. He appeared often on local television broadcasts that dealt
with children and youth.174 Clearly he had provided the HSA with its desired local
and national reputations.
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Figure 5: Rusk Settlement Home, landscape shot, 1947
While attempting to “Americanize” its largely Mexican immigrant clientele, Rusk
also insisted that whites accept Mexican and Mexican American young people as
equal citizens. From Neighborhood Doorways (1959). Courtesy of the Center for
American History, University of Texas at Austin.

His association with Rusk automatically rendered Harbach a local expert
on juvenile delinquency. The Rusk neighborhood was home to some of Houston’s
most notorious Mexican American youth gangs. During World War II, the
exploits of the Black Shirts and the Snakes made headlines. Harbach left little
record of Rusk’s involvement with them, but scattered evidence suggests that he
acted frequently as an intermediary between neighborhood boys and the Houston
police. The county juvenile probation department sometimes remanded boys to
105

the custody of Rusk staff, suggesting that it functioned occasionally as a kind of
halfway house. Some boys earned staff positions as “group workers” or youth
counselors. At least one or two of them went on to college, receiving
recommendation letters from Harbach that admonished universities for their lack
of students of color. For example, one letter advised Rice University that the
admission of a Magnolia Park high school senior was “very important both for
him and for Rice.”175 This support came with an expectation that graduates would
return to their home communities. In 1948, Harbach created a small college
scholarship program “to help our boys from Rusk... to help their own people;”
years later, he administered a similar fund for black students.176
One of Harbach’s wartime allies was Roy Hofheinz, who served as county
juvenile court judge between 1937-1944. Hofheinz championed alternatives to
incarceration for young offenders in language reminiscent of the era’s discourse
of social citizenship. “No youngster is born mean,” he insisted. “When they go
bad, it is because you and I thought our responsibility to the community ended
with... our own children.”177 During his tenure, Hofheinz instituted juvenile
probation, foster care, and separate detention facilities for juveniles. “[A]nything
which approaches a home environment,” he stated in one of his many public
speeches, “is better than any institutional care.”178 He achieved national fame,
becoming the first southern judge to address the National Probation Association,
175

Harbach to Dr. James Giles, 11/2/1959. Harbach Papers.
Harbach to Felix Tijerina, 3/23/1948; Harbach to Mrs. W. B. Sharp, 6/25/1962. Harbach
Papers.
177 Edgar W. Ray, The Grand Huckster: Houston’s Judge Roy Hofheinz, Genius of the Astrodome
(Memphis, TN: Memphis State University Press, 1980), 72.
178 Ibid., 65.
176

106

the National Association of Juvenile Judges, and the National Juvenile Agencies
Association. During the latter meeting, which took place in New York in 1939,
Hofheinz appeared on a national radio broadcast with former Democratic
presidential candidate Al Smith to discuss the need for alternatives to institutions.
According to his biographer, Hofheinz often sided with “his boys,” including
accused African Americans, against police officers who had produced written
confessions of guilt that later turned out to be coerced. Through his work with
teenage boys, Hofheinz achieved local and national celebrity.
He was elected mayor of Houston in 1953. The following year, Hofheinz
created a Juvenile Delinquency and Crime Commission and appointed Franklin
Harbach as one of its members. The commission was a product of the national
panic over juvenile delinquency, which resulted in hearings before the United
States Senate between 1953-1956. The Senate investigated the comic book,
television, film, and illegal drug industries, convinced that they collectively had
undercut the authority of “the family, the church, and the school,” in the words of
onetime chair Estes Kefauver.179 The Senate investigation portrayed a quasiconspiracy of media moguls and drug peddlers that had invaded traditional
spheres of adult authority. That they based this conclusion largely upon anecdotal
reports from New York City suggests a national diagnosis borne of Northeastern
symptoms. Quite different conclusions emerged from the Houston committee.
First, it determined that Houston’s actual juvenile crime rates had risen
substantially but found the greatest statistical increases in nonserious offenses
179 On the juvenile delinquency hearings, see James A. Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America’s
Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950’s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986),
143-161.
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among 13-15 year old boys. And while it decried the influences of popular culture
and drugs, the committee placed blame largely upon social processes –
particularly suburbanization - in which American families were active participants
rather than unwitting victims.180 Often remarked upon in the 1950s, suburban
alienation rarely was blamed directly for juvenile delinquency.181 Unlike media
commentators, however, locally based experts like Harbach witnessed these
massive social and demographic shifts at close range. He saw the suburbs and
inner cities as equally “disorganized” breeding grounds for “hard-to-reach”
teenagers.182 The “movability [sic] of people,” he wrote to Texas Senator Lyndon
Johnson in 1956, represented “one of the major problems of this generation.”183
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Figure 6: “Teen-Age Dance at Pasadena, 1950s”
The lack of community felt by the parents of suburban children and teenagers
helped expand the traditional mission of the settlement house to include upwardly
mobile families. From Neighborhood Doorways (1959). Courtesy of the Center
for American History, University of Texas at Austin.

Harbach’s response was to overhaul the missions of Rusk and Ripley. In
1954, the Houston Settlement Association became the Neighborhood Centers
Association of Houston and Harris County (NCA).184 The discarding of the word
184
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“settlement” reflected the growing dispersion of NCA participants across
neighborhood lines, as well as a concomitant detachment of the institution from
its traditional geographic base. For instance, Ripley House functioned as a kind of
central office for recreational and vocational youth programs administered by
NCA staff in schools throughout east and southeast Houston. Less likely to live in
the facility itself, staff workers increasingly were immersed in career paths rather
than personal relationships to putative neighbors. University programs instilled
“scientific” models of social work that drew heavily upon the theories of
psychology and psychiatry. Offering “teen-age dances” (see figure 6) and
marriage counseling services stemmed the tide of suburban alienation for middleclass families (white and black) who undoubtedly would have viewed the
nomenclature “settlement” as an unwelcome evocation of urban poverty.
By contrast, Rusk openly acknowledged the poverty of its neighbors, as it
had for decades. In 1958, Rusk launched a “Neighborhood Development”
program in the nearby Clayton Homes public housing project. Opened in 1952
with the help of a private donor, Clayton Homes was the city’s only public
housing for Mexican Americans. Standing on land formerly dotted with
dilapidated shotgun shacks, the low-rise apartment buildings represented an
attempted physical restructuring of Houston’s oldest barrio. It was also the result
of NCA director Franklin Harbach’s tireless advocacy of public housing. Since
his arrival in 1943, Harbach had cultivated alliances with the Houston Housing
Authority (HHA). In the aftermath of World War II, Harbach had served on the
Mayor’s Advisory Committee on Reconversion, where he lost a battle with
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ultraconservative and real estate factions to devote resources to public housing.
Indeed, Clayton Homes was the last housing project built in Houston after the
1949 referendum that ended the city’s involvement in public housing.185
At the HHA’s invitation, Rusk opened a recreation room and child care
center in the Clayton Homes. These programs were poorly attended, which
surprised Rusk workers given that “young families” comprised most of the
resident population. In 1957, Rusk hired a full-time social worker to find answers.
She concluded that “indifferent” young fathers were to blame; they discouraged
their wives, who ostensibly stood to benefit most from services such as child care.
Worse, fathers reinforced their teenage sons’ distrust for supervised recreation,
which exasperated Rusk officials who for years had struggled to retain boys in
such programs as they reached the “dangerous” age of adolescence. Youth gangs
were seemingly on the rise in the barrio after years of relative quiescence, lending
urgency to Rusk’s failures. The frustration was visceral in Rusk’s official reports,
as in the following exclamation: “Just where do we lose our hold on our boys as
they grow into manhood?”186
What had changed, according to a 1959 NCA report, was the replacement
of an upwardly mobile, urban working-class with a permanent underclass. Men
who in past eras would have filled unskilled factory jobs found them foreclosed
185
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by automation; families who once might have looked forward to the good life
now remained mired in “extremely complicated [and] long histories of substandard existence.”187 Rusk’s social workers found families lacking “mental and
physical health, employment, education, legal and protective services, housing,
and vocational training.” Anecdotes described working families headed by both
parents or single mothers struggling with low incomes, long hours, and
exhausting labor; in the next breath, these reports lamented untreated mental and
physical disorders that ranged from obvious health problems to ambiguously
defined “cultural” or moral personal failings. Labeled alternately as “hard-toreach” or “multi-problem families,” project residents collectively represented a
deviant community in need of not only individual services but of a more
comprehensive intervention.
According to the 1959 report, then, reforming the neighborhood would
require a far more comprehensive program than had been attempted thus far. Such
a program would have to enlist the active participation of residents in both the
planning and execution stages. Later that year, after staff workers attended
seminars on “community improvement” at Chicago’s Hull-House, the NCA held
a town hall meeting at Clayton Homes. Social workers informed residents that the
NCA wished to conduct a “broad program of neighborhood improvement” that
would proceed according to the results of an opinion survey. Respondents
“showed no resentment at the necessary surveys and the strange consultants,”
recalled NCA board member Corinne Tsanoff years later; “[o]n the contrary, they
187
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seemed interested and pleased to know that others were really concerned about
their well-being.”188 This apocryphal-sounding gratitude was tempered with a
desire for self-determination. Clayton locals would elect representatives to share
power with social workers on the “Clayton Homes Neighborhood Development
Program Committee.” The committee decided upon and executed a series of
projects ranging from mundane physical improvements to political activism.
Often activity of one type led to the other, as when a mass cleanup of housing
project grounds inspired the committee to pressure the city’s sanitation
department to provide pest-control services, and to protest the disproportionate
dumping of garbage in the area. With financial assistance from the NCA, the
committee opened a locally owned grocery store; enrolled children in pre-K,
kindergarten, and elementary school; and sponsored adults who wished to take
night classes at the local high school.189
By fall 1961, the Clayton Homes project began to attract outside attention.
One of its most enthusiastic champions was Robert Sutherland, a professional
acquaintance of Franklin Harbach and the director of the Hogg Foundation for
Mental Health at the University of Texas. At the time, Sutherland was serving as a
consultant to the Ford Foundation’s “gray areas” project, which bankrolled
scientific studies of poverty and delinquency in urban areas. One of the earliest
recipients of Ford money, Mobilization for Youth, was headquartered at
188
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Harbach’s former place of employment, the Henry Street Settlement on New
York’s Lower East Side. Sutherland’s colleague at the “gray areas” project,
Richard Boone, wrote Harbach in September 1961 for information on “the
neighborhood program based on the family as a unit.”190 That December, Harbach
sent Sutherland a draft copy of a grant proposal destined for the National
Institutes of Health, along with an inquiry about its fitness for a Ford grant. In
addition to agreeing to serve as a consultant to the project, Sutherland’s response
included a copy of a confidential internal Ford memo containing a statement of
purpose for the “gray areas” project.191 He also wrote to David Hunter, the Ford
project director, extolling Harbach’s personal virtues as well as those of the
Clayton Homes proposal. “He has had more experience in group and
neighborhood work than anyone else in Texas,” wrote Sutherland; “I had thought
that he might be lost in the tradition of his profession, but on their own they have
started an all-out push program of community improvement... which they are now
trying in an area of the worst circumstances.”192 This was hardly idle praise
because at least two other private Houston social service agencies had grant
applications pending before the Ford Foundation. In Sutherland’s eyes, they paled
before the Neighborhood Centers Association’s “area project which comes closer
to the neighborhood approach than any other activities in Houston.”193
On closer examination, the “neighborhood approach” resembled an
updated version of the “community action” programs carried out by the Hogg
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Foundation a generation earlier (see chapter 2). The NCA identified problems of
racial conflict, education, employment, housing, health, delinquency, and crime.
But where small-town programs of the 1940s had highlighted the psychological
effects of a dilapidated physical environment and a lack of social services, the
NCA project took emotional “damage” as its starting point. Clayton’s residents,
the proposal contended, lacked the cultural capital (“competence,” in social
scientific parlance) and confidence necessary for self-improvement, social
mobility, and community cohesion. “Our experience to date,” noted the NCA
proposal, “indicates that individuals and families... experience growth and
development as they plan and work together in self-help neighborhood
development projects such as beautification, school bus transportation, or
neighborhood traffic control.” The demonstration program would focus especially
upon “promoting positive and preventive mental health on the neighborhood
level.”194
The ultimate goal, according to the NCA grant proposal, was the creation
of a “therapeutic neighborhood.” The phrase was adapted from the postwar
movement for community psychiatry, which advocated, among other things, a
psychiatric clinic for every neighborhood. More specifically, the NCA borrowed
from a published study of British experiments in group therapy. In hospital wards
for traumatized war veterans and other patients, psychiatrists sought to replace
psychoanalysis with group therapy, vocational guidance, and cooperative activity.
At the Industrial Neurosis Unit of Belmont Hospital, patients collaborated on a
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newsletter; some left the psychiatric ward for job training and leisure activities,
but returned for group sessions. Doctors referred to these practices as “life
adjustment” or “rehabilitation” or “community methods of treatment;” although
the locus remained a hospital ward, the program seemingly prepared patients for
re-entry into productive roles better than did laborious one-on-one psychotherapy.
According to Goodwin Watson, a professor of social psychology at Columbia
University’s Teacher’s College, the Belmont experiment had opened a new vista
for American advocates of community-based treatment:
Social psychiatry may have to develop for some more years within
cloistered walls, but eventually its concepts must lead to experiments in
the treatment of disordered personal relations by immersion in better-thanordinary neighborhoods without any of the grim characteristics of
confining institutions. Then ‘psychosanitation’ will emerge, and social
psychiatrists will normally protect entire communities from ways of life
which are emotionally crippling much as public health officers now save
cities from epidemics caused by bacteria.195
A major obstacle to achieving the therapeutic neighborhood was “the
problem of teenagers,” discussed at length in the first published results of the
Clayton Homes experiment in a 1964 issue of the social work magazine
Children.196 Project staff discovered the key to teenage participation during a
successful polio vaccination campaign: a “youth leadership committee.”
Prospective youth leaders accompanied adult staff on a two-day educational
retreat, where they learned how to organize the parties, dances, and field trips that
they “hardly ever” got to do in school. So popular were the committee’s events
that its first official election, in March 1963, attracted 151 of 162 eligible young
195

Foreword to Maxwell Jones, The Therapeutic Community: A New Treatment Method in
Psychiatry (New York: Basic Books, 1953), x.
196 Tsanoff, “Working Together,” supra note 55.

116

voters. Not only did the committee divert “at-risk” teenagers into controlled
recreation, it provided an object lesson in representative democracy. And like any
good government, the committee sought to provide jobs for its constituents, in the
form of a vocational program that offered job training in typing, filing, auto
repair, maid and janitorial service, and babysitting. Teenagers cleaned apartment
houses in exchange for field trips “all over Texas,” a trade-off that as easily
acclimated them to low-wage labor as instilled the Protestant work ethic. In any
case, public officials found much to praise in the program. Juvenile probation
officers observed “a noticeable reduction in unsocial behavior,” while the HHA
director noticed that friendly cooperation had replaced previously “cold and
unfriendly” behavior. This new spirit apparently spilled over to intergenerational
relations as well. An attempt to oust “troublesome” boys from a Boy Scout troop
met with resistance from one local father who insisted “they are our boys and we
must get hold of them.”
This sunny portrait became the occasion for Tsanoff to lecture her fellow
social workers on their propensity to misjudge or ignore the needs of its client
populations. “In the past,” she recounted, “social workers have been educated to
identify the problems, recognized by our own standards, and to offer solutions.
But in our work the staff must first listen before they talk.”197 Too many urban
agencies subjected residents to needlessly rigid appointment schedules, lengthy
written questionnaires, and other off-putting requirements for services. “Should
agencies require that the client be trained to accept their services,” she continued
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sardonically, “or should they train workers to offer services on a neighborhood
level where people can and will accept them?” The populist tone belies the fact
that, by the project’s own admission, teaching residents to access social services
was in fact central to NCA’s mission of a therapeutic community. Franklin
Harbach highlighted the project’s “mental health implications for urban areas” to
the Boston Settlement Council and the National Institutes of Mental Health in
summer 1963.198 Onetime settlement homes began to emulate functions
envisioned for community mental health clinics, as letters poured in asking for
literature on the Clayton experiment.199
As the settlement ceased to be a settlement, its geographic reach expanded
beyond national as well as neighborhood borders. During his term as NFS
president (1947-1950), Harbach helped launch a training program for LatinAmerican social work students. Over the next decade, students came from across
the region to intern at settlement houses in Houston, New Orleans, and San
Antonio. The program eventually involved the NFS in cooperation with both the
U.S. Children’s Bureau and the Agency for International Development. Evoking
both the traditional emphasis upon interclass cooperation and Chicago sociology,
Harbach called the “southwestern” city a “natural laboratory for Anglo and Latin
relationship.”200 Moreover, these cities made ideal training sites because of their
lack of publicly funded social services compared to “the highly organized centers
198 “Creating a Neighborhood Climate for Better Mental Health,” talk given to the Boston
Settlement Council and TAP, July 1963; “Settlement Programs with Mental Health Implications
for Urban Areas,” talk given to the National Institutes of Mental Health, August 1963. Harbach
Papers.
199 Baltimore and New York to Harbach, 12/63; San Antonio to Harbach, 1/64. [FIND CITE]
200 Harbach to G.A. Walls, 7/2/1947. Harbach Papers.
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of the East and Middle West.”201 In the emerging Sun Belt, social workers had
devised methods suitable “to countries not so highly developed.”202 The emphasis
remained on traditional child saving; the annual meeting of the Pan-American
Child Congress had provided the forum for the invention of the exchange program
and for subsequent reports on its progress.203
Connecting Latin America to the Clayton Homes project was a shared
theoretical underpinning in the “culture of poverty.” In 1959, the Neighborhood
Centers began an annual conference that brought together Latin American social
workers, American officials, and Clayton Homes community leaders. Held at
Texas A&M University in nearby College Station, Conference on Citizenship in a
Democracy (COCIAD) featured panel discussions on various topics.204 In 1963,
the keynote speaker was Oscar Lewis, the cultural anthropologist whose
impressionistic profiles of impoverished Latin American families had lent
credence to a culture of poverty that transcended racial and ethnic groups, regions,
and national borders.205 No records exist of Lewis’ presentation, but Harbach later
wrote that his comments were received favorably by all, including the
presumptive members of the culture of poverty who had journeyed from Clayton
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Homes. As American policymakers eagerly transplanted Lewis’ theory to explain
the reasons for poverty and delinquency in urban ghettos and barrios, the
American settlement house movement used its experiences working in urban
slums as a lens through which to view social welfare needs in Third World cities.
A “training ground for... international work,” Clayton Homes reflects the infusion
of psychological theory into urban antipoverty campaigns long before the official
start of the War on Poverty.206 The main source and rationale for that knowledge
was juvenile delinquency, itself predicated upon a “normal” adolescence that
rendered as universal the historically and socially specific experiences of middleclass and largely white teenagers.
II. Constructing the “Lonely” Teenager: Greater Houston Action for Youth
The roots of Greater Houston Action for Youth can be traced, in part, to
well-publicized episodes of violent juvenile crime in the preceding years. For
example, in January 1958, a group of angry white homeowners in Houston
formed a Citizens’ Committee for the purpose of lobbying local and state
lawmakers. The committee was based in the comfortable West University Place
neighborhood near Rice University, where a decade later white residents would
resist court-mandated school integration by seceding from the Houston
Independent School District. This particular committee’s grievances, however,
arose from something quite different – a single violent incident that took place the
previous Christmas Eve. That night, four teenage boys on parole from the
Gatesville state school for juvenile delinquents went joyriding through the well206
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kept streets of West University Place. Riding shotgun was seventeen-year-old
Stuart “Sandy” Lumpkin, who had been arrested no less than nineteen times for a
range of offenses including malicious mischief, burglary, fighting, and sexual
assault. The boys came upon the residence of the Evans family, when for no
apparent reason, Lumpkin cocked his .38 caliber revolver and shot fifteen-yearold Jay Evans to death in his own front yard.207
This drive-by shooting, certainly a rarity for any upscale neighborhood in
Eisenhower’s America, elicited an angry outcry against “teen-ager terrorism.”
Leading the chorus was the newly formed citizens’ committee, which within the
month drew up a highly publicized “blueprint” for curbing juvenile crime. A
cover letter admonished readers that “any family’s child, even yours” might have
suffered Evans’ fate.208 Local and state officials lined up to endorse the
blueprint’s major conclusions, which portrayed the juvenile justice system as a
revolving door that neither kept the public safe nor held juveniles long enough to
rehabilitate them. For his part, Texas Governor Price Daniel prudently lent an
emphatic affirmative to the question posed by a Houston Chronicle headline:
“Are Youngsters Coddled by Law?”209 He agreed with the blueprint’s
recommendations for trying violent juvenile offenders as adults and increasing the
number of juvenile training schools. Always eager to maintain law and order, the
207
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state legislature quickly transformed these proposals into policy, lowering the age
for possible adult sentencing to fifteen and allocating funds for a new lockdown
facility for violent and serious juvenile delinquents (see chapter 4).
The “get tough” rhetoric that surrounded the Evans murder reflected a
shift in public discourse that swept the nation in the late 1950s. By then, the
perennially vexing problem of juvenile delinquency had turned violent. Youth
gangs surfaced in growing numbers on the streets of several of the largest
American cities. “Senseless” murders stemming from ethnic gang rivalries filled
the headlines. Often a seemingly random slaying would turn out, upon further
investigation, to stem from simmering disputes between individuals, gangs, or
ethnic groups. For example, a nationally publicized 1955 shooting of an
“innocent” fifteen-year-old boy in New York initially shocked observers as an
example of the thrill-killing habits of Puerto Rican gangsters. The story took on a
more ambiguous cast, though, when the clean-cut white victim turned out to be a
gang member himself.210 In Chicago, Detroit, and New York, the phenomenon of
racial and ethnic succession in formerly all-white neighborhoods produced bloody
clashes fought mostly by adolescent and young adult males.211 These incidents
represented the nerve endings of a national trend that frightened longtime
observers of young people’s doings. In the 1950s, the juvenile age population
210 The full story of the murder of William Blankenship, Jr., by Frank Santana of the street gang
the Navajos, was the subject of a book by then well-known psychiatrist Frederic Wertham. See
Frederic Wertham, The Circle of Guilt (New York, 1956). For an example of media reaction, see
“The Problem Grows Worse... What to do When Kids Shoot Down Kids?” Newsweek (May 16,
1955), 32-33.
211 Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 74-76; Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the
Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
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increased 25%, while the juvenile arrest rate increased by nearly 50%. Although
this figure largely represented a rise in arrests for nonviolent offenses, the
numbers for violent crimes such as murder, aggravated assault, and manslaughter
still averaged about one and a half times the growth in eligible population.212
While national crime statistics rarely recorded both age and race, they
strongly suggested that urban young people of color comprised a disproportionate
percentage of those teenagers arrested for violent crimes. In 1960 alone, roughly a
quarter of all homicide arrests involved offenders under the age 21, while nearly
two-thirds (61%) of all accused murderers were black. Furthermore, the only
national breakdown of arrests by race and ethnicity failed to record separate
numbers for Latino arrests; most likely, city police departments simply followed
the Census Bureau’s practice of counting Latinos as “white.” Surely the figure for
total white offenders, which was 37% of the total homicide arrests, included a
significant number of Latinos.213
Harris County’s delinquency statistics both mirrored and departed from
national trends. Between 1952-1962, the juvenile population doubled, from
156,930 to 308,159. Delinquency referrals tripled, from 2,030 to 6,010. In 1962,
the total number of male referrals was 4,569, almost half for black or Latino boys.
A similar ratio held true for girls. Furthermore, nonwhite youth represented over
half of the total cases that were processed through the juvenile court. Of those
cases, African Americans outnumbered the combined numbers of whites and
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Latinos (108 to 104) committed to juvenile reform school.214 It is thus hard to
escape the likelihood that calls for tougher punishments for juvenile offenders
disproportionately targeted blacks and Latinos. In December 1958, a newlyelected county judge proposed lowering the age at which juveniles could be tried
as adults from 17 to 15; two years later, in 1961, Houston District Attorney Frank
Briscoe “declared war” on juvenile offenders. Only Paul Irick, the chief of the
juvenile probation department that had compiled the damning statistics, called for
increased social services rather than stiffer punishments.215
Relief seemingly arrived in spring 1962, in the form of Greater Houston
Action for Youth (GHAY). A collaborative project of academics and social
agencies, supported by the financial largesse of the federal government, GHAY
promised to muster an “all-out, comprehensive action program to fight down
juvenile delinquency.”216 While it rarely lived up to this ambitious pledge, as did
most of its counterparts in other American cities, GHAY distinguished itself in
another way. It spent an unusual amount of money and effort on a media blitz to
convince the general public of the urgency of its cause. The result was a welldeveloped series of images and narratives that highlighted psychological disorders
in individuals and families as the main causes of juvenile delinquency. In GHAY
narratives, “classless” problems replaced poverty, inequality, and discrimination,
in contradiction to the known facts about the demography of juvenile offenders.
214 The above figures all come from Annual Report of the Harris County Juvenile Probation
Department for 1962. HMRC.
215 “Elliott to Seek Criminal Trials at Younger Age,” Houston Chronicle, 12/9/1958; “D.A.
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These emphases reflected local public opinion and the desire of social service
agencies to vie for GHAY dollars. But they were also central to the intellectual
framework of the federal delinquency program.
The guiding principle for the President’s Committee was “opportunity
theory,” as outlined in Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin’s study Delinquency
and Opportunity (1960). The authors drew largely upon their work with black and
Puerto Rican teenagers in New York’s Lower East Side, in Mobilization for
Youth, a program funded by the Ford Foundation and designed to test opportunity
theory. Fifties sociology had held that such boys who had organized themselves
into violent youth gangs belonged to a “delinquent subculture,” a group that
operated under its own set of rules and mores that were opposed to those of the
dominant culture.217 Cloward and Ohlin agreed with this conclusion, but not with
the prevailing views of its causes. The ghetto’s lack of licit opportunity for social
mobility, rather than its inherently “deviant” culture, had instilled “status anxiety”
in otherwise normal boys who had internalized the American Dream as fully as
had their suburban middle-class peers.218 In other words, these boys wanted the
house and car in the suburbs, but lacked the means to acquire them, and in
frustration turned to crime and violence.219
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In May 1961, opportunity theory inspired the creation of the President’s
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, which enlisted the participation of Lloyd
Ohlin himself. The committee’s main task was to distribute some $30 million
over a three-year period to local “community action” programs, as authorized by
the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act. The template for local
projects was Mobilization for Youth, which included vocational training, public
service jobs, neighborhood social service centers, employment of local residents
in participating service agencies, and organization of neighborhood groups to
identify and solve problems. The participation of the poor in their own uplift,
along with a pointed emphasis on reforming service institutions, lent a radical
edge to opportunity theory. In several American cities, as historians have
chronicled, CAPs designed to fight delinquency and poverty instead provoked
political battles that pitted blacks against whites, reformers against “radicals,” city
mayors against liberal academics, and business elites against community
groups.220
In the conventional history, poverty swallowed up delinquency as an
object of national concern, fueling local battles over ideology and funding, and
providing a crucial context for the wave of urban riots of the day. This conclusion
seems logical given the premises of opportunity theory, particularly its emphasis
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upon socioeconomic rather than psychological causes for delinquency. But
sociologists were more wedded to psychological theories of adolescent and family
pathology than their sudden interest in “root causes” would suggest. A clear
example came from Robert Sutherland, director of the UT Hogg Foundation for
Mental Health and a colleague of Ohlin’s on the President’s Committee. In
“Delinquency and Mental Health,” an article in the March 1957 issue of Federal
Probation, Sutherland outlined the psychological premises behind opportunity
theory and much of antipoverty thought to come. Readers first met “Tom,” a
knife-wielding teenage thug. Tom belonged to a neighborhood youth gang in the
inner city, and was therefore a “cultural delinquent” whose actions stemmed from
a “subculture... at odds with the larger community.”221 Tom’s antisocial behavior,
in this formulation, resulted from his membership in a pathological subculture.
But Tom was an anomaly even in this presumably deviant community, because he
was afraid to fight and often resorted to bullying “little punks,” even engaging in
acts of gory sadism. His failure to “adjust” to the gang’s rules and norms made
Tom a “cultural” as well as an “emotional” delinquent. According to these
categories, all delinquency ultimately represented some degree of psychological
disorder, although not all “delinquency areas” automatically produced damaged
teenagers. Sutherland pointed out that “some settlement houses and other group
work agencies have formed a subculture within a slum area which is relatively
free of delinquency.” And while a few social workers had braved the dark
continent of the deviant ghetto, “some of the ‘better neighborhoods’” had
221
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produced some of the most “reckless behavior opposed by family, church, and
school.” Middle-class communities were struggling to instill in their youth values
of self-discipline and deferred gratification.222 Emotional delinquency, then, could
be found anywhere, while its cultural equivalent sprung from the fertile soil of the
urban concrete jungle. This meant that “the psychiatrist, psychologist, clinical
psychologist, and psychiatric social worker” were to play a leading role in curbing
delinquency, no matter where it should appear. In urban areas, sociologists and
anthropologists presumably could provide limited support.
Despite these disciplinary reservations, the President’s Committee
received a variety of applications. From Houston, these included the Vocational
Guidance Service, a privately funded job training program; the Community
Council, the largest charity-based service agency in the city; and the
Neighborhood Centers Association, seemingly in the best position with personal
support from Sutherland himself. Thus it came as a shock when the University of
Houston (UH) suddenly announced in February 1962 that it had applied for an
antidelinquency grant, hosted a meeting with Lloyd Ohlin, and secured the
indispensable cooperation of the Community Council’s board of directors and the
Houston school board. Behind-the-scenes negotiations between the Houston
Crime Commission, the county juvenile judge, and UH officials had pre-empted
other applicants. The decision was apparently a foregone conclusion in favor of
UH, which by April received its first installment grant of about $260,000. UH
222 This claim echoed Albert K. Cohen’s essay “Middle-Class Delinquency and the Social
Structure,” read at the 1957 meeting of the American Sociological Association, and reprinted in
Edmund W. Vaz ed., Middle-Class Juvenile Delinquency (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 203207.
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immediately announced the creation of Greater Houston Action for Youth, and its
intention to include researchers and board members from the Community Council
as partners in designing and running the program.223
UH named Richard Evans, a professor of psychology, to direct GHAY. A
professional acquaintance of Hogg Foundation associate director Wayne
Holtzman, Evans had moved to Houston only a few years earlier after earning his
doctorate at Michigan State University. He recalls being attracted to UH by “the
weather” and the opportunity to help start one of the nation’s first public
television stations. From the late 1950s into the 1970s, Evans interviewed several
leading lights of psychology, psychiatry, and the social sciences on the UH
educational channel, including Erik Erikson, Kenneth Clark, and countless others.
As early as 1955, Evans moderated televised discussions of juvenile delinquency.
His involvement with television convinced Evans of its potential power to
influence public opinion, and led him to devote significant GHAY resources to a
multimedia campaign.224
His appointment provoked bad feelings from his more traditionally
oriented Community Council partners almost immediately, not least because
Evans decided to locate GHAY’s main offices in the UH psychology department.
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I. Evans ed., The Making of Social Psychology: Discussions with Creative Contributors (New
York: Gardner Press, 1980).
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Each side began to accuse the other of sacrificing “action” on the altar of pure,
rather than applied, scientific research. Joseph Zarefsky, the Council’s research
director and co-director of GHAY, complained to Sutherland repeatedly about
“the academic approach to the planning grant.”225 For his part, Evans claimed that
“many people regard the Council as a ‘perpetual studier’ rather than an action
group.”226 Between April and October 1962, the relationship soured further, as
both Evans and Zarefsky took their complaints to various officials in Washington.
Finally, a frustrated Evans resigned, prompting calls from both Houston and
Washington for Sutherland himself to assume the directorship of GHAY. He
demurred, and managed to convince the warring parties (including Evans, who
returned) to accept instead Robert Ives, appropriately a former Army general.227
Privately, however, Sutherland regretted the President’s Committee’s hasty award
of the planning grant to UH, which had created “a most difficult situation which
probably could have been avoided.”228
This parochial dispute was a microcosm of a broader debate in Houston
over the inadequacy of social services, especially those that affected children and
adolescents. State and local chapters of the National Mental Health Association
recently had mounted a media campaign on behalf of expanded clinical services
for children. A 1958 film, “Help Wanted,” had portrayed children rotting in the
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Zarefsky to Sutherland, 2/15/1962. Sutherland Papers.
Sutherland notes from conference, supra note 86.
227 “Ex-General to Tackle An Insidious Enemy,” Houston Press, 8/23/1962, p.5. JD-HMRC.
Zarefsky to Sutherland, 8/20 and 10/15/1962; Sutherland to Zarefsky, 10/22/1962; Sutherland to
Sanford Kravitz, President’s Committee, 11/21/1962. Sutherland notes from remarks at Houston
delinquency staff meeting, 10/19/1962. Sutherland Papers.
228 Sutherland to Zarefsky, 10/22/1962. Sutherland Papers.
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county’s dilapidated juvenile detention ward.229 Standing squarely in the way of
reform was the city’s business class, whose members not only exercised decisive
influence on city hall but filled the boards of directors of virtually all of Houston’s
service agencies. Their views were made clear in a 1959 opinion survey
conducted by the Community Council, as part of a multiyear “Child Welfare
Study.” Twice as likely as their professional staffs to select “punishment” over
“treatment” for “childhood deviations,” agency boards interpreted behaviors as
“causes” rather than “effects” of social environment. They also expressed a
preference for voluntary over tax-based funds, and dissented from the prevailing
view among their employees that existing services were inadequate.230
This climate of opinion confronted the architects of Greater Houston
Action for Youth with lukewarm public support for a prospective “action
program” intended to empower the poor and to improve the delivery of social
services. Accordingly, Evans opted for a major media campaign even before a
decision had been made on the location of the project’s demonstration area. He
hired Jane Brandenberger, a public relations representative for the United Fund,
as a “media coordinator,” and Mary Ellen Goodman, a UH cultural
anthropologist, as a “community relations coordinator.” A graduate of Columbia
University in the early 1950s, Goodman had expanded on psychologist Kenneth
Clark’s “doll studies” showing that school segregation damaged the self-esteem of
black schoolchildren. After her death in 1969, one of Goodman’s former mentors,
229 Excerpted from “1958 Mental Health Campaign Publicity Report,” Mental Health Association
of Houston and Harris County. Papers of Ima Hogg. Center for American History, University of
Texas at Austin.
230 Child Welfare Study #4, 1/26/1959. HCC.
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Otto Klineberg, praised her first study Race Awareness in Young Children (1952)
as “a classic investigation” that had “played a part in the Supreme Court’s
desegregation decision” in Brown v. Board of Education.231 Goodman functioned
as GHAY’s expert on the psychology and culture of the expected multiracial,
multiethnic population of the eventual demonstration area. Conversely,
Brandenberger’s role was clearly as a liaison to service professionals, influential
citizens, and the general public – in other words, white Houston. Together, Evans,
Brandenberger, and Goodman devised a “media saturation” onslaught that
included three feature-length films, eighteen short videos entitled “Facts About
Houston’s Youth,” radio spots, print advertisements, and a monthly newsletter for
youth-serving agencies and professionals.232
Entitled “Youth in Trouble,” the film series was the “critical” centerpiece
of GHAY’s media campaign. All three local commercial television stations, as
well as the UH educational station, agreed to broadcast each film in the same
prime-time slot. In an age before cable and satellite television, and the Internet,
this arrangement granted GHAY a near-monopoly over the attention of Houston
viewers.233 The first film, “The Lonely Ones,” profiled three semi-fictitious
teenagers whose stories were composites of case files from the county juvenile
court: “Jimmy Johnson,” a lower-class white son of a single mother; “Susie
231

Klineberg foreword to Mary Ellen Goodman, The Culture of Childhood: Child’s-Eye Views of
Society and Culture (New York: Columbia University Teacher’s College Press, 1970), xi. See also
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America’s Struggle for Equality (New York: Random House, 1976), 315-339.
232 Interview with Evans. The details are in Jane Brandenberger, “Communications Outline,”
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233 Ibid.
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Jamison,” a wealthy daughter of an oil family; and “Johnny Garcia,” a “LatinAmerican” son of immigrants. UH drama students portrayed these characters,
while a probation officer narrated from his “own files.” Although “The Lonely
Ones” ended up as the only completed film in the series, it won acclaim outside of
Houston. In September 1963, Richard Evans presented an academic paper at the
annual meeting of the American Psychological Association on “A Unique
Utilization of Television as a Tool of the Behavioral Scientist in Community
Social Action.” Evans’ panel, entitled “New Dimensions Involving Behavioral
Scientists in Social Action,” included two Peace Corps officials and Kenneth
Clark, who spoke on his soon to be ill-fated Harlem Youth Opportunities
Unlimited delinquency project.234 According to Evans, “The Lonely Ones” also
won an “honorable mention” award at that year’s San Francisco Film Festival.235
Clearly, the film struck a chord with both social scientists and liberal reformers.
The film began with two brief addresses to the audience.236 First, Evans
himself testified to the film’s authenticity and warned that delinquency was “far
more complex than any single film could portray.” These disclaimers recalled the
messages attached to controversial popular films about teenagers such as
Blackboard Jungle (1955). Where that film told the story of juvenile delinquents
from a teacher’s perspective, the point of view in “The Lonely Ones” was an
amalgam of a psychologist and a middle-class parent. As Houston Congressman
234 “Proceedings of the American Psychological Association Annual Conference for 1963,”
American Psychologist (1963), 771. Evans to Sutherland, 3/12/1963. Sutherland Papers.
235 Interview with Evans. Evans owns the only surviving copy of the film, but has expressed no
desire to release it for a viewing.
236 Unless otherwise noted, the following descriptions come from a script for “The Lonely Ones”
dated October 1962. Sutherland Papers.
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Albert Thomas noted on camera, “only three percent” of local teenagers broke the
law, but “these eight thousand children cost you and me thousands of dollars
every year.” Assured that their own children were not delinquents, viewers
learned that other people’s kids were draining the public treasury.
The first vignette begins with a group of rather middle-class looking white
teenagers who go on a drunken joyride in a stolen car (see figure 7). A police
chase leads to a crash that kills all of the teenage passengers. As the narrator
fulminates over the “senselessness” of the incident, a flashback tells the backstory
of its architect, Jimmy. He lived in the San Felipe Courts, a public housing project
located in an all-black neighborhood but designated by the city for whites only.
None of this is mentioned in the film; clearly viewers were to understand that
Jimmy was poor. The head of the household is a single mother with five children
by four different men. She routinely parades men in front of Jimmy; one cut has
her ushering a strange man into the bedroom while a troubled Jimmy looks on.
Next we see Jimmy in juvenile court, a situation brought on by years of petty
crime and underage drinking; bizarrely, Harris County Juvenile Judge J.W. Mills
sentences the fictitious Jimmy to the Gatesville School for Boys. The film
portrays Gatesville, a state juvenile training school, as a compassionate and
orderly place that provides the wayward Jimmy with both education and
counseling. “Flashes of sullenness and defiance,” however, give telltale signs that
it is already too late for Jimmy.
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Figure 7: Promotional still shots from “The Lonely Ones”
“Old friends... a stolen car... a bottle of booze... and trouble was back in Jim’s
life” (original caption).

“At the Texas Youth Council correctional institution in Gatesville, Texas, Jimmy
went to school” (original caption).
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“His life is snuffed out, too. He was quite a football star in high school last
season.”

Upon his release from Gatesville, Jimmy finds that his mother has
abandoned him, and so he moves in with a foster family on a country ranch. In
this idealized setting, Jimmy finds happiness and “loving parents,” a fleeting state
of affairs. When he returns to school, Jimmy “immediately” falls in with “the
wrong kind of friends.” He fights with his foster parents, runs away to Houston,
and begins committing crimes, all of which culminates in the fatal crash. As the
camera lingers on the bloodied bodies of Jimmy and his friends, the narrator
laments his passengers’ lost potential, as well as his “lifetime of deprivation.”
Aimless and angry, Jimmy rebelled against “the lonely position,” a description
that erases his material conditions and leaves only his neglectful mother to blame.
“Susie” suffers from similar problems, despite her parents’ extreme
wealth. She is the illegitimate daughter of an alcoholic heiress and a deceased
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businessman. Her mother has remarried, unwisely, a nightclub singer who has
insinuated his way into the family. This soap opera scenario is intended to
illustrate the contention that not all delinquents come from “economically
deprived” homes, but this assertion of typicality seems unpersuasive. Susie’s
stepfather assaults her regularly while her drunken mother ignores her. By age
fifteen, Susie had “slowly turned into a wanton little creature” who was sexually
precocious and emotionally unstable. We see her picking a fight with another girl
at school, and later “dancing suggestively” with boys; the narrator describes Susie
as “a wild, sensual youngster on the surface” but “scarred” by her home life.
Local service agencies like the YWCA turn her away, partly because of her
“sudden twists in attitude” and partly due to her own refusal to accept help. “I’m
no poor slob from the slums, looking for a hand-out from you social workers,” she
sneers. Soon Susie descends into addiction and prostitution, living in the slums
with a junkie boyfriend. The story ends with her detoxing in the county juvenile
detention ward. Again, the film lays all responsibility with selfish and corrupt
parents; nowhere does it question the failure of social agencies to “reach” Susie.
Finally, the probation officer-narrator introduces his “first Latin-American
case,” fifteen year old Johnny Garcia. A widower, Johnny’s father is nevertheless
diligent, hard-working, and loving. He accepts help from the local social agencies;
we see him with a Rusk social worker learning how to budget his meager income.
But Johnny is often on his own, struggling to overcome “the plight of the Latin,
who finds the cultural background and patterns of the Anglo-American quite
varied and different from his own.” Punctuating his inability to “adjust,” we see
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him pick a fight during a Little League baseball game. He is irrational, “hotblooded,” physically small, but basically good at heart. At age twelve, he stabs
another boy in a knife fight, leading to two years on probation. At school, “patient
teachers” build his “self-esteem,” but then, much like Jimmy, he falls in with a
bad crowd. “As angry with society as he had ever been,” his new friends
“rekindle... his old fear and rage of being born underprivileged... [and] denied the
love of his mother.” In short order, Johnny becomes “the brains” of the gang, as
images flash by of the boys ransacking the rock and roll section of a record store.
After a number of crimes, the gang disintegrates in a drunken fratricidal
episode. When a boy mocks Johnny’s smallness, he lapses into a “distorted fury”
and launches a “swift and savage” knife attack. In the ensuing melee, all filmed to
the “rhythm of loud... rock and roll music,” Johnny winds up accidentally killing
his best friend. As the victim crumples to the floor, the music gives way to a
“scratching needle:” Johnny’s violent binge is over. He is a quintessential
“emotional delinquent” left “caught... not by the police... but by his own
conscience.” The story ends with Johnny’s probation officer learning by phone
that he has committed suicide, while his best friend’s corpse is carted off in the
immediate background.
Other than the reliance on class and ethnic stereotypes, a telling aspect of
the film is the paucity of dialogue allotted to the teenagers themselves. It is less
interested in telling the “delinquent’s own story” than in highlighting parental
failures. Two of the three stories imply a solution of replacement rather than
rehabilitation of parents. In Johnny Garcia’s case, the absence of a mother feeds
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into a larger narrative of “hypermasculinity” that social scientists of the day
thought went hand-in-hand with both cultural conflict and the increasingly
racialized “culture of poverty.” The brief acknowledgement of socioeconomic
environment seems to allow the film to emphasize individual and family disorders
without

appearing

narrowly

psychological

in

orientation.

Even

more

conspicuously, the film omits any mention of racial discrimination; where once
psychologists had convinced the Supreme Court that segregated schools fostered
feelings of inferiority in black children, here we see a Mexican American teenager
from the barrio whose lack of “self-esteem” stems only from his lack of a mother
and a middle-class standard of living. Indeed, the absence of African American
characters belied their overrepresentation in the Harris County juvenile probation
rolls. If the interests of the presumed white audience were served in this regard, so
too were those of the local social agencies that were cooperating with GHAY; in
all three stories, service professionals appear as eager providers of compassion,
education, and therapy.
The script’s bleak conclusion became a source of further conflict amongst
the GHAY staff. While Evans was directing the film in December 1962, he
clashed with co-creators Brandenberger and Goodman. He wanted to rewrite the
ending “to make it more hopeful,” which Brandenberger deemed “too soft.”237
Both women resigned on the same day, citing a “sudden change” in GHAY’s
direction. In a vague and roundabout statement, Goodman recounted that she “had
urged the project to deal with juvenile problems at various economic levels as
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well as in depressed and underprivileged areas – and to have the program
presented to inspire a big community response as opposed to one [that] might
merely be imposed on the community.”238 This objection may have been to the
choice of three archetypes of delinquency with whom few viewers were likely to
relate. Portrayed by clean-cut college students, the main characters came from
every class background but the middle-class. The paradox was that the focus on
psychological disorders placed the three characters onto terrain largely occupied
by the middle-class in the 1950s and 60s, even as the facts of their stories
departed from the specific experiences of most viewers.
Conclusion: Typecasting Political Protest as Youth Rebellion
On the night of May 16, 1967, Texas Southern University (TSU), a
historically black college located in the heart of GHAY’s demonstration area,
exploded in violence. Police surrounded the campus, allegedly to arrest
individuals suspected of possessing guns and intent on using them against “the
duly constituted city authority.”239 A shot was fired, the source of which remains
in dispute, followed by extended gunfire resulting in the death of one policeman.
Police concentrated several thousand rounds of ammunition into two men’s
dormitories, then stormed them and arrested about five hundred students.
Although police found no guns, and the initial source of gunshots remained in
dispute, city officials and the white press uniformly praised police restraint and
held up the dead rookie cop as a martyr of the Silent Majority’s victimization
238 “2 Quit Youth Program in Policy Differences,” HP, 12/19/1962, news clipping. Sutherland
Papers.
239 See John S. Lash et al., Texas Southern University: From Separation to Special Designation
(Houston: Texas Southern University, 1975), 33-34.
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from Sixties political violence. Houston Mayor Louie Welch accused the TSU
administration of lax discipline; onetime “get-tough” juvenile judge and current
City Councilman Bill Elliott charged “outside agitators” with planning the riot;
Texas Governor John Connally contemplated closing the university down; and
District Representative George Bush called for “law and order.”240 Newsweek
dubbed the episode “a Happening of the Stokely Generation,” a reference to
recent visits from James Forman and Stokely Carmichael of the Student NonViolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).241 By 1967, SNCC had come to
embody a more militant and identity-based African American social movement,
which seemed to give license to white officials who expected black protest to turn
violent. Later reports, however, found not only that police had initiated most of
the violence, but that a ricocheting police bullet had been responsible for the one
police fatality. Black community leaders such as the Reverend William Lawson,
and the five TSU students arrested and then released on murder charges, later
remembered it as a police riot.242
Liberal-minded observers familiar with race relations in Houston, and with
TSU specifically, were also taken aback. In 1947, the Texas legislature had
chartered TSU in Houston’s Fifth Ward in a last-ditch effort to avoid compliance
with an imminent Supreme Court order desegregating the University of Texas.243
240 “5 Charged in TSU Riot Fatal to Young Officer,” Houston Post, 5/18/1967, p.1; “Elliott
Claims TSU Riot ‘Premeditated,’” HP, 5/20/1967.
241 “The Stokely Generation,” Newsweek 49:22 (5/29/1967), p.24-25.
242 Bill Helmer, “Nightmare in Houston,” Texas Observer, 6/9-23/1967, p.1-6; Leslie Linthicum,
“Nightmare at TSU in ’67 Still Spawns Controversy,” Houston Post, 5/11/1987, p.1. On SNCC,
see Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (1981).
243 The case, of course, was Sweatt v. Painter, decided by the Court in 1950. See Lash, Texas
Southern University.
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While historically black colleges such as Fisk and Howard seethed with civil
rights activity in subsequent years, TSU shared with much of black Houston a
reputation for apathy; one liberal journalist had pronounced the city’s blacks
“among the most politically docile and backward in the South, if not the nation.”
SNCC organizers likewise had been frustrated in earlier efforts to mobilize
Houston’s large black population.244
If nothing else, the TSU shoot-out undercut this presumption of racial
consensus. “Few TSU students actually fired on the police,” observed Newsweek,
“but a good many more talked as if they wished they had.” The article quoted one
student at length: “Kill some more of ‘em… This is a new day, honkie. And this is
a new Negro. We’re not afraid of you – and we’re not running anymore.”245
Grievances long ignored in the white press came to the surface. Only a few days
earlier, the drowning of a child in a landfill located in the nearby Sunnyside
neighborhood had sparked protests. The morning of the TSU standoff, students
and SNCC activists had blocked garbage trucks from entering the landfill. At a
nearby middle school, protesters objected to the suspension of black students for
fighting with white students. Student activists also mounted grievances on the
TSU campus, including the revocation of SNCC’s status as a student
organization; the hiring of black faculty; police brutality; and the refusal to close
244 Saul Friedman, “Houston, a Backwater of the Revolt,” Texas Observer, 11/15/1963, p.8-10.
On the historic reputation of apathy, see James M. SoRelle, “Race Relations in ‘Heavenly
Houston,’” Black Dixie, 175-191. In fact, TSU students led sit-ins that successfully desegregated
lunch counters in downtown Houston, often against the wishes of black TSU administrators. See
F. Kenneth Jensen, “The Houston Sit-In Movement of 1960-61,” Black Dixie, 211-222. For a
penetrating personal reminiscence, see Part One of Thomas R. Cole, No Color is My Kind: The
Life of Eldrewey Stearns and the Integration of Houston (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1997).
245 “The Stokely Generation,” supra note 104.
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Wheeler Avenue, a main thoroughfare that ran right through the middle of the
TSU campus.
Several leading SNCC “militants” were paid employees of the Harris
County Community Action Association (HCCAA), an antipoverty agency funded
by the Office for Economic Opportunity. HCCAA director Samuel Price was one
of the star witnesses of the Houston delegation that testified before the U.S.
Senate committee on urban riots in November 1967.246 A TSU graduate, Price had
worked for the Neighborhood Centers Association for thirteen years before
becoming involved with Greater Houston Action for Youth in spring 1962. He
claimed to have “more or less designed” GHAY, the direct precursor to his
antipoverty program.
Blair Justice, a sociologist at Rice University and advisor to Mayor Welch
on race relations, surveyed the opinions of high school and college age AfricanAmericans twice in 1967, before and after the TSU “riot.”247 He found about
two-thirds in favor of “SNCC Black Power” initially, a number that “rose
sharply… off and on campus” after May. Justice’s task was to take the pulse of
Houston’s black community and find out if an urban uprising on the order of
Watts was imminent. In analyzing his results, Justice turned largely to the field of
adolescent psychology. He argued that the “identity crisis” was especially painful
246 Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion comes from Testimony of Samuel L. Price,
Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations. U.S. Congress. 90th Congress. 1st
Session. November 1, 2, 3, and 6, 1967. Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967), 61-144. A brief summary of the TSU incident appeared in U.S. National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(New York: Bantam Books, 1968), 40-41.
247 The following section comes from Blair Justice, Violence in the City (Texas Christian
University Press, 1969); and Justice’s testimony in Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, 310-340.
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for black adolescents, some of whom resorted to compensatory “negative
identities;” Justice provides extended sketches of two such “types” – the political
activist found on college campuses and the juvenile delinquent or criminal found
on ghetto streets - which he labels, respectively, “the black revolutionary” and
“the rebel without a cause.” In his mind, these types corresponded to the leaders
and the followers in urban mobs. Both suffered from a version of inferiority
complex, according to Justice. For him, black separatism represented a deep
insecurity about competing with better-prepared whites in the academic and
economic marketplace; Black Power specifically relied on an exaggerated
masculinity that reacted against generations of being called “boy.” The black
“rebel,” in Justice’s hands, saw in mob rioting an outlet for inchoate frustration
and a source of “kicks.” Justice circulated these opinions in a lengthy published
study, Violence in the City, and in Senate testimony.
Why did city officials respond to well-grounded protests with what seem
to have been demeaning psychoanalyses based on adolescent “storm and stress?”
Although there are many reasons, the precedent set by Greater Houston Action for
Youth is important. In the years following the melodramatic infighting of the
professionals, and the lofty promises of “action,” GHAY produced three massive
reports.248 They revealed data on Houston’s paucity of publicly-financed social
services; outlined “action” programs that involved community residents with
248

The following discussion summarizes these reports: “Greater Houston Action for Youth: A
Community Project to Plan for the Prevention and Control of Delinquency Sponsored by
University of Houston and Community Council of Houston and Harris County,” January 1964;
“Houston Action for Youth: Application for a Community Action Program,” May 27, 1965;
“Houston Action for Youth: Application for Renewal of a Community Action Program,” May 23,
1966. HMRC.

144

private welfare agencies; and described the Houston Independent School
District’s eventual willingness to support federal programs such as Head Start.
More fundamentally, they described the demonstration area itself while including
very little qualitative detail about the people that lived there. The results of
various opinion surveys appeared without so much as a quote from their
participants, and the wishes of “community leaders” came across in vague, third
person prose. This rhetorical style comported nicely with GHAY’s assumption
that the residents lacked “competence,” belonged to a “culture of poverty,” and
therefore needed to learn most the art of “self-help.” The “bootstraps” emphasis
became even more pronounced after GHAY’s first year, when most of the UH
academics, including Richard Evans, departed and left the reins in the hands of
the older social workers affiliated with the Community Council. Where Evans had
stressed fostering “self-determination” among community residents, later reports
ventured down the slippery slope to an older notion of self-help that, in Evans’
recollection, simply perpetuated a form of dependency upon private welfare
agencies.249
Citing the Neighborhood Centers Association’s project in Clayton Homes,
which sat adjacent to GHAY’s demonstration area, Evans fashioned a program
based on the idea of the “therapeutic community.” But he added a second
approach, a “correctional community” – language that evoked a prison without
walls, or, more precisely, a juvenile reform school.250 Only a few hours’ drive
away, the Gatesville juvenile complex used walls, barbed wire fences, and armed
249
250
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guards on horseback to contain an inmate population that included a
disproportionate number of black teenagers from GHAY’s demonstration area.
Evans’ metaphor implied that the boundaries were equally firm, if not quite as
visible, in Houston’s inner-city neighborhoods. Although a history of racism,
structural inequality, and police force hemmed in Houston’s ghettos and barrios,
GHAY’s reports (especially after Evans’ departure) consistently followed the
prevailing social thought that the urban poor’s imprisonment was their own doing.
Adults and teenagers alike were “delinquents” suffering from arrested
development, in need of “life skills” and therapeutic services rather than political
empowerment.
By 1966, the final year of GHAY’s existence, it was clear that the project
had accomplished little. The final report provided statistics that showed little
improvement in the rates for crime, juvenile delinquency, or poverty in the
demonstration area. So detached was GHAY from its initial “scientific” mission
that it failed to generate its own data on its client population. Its most precise and
developed data came from the U.S. Census, the Harris County Probation
Department, and city welfare agencies. The only real activities described in the
1966 report were neighborhood clubs, discussion groups, vocational programs,
and Head Start and child care services. Instead of creating “opportunity” for
downtrodden teenagers, GHAY had become a glorified service coordination
agency.251
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A lesson learned from the struggles of the delinquency and poverty
programs was that no one academic discipline held a monopoly on solutions to
urban problems. In 1964, Robert Sutherland joined with Lloyd Ohlin and Judge
David Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in calling for
interdisciplinary solutions to urban crime. The Southwest Center for Law and the
Behavioral Sciences, opened that year on the UT campus, offered training courses
for police officers (most notably from Houston under GHAY’s sponsorship).
Reformers, many with good intentions, had subordinated the actual needs
of children and teenagers while reducing the adult population to the status of a
collective and unruly adolescence. At the Houston Settlement Association, young
people were divided into “teenagers” and “at-risk” youth, in a way that seemed
logical at the time but has contributed to the tendency to view young people of
color as adults rather than teenagers. Simultaneously, the adult population of inner
city neighborhoods increasingly inhabited notions of “underdevelopment” or
delayed adolescence. Both the settlements and the 1960s’ community action
movement embraced the notion of a “therapeutic community” that resembled
nothing so much as a juvenile reform school. Perhaps this made sense because the
teenagers who lived in urban areas were filling up Texas’ state juvenile reform
schools in growing numbers. As we shall see, therapeutic ideas based on “child
mental health” made their way into the juvenile justice system in Texas, but often
papered over practices that were brutal and damaging for adolescents. To invoke
the reform school in neighborhood work was to inspire mistrust in residents for
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whom the Texas juvenile justice institutions held a fearsome reputation that had
little to with “development” or “rehabilitation.”
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Chapter 4: Ministering to “Hurt, Frightened, Children”: The Rise
and Fall of the Texas Youth Council, 1949-1971
In his 1964 autobiography, My Shadow Ran Fast, ex-convict Bill Sands
introduced American readers to the Preston State Reformatory in California.
Located in a remote, desolate area, Preston operated under military-style
discipline and a ranking system based on toughness. Preston boys fought each
other for the pleasure of their jailers, endured severe punishments for minor
transgressions, and spent long hours laboring in oppressively hot weather. This
system usually bludgeoned new inmates into submission; however, Sands rebelled
against it. He attacked guards, laughing at them as they dragged him off to
solitary confinement. Later he escaped Preston, only to return voluntarily in order
to mock his would-be captors further. Thanks to the intervention of his father, a
prominent local judge, Sands eventually won his release. Praising Sands’
“excellent progress” in Preston, a juvenile judge pronounced him rehabilitated.
“Who was he kidding?” sneered Sands. He “scoffed at what was termed ‘justice’”
and used “lessons learned in Preston” to commit a series of armed robberies.252
Soon after, Sands landed in San Quentin Prison, where only a fortuitous encounter
with a sympathetic warden transformed him from a career criminal into a lifelong
counselor of prisoners and ex-convicts.
It wasn’t supposed to work this way. The Preston State Reformatory
belonged to the California Youth Authority, a state agency created in a national
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wave of criminal justice reform during the 1940s. The template for the CYA was
the Model Youth Correction Authority Act, authored and disseminated by the
American Law Institute (a New York based consortium of criminal justice
experts) in 1941. The Act’s genesis came from a 1938 study of the Tombs prison
in New York, which found that “youthful offenders” aged 16-21 suffered
“disastrous” emotional damage behind bars. But while the Act aimed to treat
nonviolent young adult offenders separately from more hardened criminals, state
legislatures used it as a blueprint to expand and reorganize existing juvenile
justice institutions. In California, Texas, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Massachusetts,
and the District of Columbia, previously separate training schools for delinquents
now fell under the purview of a single state agency. The youth authority flexed
intellectual as well as legal muscle, setting up programs based on the latest
scientific knowledge about human behavior. In this new regime, young offenders
like Sands were to receive “genuine treatment” instead of the “retributive
punishment” that, according to the Law Institute’s reformers, had characterized
training schools for decades.253 Staffed and run by mental health professionals,
the state youth authority was to provide an individualized treatment program
based on a careful diagnosis. Additionally, the youth authority was to promulgate
neighborhood youth programs to keep teenagers out of trouble and effect
rehabilitation outside the walls of the training school. Lowering the inmate
populations of training schools, thought policymakers, would create more
253
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favorable staff-inmate ratios and put an end to the mass-custody feel of the
institution. In turn, juvenile justice would edge closer to its historic goal of
rehabilitation.254
Published nearly twenty years after the creation of the California Youth
Authority, My Shadow Ran Fast suggests that the experiment was a failure. Sands
describes poorly educated, thuggish guards, as well as practices that seem to bear
little relationship to rehabilitation. His story was neither the first nor the last of its
kind; to this day, institutions that brutalize and fail troubled youth surface in news
reports with disturbing regularity.255 However, Sands’ book appeared in the
forefront of a historic shift in attitudes toward the juvenile delinquent. If the
decade of the 1950s was an “age of experts,” the 1960s and 70s comprised a time
when many Americans, particularly those of college age, increasingly questioned
the authority of official experts. While young counterculturalists and New Leftists
rejected their parents’ assumptions about a “normal” coming of age, a generation
of reformers sought to hold juvenile justice accountable for ensuring a “normal”
adolescence for its charges. By the mid-1970s, this “loose coalition of concerned
parents, older students, citizen and professional advocates, and public officials”
had formed what the child welfare administrator Peter Edelman would dub “the
children’s rights movement.”256
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To speak of children’s rights was to invoke the ideals that had animated
the so-called “child savers” of the Progressive Era. Social reforms such as the
juvenile court, lowering the age of consent, compulsory schooling, ending child
labor, and mothers’ pensions, together articulated what the historian Kriste
Lindenmeyer has called “a right to childhood.”257 In 1912, this idea found an
institutional home in the federal Children’s Bureau, which conducted studies of
children and youth, drafted and lobbied for reform legislation, and disseminated
information about the dangers threatening the physical and moral health of youth.
They believed that a rational state could and should act “in the best interests of the
child,” even assuming the role of surrogate parent, particularly for the children
working-class and single-mother households.258 In the juvenile court, this
principle was encoded in the English legal doctrine of parens patriae, which gave
the state the right to intervene in family matters to safeguard a child’s welfare.259
A right to childhood, based largely on a notion of child welfare, differed
significantly from “children’s rights,” which drew upon the civil rights and
identity-based social movements of the 1960s. Child welfare required the use of
scientifically managed institutions for “dependent and delinquent” youth;
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children’s rights often called for the liberation of young people from those same
institutions. Both concepts admitted the developmental uniqueness of childhood
and adolescence; however, the cultural idea of the “teenager” and the
psychological theory of identity formation, both of which gained widespread
acceptance after World War II, separated children’s rights activists from their
Progressive Era predecessors. Nowhere was this distinction clearer than in the
civil rights-era rash of public attacks and lawsuits directed at juvenile training
schools, which accused them of obstructing rather than clearing the path to a
“normal” coming of age. Journalists, legislators, parents, attorneys, and younger
social scientists regularly combined the rhetoric of rights with language drawn
from Erik Erikson’s writings on adolescent identity. In the case of black and
Latino youth, who comprised an outsized percentage of juvenile inmates, critics
evaluated the damage done to individual identity partly by way of institutional
discrimination. Class-action lawsuits, most notably Morales v. Turman (1974) in
Texas, demanded that juvenile training schools either make massive changes or
shut down altogether.
But the children’s rights movement mounted far more than a legal
challenge to established practices. Through the mass media, activists and
advocates sought to change the way Americans thought about young people in
trouble. Protracted reform campaigns often preceded the filing of lawsuits against
local and state agencies. Critics of juvenile justice testified before legislative
committees, helped create damning television documentaries, and mobilized
parent and citizen groups. The scope of this activity suggests the extent to which
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officially constituted experts had monopolized public discourse about juvenile
delinquency. Like their critics, these entrenched professionals had addressed
discrete audiences with well-crafted appeals to popular fears about juvenile crime;
citizen groups’ concerns about the rehabilitation of troubled youth; professional
organizations’ searching for contributions to scientific knowledge about
delinquency and corrections; and governments’ interests in law and order,
achieved efficiently and on a low budget.
This chapter tells an emblematic story from the “prehistory” of the
children’s rights campaigns, focusing on the heyday of the “youth authority”
approach to juvenile delinquency in Texas, which instituted one of the earliest
model agencies in 1949 and became a battleground state for children’s rights two
decades later. Part One explores the Texas State Youth Development Council’s
public relations campaign of the early 1950s. Officials embarked on barnstorming
tours across the state, urging citizen groups in cities and towns to support
taxpayer-financed reforms of institutions. Often these changes simply cast a
scientific veneer over damaging practices such as racial segregation or excessive
use of physical force, a trend that boded ill for the Youth Council because the
inmate population grew increasingly urban and nonwhite in the postwar decades.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, a black legislator helped lead an investigation of
the Youth Council in the late 1960s, the subject of Section Two. I explore the
dueling representations of the juvenile delinquent that accompanied a debate
waged in the print and electronic media. In the face of mounting public criticism,
the Youth Council’s connections to powerful state politicians staved off an
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embarrassing investigation. This victory proved temporary, as demonstrated in
Section Three, where I describe the events leading up to Morales v. Turman, a
class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of incarcerated juveniles in February 1971. By
then, the Youth Council had lost control over portrayals of both itself and the
group of young people it purported to serve. Once viewed as a caring but tough
surrogate parent to wayward youth, the Youth Council increasingly appeared to
produce the kind of “maladjustment” that it had been created to correct.
The invention of “child mental health” forms a crucial component to this
story. The Hogg Foundation for Mental Health represented an institutional home
for academic research on the subject; the Houston Settlement Association put its
“action” theories into practice. The men who launched the Texas State Youth
Development Council in the 1940s and 50s held graduate degrees from the
University of Texas and had studied under Hogg Foundation associates. They
envisioned the Youth Council as an instrument through which child mental health
could, at long last, be applied on a systematic basis to its original target
population: juvenile delinquents. In the process, they set a standard for treatment
that proved difficult to achieve in practice. Individual prejudices, budgetary
problems, and professional ambitions combined to perpetuate and even expand
the use of lockdown institutions that mixed nonserious with violent offenders. At
the same time, the Youth Council’s public statements echoed other child mental
health spokespersons in promulgating a more compassionate way of talking about
troubled teenagers. While the discursive juvenile delinquent increasingly became
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an object of sympathy, the juvenile inmate languished in a prison environment
that too often taught self-destructive lessons, as in the case of Bill Sands.
I. “Child by Child We Build a Nation”: Reforming Juvenile Justice, 1949-1957
The delinquent boy is the most misunderstood, misrepresented, misguided
and mistreated individual in Texas… The criminologist analyzes and
classifies him. The philosophers theorize and speculate about him. The
sentimentalists weep over and mollycoddle him. The politician rants and
raves over him. The preacher advises and admonishes him. The club
women advise and criticize the management of him. The policeman
watches and chases him. His mother scolds and pets him. His father
knocks and kicks him. His family is ashamed of him. The world has it in
for him and a devil of a bit of difference does it make to him. He is an
animated junkheap, a veritable Ishmaelite, a wild man, whose hand is
against every man and every man’s hand is against him.260
So spoke A.W. Eddins, the superintendent of the Gatesville State Juvenile
Training School for Boys, before an audience of San Antonio teachers in
November 1914. From his bully pulpit, Eddins portrayed the juvenile delinquent
(usually presumed to be male) as a “rebel without a cause,” the product of a
society in which traditional pathways to adult manhood had begun to disappear.
For Eddins, the clearest example of these broad changes was the replacement of
paid labor with compulsory school attendance, which subjected adolescent boys
to “lax, uncertain, makeshift discipline” and “laws that are never enforced.”
Mocking the “play-like work” of urban vocational high schools, Eddins called for
“four hours of honest manual labor every day.”

Boys in trouble came

predominantly from the city because, in his view, the average country boy worked
“in the fields with his father or on the chores about the house.” Eddins concluded
260
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his diatribe by admonishing public schoolteachers to “make men rather than
scholars” and “pay more attention to character.”261
Eddins correctly identified the trend toward full-time education for
adolescents, and the ways in which it created what the historian Joseph Kett has
called “semi-dependency” upon adults.262 Moreover, he joined this criticism with
fears that the progressive curriculum derived from the pedagogical experiments of
John Dewey subjected boys to emasculating “play work” and thus inspired
delinquent behavior.263 The antidote for boy victims of the new schooling was
located in the yeoman past, in what Eddins called “stern discipline of the old
Puritan home.” His predecessors had felt the same way when they located
America’s first juvenile reformatories in the countryside; recall also the
Children’s Aid Society program of relocating urban “street Arabs” in rural foster
homes. Compulsory schooling and curriculum reform merely added to the list of
reasons for locating juvenile training schools in the “virtuous” countryside.264
Eddins presided over an institution that exemplified such viewpoints. The
Gatesville State School for Boys, originally named the House of Correction and
Reformatory, was located a couple of miles outside of the small town of
Gatesville in east Texas, on a plot of land that had enamored the state
261
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commissioners who had selected it in 1887. “The lay of the land is most
beautiful,” wrote one, “and commands the most beautiful and picturesque scenery
we have ever had the pleasure of witnessing.”265 Within a year the facility was up
and running; inmates lived, studied, and worked in two buildings “of imposing
appearance and pleasing to the eye, [with] scarcely a resemblance to a prison.”266
In its first fifty years, Gatesville offered its boys moral uplift through hard work,
strict discipline, vocational training, and religious instruction. A 1932 yearbook,
disseminated to the parents of juvenile inmates, trumpets the school’s virtues in
language that had changed little over the years. Photographs of dour-faced
ministerial administrators appear above captions describing their “diligence,
force, and thrift.” The school’s exterior radiates order and harmony; grim-faced
boys are pictured working in various vocational shops, marching in military
formations, and posing inside their “meticulously scrubbed” dormitories.
Relegated to the back of the book is the Jim Crow dormitory, a small and
obscurely located one-room building into which nearly two hundred black
teenagers crowded every night. The final image, entitled “A Gala Occasion,”
shows two boys dressed in suits alongside the superintendent. “Godspeed in their
efforts,” reads the caption, “to face the battles of life in a manly courageous
way.”267 One parolee smiles mischievously while reclined comfortably in a chair,
indicating, perhaps, a boy who has not yet inculcated the lessons of Gatesville.
265 Report of the Commissioners and Trustees of the House of Correction and Reformatory,
located at Gatesville, Coryell County (Austin: State Printing House, 1888), 1-2. Texas Youth
Commission Facilities and Programs History and Information Notebooks. Archives and
Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission (hereafter TYC
Notebooks).
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A decade and a half later, Gatesville’s approach to the juvenile delinquent
underwent a major overhaul. In 1948, the Texas legislature created the Training
School Code Commission to investigate a host of failings attributed to the state’s
institutions for juvenile delinquents. One-third to one-half of all inmates at the
state schools were repeat offenders; a survey of the state’s prisons found that over
half of all adult criminals convicted in the previous decade were “graduates” of
the schools for juvenile delinquents. So notorious were the state schools’
reputations that many juvenile judges had become reluctant to commit all but the
most violent offenders, even in the face of rising juvenile crime. At Gatesville, the
physical plant had fallen into disrepair. Electrical outages were commonplace,
while the cafeteria and hospital were dangerously unsanitary. Equally out of date
were brutal and bizarre punishments, notorious among guards and inmates but
less well known on the outside. Perhaps the worst of these was the “water cure,”
in which guards fired a high-pressure hose at the groin of any boy unfortunate
enough to break the wrong rules. Delinquent girls also had become the subjects of
inventive, near medieval style punishments. At the Gainesville Training School
for Girls, located near Dallas, potential runaways were made to wear ankle chains
and sometimes had their heads shaven by guards.268
Texas was hardly alone in harboring such well-publicized abuses. Albert
Deutsch, the author of a best-selling expose of institutions for the mentally ill,
turned his muckraking pen to the subject of the nation’s juvenile training schools
in Our Rejected Children (1950). His detailed compilation of horror stories,
268
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punctuated by the tale of a Kansas girls’ school that sterilized its most
“ungovernable” inmates, prompted Deutsch to pronounce the American training
school “a disgraceful blot on a democratic and rich society.”269 However, Deutsch
spared one agency from criticism: the California Youth Authority. Deutsch was
especially impressed with the CYA’s use of scientific methods of diagnosis,
classification, and treatment, which he credited with cutting down on abuses of
inmates. A major influence on Deutsch was Austin MacCormick, a criminologist,
member of the American Law Institute, and leading authority on corrections
reform. MacCormick headed the Osborne Foundation, which had sponsored
investigations of juvenile training schools in the 1930s, and was a leading
proponent of ending corporal punishment. Writing in the preface to Deutsch’s
book, he acknowledged the obstacles to reform. The public either supported or
ignored practices that a growing number of experts deemed, at best, ageinappropriate. It fell to younger professionals, therefore, to arouse the collective
conscience of the populace. MacCormick urged younger professionals toward a
more activist role in enacting reforms. Their task, he wrote, was to teach
Americans to view the juvenile delinquent as “a human being... with the warmth
of human understanding and not merely through the eyes of cold science.”270
As a roving consultant, MacCormick developed a relationship with the
Texas Youth Council that would last for over two decades. In 1948-49, he worked
closely with Walter Kinsolving Kerr on Child by Child We Build a Nation, a
269 Albert Deutsch, Our Rejected Children (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1950), 3. Other
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report that served as a blueprint for the Youth Council. Kerr was vice-chairman of
the Texas Training School Code Commission and became the agency’s first
director in 1949. His background, while not suggestive of a person destined to
become a youth expert, nevertheless prepared Kerr well for the position. The son
of a lumber and cotton businessman from East Texas, Kerr often had displayed a
knack for performing in front of audiences. He had starred on his high school
football team in Teague, Texas, and served as president of the University Light
Opera Company for three years while pursuing a law degree at the University of
Texas, which he obtained in 1937. Instead of practicing law, however, Kerr
abruptly moved to New York City to pursue a career in theatre or radio. Within a
year, he returned with a new bride and opened a law practice in Lufkin. Soon he
was working on the staff of Democratic governor Coke Stevenson, a job that
brought Kerr to Austin, which was in the midst of reforming its county services
for juveniles.271 In 1948, Kerr convinced county officials to support the
construction of a new juvenile detention center in south Austin, and wrote a
Master’s thesis in sociology about his effort.272 During this time, Kerr became the
pastor of the Central Methodist Church near the UT campus, chairing the church’s
“social action committee” and gaining access to local and state power brokers.273
Well-connected and conversant with government bureaucracy, social science, and
moral suasion, Kerr proved an ideal choice to spearhead the Texas reform effort.
271

“A Crusader for Freedom,” Dallas Herald, 10/21/1962. “Walter K. Kerr” Vertical File, CAH.
Walter Kinsolving Kerr, “Juvenile Detention in Austin and Travis County” (unpublished MA
thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1949).
273 “Jester Will Recommend Adoption of Extensive Youth Program,” Houston Chronicle,
2/6/1949. Scrapbooks, State Youth Development Council, 1949-1955. Archives and Information
Services Division. Texas State Library and Archives Commission (hereafter TYC Scrapbooks).
272

161

As the Youth Council legislation made its way through the ratification process in
early 1949, Kerr made several public appearances to tout its contributions to
public safety, the salvation of wayward youth, and modernization of juvenile
facilities, all with a low price tag.274
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Figure 8: “Where Credit Is Due.” Editorial cartoon, Tyler Morning Telegraph
(May 1951).
Community-based youth programs were the early focus of the Texas State Youth
Development Council, which portrayed the typical juvenile delinquent as white
and the social problem of juvenile delinquency as a product of bad parenting.
Courtesy of the Texas State Archives
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Figure 9: “Why Do They Stray?” Editorial cartoon, Austin Statesman (August
1950).
This cartoon accompanied an editorial that made an impassioned case for the
Youth Council’s recreation programs. “A freckle-faced boy, no matter how
straight his mind would be... has no chance to grow up in a hopeless home and
neighborhood environment to self-respect and a decent place in society.” Note
that the figure of “crime” is represented by a woman. Courtesy of the Texas State
Archives.
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A key selling point for the Youth Council was its community service
program, which provided roughly two hundred counties with field consultations
in the agency’s first year (September 1949-August 1950). Juvenile court
procedures varied wildly across the state; some rural counties went without a
juvenile court altogether. All but the largest cities lacked juvenile probation
departments and detention centers, which meant that teenage offenders often
awaited trials alongside adults in county jails. Prevention programs were virtually
non-existent; of over seven hundred incorporated communities, only about twenty
maintained public recreation services.275 “Thousands of children are prone to join
the ‘street corner society,’” warned the Youth Council’s first annual report. “Our
future depends largely upon how we use our leisure time.”276 City councils from
metropolitan areas and small towns alike solicited survey reports from the state’s
experts as a first step to launching public swimming pools, summer camps, and
afterschool programs. Visiting consultants often helped spark the restoration of
teen canteens that had been closed at the end of World War II. Such community
outreach won over county governments as well as a significant segment of the
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populace (see figures 8 and 9).277 In its first two years, the Youth Council helped
start twenty-two new county recreation departments.278
Adding to its professional credentials, the Youth Council led the Texas
delegation to the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth.
Director Walter Kerr served as Vice Chairman of the national Conference
Committee on State and Local Action, which examined on a state-by-state basis
needs in education, recreation, mental health, housing, and juvenile justice. To a
great extent, the Committee’s report displayed the dominance of child mental
health over all aspects of planning on juvenile delinquency. Supervised recreation,
school counseling, and clinical therapy comprised the spectrum of prevention.
Placement of an adjudged juvenile delinquent increasingly relied upon a
classification system based on a psychiatric diagnosis. The training school itself
was to offer a controlled environment for the schooling, recreation, and therapy
that presumably had been lacking on the outside, and thus provide
rehabilitation.279
Another way in which local communities encountered the Youth Council
was through its mobile diagnostic clinic, which traveled to eight counties between
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March and August 1951. The project was consistent with the Hogg Foundation’s
campaign to raise awareness of mental health in small towns that lacked
psychiatric services, reflecting the training of the clinical psychologist who
headed up the mobile clinic. James Aubrey Turman had completed his Master’s
degree in psychology at the University of Texas in January 1951; over the next
five years, he pursued his doctorate while attempting to bring his brand of child
mental health to the small town frontier. A former Army captain and engineer at
the DuPont Corporation in east Texas, Turman wrote his thesis under the
supervision of Hogg researchers Wayne Holtzman and Carl Rosenquist. The
thesis surveyed the opinions of black and white schoolteachers on “nonsegregation” – the impending integration of public schools that seemed the
eventual outcome of the Supreme Court’s 1950 decision Sweatt v. Painter. He
found that schoolteachers overwhelmingly supported integration, while the
general white population opposed it by a margin of twenty-five to one, a lesson on
the gap between professional and lay opinion that informed Turman’s subsequent
tenure as director of the Texas Youth Council.280
Unlike school integration, Turman’s mobile clinic project aroused little
controversy. The clinic attracted positive coverage in local newspapers; in the
border town of Edinburg, the county child welfare supervisor requested the visit
to demonstrate clinical methods to skeptical local councilmen.281 At
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Nacogdoches, the clinic examined children and teenagers from several nearby
towns in East Texas.282 In a summary report, Turman noted that the clinic was
“enthusiastically received” and that local officials were “eager” for psychiatric
services for troubled children and adolescents. The typical patient received a
physical, a psychological examination, and a “social history” compiled with the
assistance of local agencies. Turman saw 152 patients, 105 of whom came from
homes where one or both parents were absent. Most of the remaining children had
“weak or inadequate parents.” The report compiled a few brief case studies,
clearly chosen to include children from all economic backgrounds. There was
Susan, the sexually active teenager whose middle-class parents had foisted her
upon grandparents as an infant; Tom and Bill, the sons of working professionals
too busy to give adequate attention to “two normal, smart boys” who wound up
committing grand larceny; and Alec, an impoverished thirteen-year-old boy who
joined a gang while his widowed mother entertained “several men friends.” More
than half of the girls were victims of sexual abuse by adults.283
The mobile clinic report exemplified the mixed benefits of child mental
health for social thought on troubled young people. It highlighted the importance
of child abuse and neglect as essential elements in the making of the juvenile
delinquent. At the same time, it said next to nothing about structural causes housing, employment, education – which can and often do exacerbate the
likelihood of adult misconduct toward children. As we have seen, the Hogg
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Foundation and the Houston settlement agencies conceived of mental health as
inextricably linked to the socioeconomic well being of the communities in which
they worked. To talk about the “root causes” of juvenile delinquency without
addressing its environment was to emphasize personal morality in a scientific
guise. By downplaying sociological data, which should have come to light in the
social histories of his patients, Turman may have shown a lesson learned from his
graduate research. Funding evaporated for the mobile clinic after its 1951 test run,
and convincing a conservative state legislature to support future endeavors surely
would not have benefited from a report that blamed juvenile delinquency upon
social inequality. From a professional standpoint, moreover, the recommendation
for increased clinical diagnosis and treatment placed the psychologist and
psychiatrist at the center of any solution to the social problem of juvenile
delinquency.
Despite these efforts, the end of the mobile clinic experiment signaled the
collapse of early enthusiasm for the Youth Council in the legislature. By its third
year, shrinking budgets forced the Youth Council to abandon its prevention and
consultation programs. Deprived of the ability to fulfill this portion of its original
mandate, the Youth Council concentrated its reform efforts on the juvenile
training schools. Events did not favor sweeping change there, either, as the
number of juvenile delinquents soared. Between 1950-1957, the adolescent age
population had grown by thirteen percent while the delinquency rate had
increased fifty-one percent.284 What accounts for this increase, outside of the
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obvious conclusion that metropolitan areas, with inner cities and suburbs, grew
rapidly in the decade? The Youth Council’s partially recorded statistics indicate a
spike in burglary arrests for boys and sex offenses for girls; overall, status crimes
went up significantly. Furthermore, the Youth Council’s own public activities had
promulgated more juvenile courts whose judges probably felt more secure than in
past years in committing young offenders to state custody. Some evidence
suggests that the Youth Council itself may have been responsible for the higher
numbers. In its efforts to standardize local record-keeping, the Youth Council
distributed a “juvenile face sheet” intended to document individual cases resolved
officially and unofficially (see figure 10).285 For the first time, then, juvenile
crime statistics included some cases settled without a court hearing or even an
arrest. This scenario may have led to more official arrests as well; a first-time
truant with a prior status offense, for example, might bring a record rather than a
clean slate into juvenile court, making a severe disposition more likely.
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Figure 10: Juvenile Face Sheet, Travis County Probation Department, circa 1953.
In order to compile more accurate statistics on juvenile delinquency, the Youth
Council sought to standardize record-keeping throughout the state. This form was
used as a sample in mailings to county police departments. Courtesy of the Texas
State Archive and Information Service, Texas State Library.
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This combination of trends meant that the training schools rapidly returned
to the overcrowded conditions that had sparked the creation of the Youth Council
in the first place. Gatesville’s average daily population doubled from four to eight
hundred between 1950-1957.286 Attempts to reform Gatesville collided with
existing attitudes both within and outside the school walls. In November 1949, the
Youth Council dismissed Gatesville superintendent R.E. Blair for defying
prohibitions against corporal punishment, particularly the policy of whipping
attempted runaways. The local newspaper sneered at “progressive” reforms thrust
upon the school by “outside meddlers” in Austin, and worried that relaxed
discipline would visit “runaways and mayhem” upon local citizens.287 In the first
year of the new policy, attempted escapes actually decreased slightly from about
thirty to twenty-six per month.288 This incremental improvement was lost on
locals, who convened a grand jury investigation in June 1950 that found the
escape rate to be twice the official tally.289
The final straw, however, was yet to come. On the morning of 15 August,
fifteen-year-old Walter Johnson escaped from Gatesville. Johnson, who was
black, had been committed only three weeks earlier for a series of petty burglaries
in Austin. Late that afternoon, Walter Mack, a fifty-five-year-old white farmer,
returned home “on his tractor” to find Johnson armed with his Winchester rifle.
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According to Mack’s own account, he pleaded for his life and attempted to flee;
Johnson shot him in the back, a wound that would eventually prove fatal. Johnson
(“the Negro” in all news accounts) helped Mack onto his bed and promised to
seek help, but was picked up by military police at Fort Hood, dozens of miles
away. Still in possession of Mack’s rifle, and doubtlessly afraid for his safety,
Johnson told them he had been hunting game. Outraged locals demanded that the
school reinstate whippings or relocate. At a town hall meeting in Gatesville, an
angry mob confronted Youth Council officials with warnings that runaways found
on private property would be shot. James Atlee, the acting superintendent at
Gatesville, delivered a one-hour speech on the ills of overcrowded, mass custody
conditions that failed to sway demands for immediate action. Atlee described
dormitories housing “sixty to seventy boys” who slept on steel cots under
overhead lights, supervised by a guard who sat behind a steel wire fence “similar
to that used to enclose the cages in a zoo.” The school building lacked bathrooms,
forcing teachers to march boys “two blocks away to outside toilets” at
prearranged times. The prison-like setting had nurtured “prison ways;” new boys
came in wearing “citizens haircuts,” while the open space behind the dormitories
was “the yard” (see figure 11). Guards contended with inmate gangs, collecting
about twenty homemade weapons a month. That the school endured at all was a
testament to its status as a major employer in the area and the impossibility of
moving it after all of the bad publicity.290
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Figure 11: Photograph of Gatesville, Austin Statesman, March 3, 1955.
“This is a juvenile delinquent... brooding over the barren ‘recreation’ area at the
Gatesville training school” (original caption). “Juvenile Delinquency” Vertical
File. Center for American History. University of Texas at Austin.

In the end, the incident provided the impetus for a major reorganization of
Gatesville. Officials seized the opportunity to institute a more thorough
classification system, which they typically referred to as “segregation.” The
official meaning of segregation described the separation of violent and nonviolent
offenders, as well as age-graded housing in dormitories. But the new
classification system contained an unmistakable racial component. Like all Texas
primary and secondary schools circa 1950, the Youth Council’s institutions
maintained racial segregation. Girl delinquents went to Gainesville (white) and
Brady (black); boys, meanwhile, slept, ate, and attended classes separately at
Gatesville. Moreover, racism distorted the “scientific” diagnoses on which
classification was based. As the top clinical psychologist at the Youth Council,
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Turman regularly oversaw a battery of intelligence and psychological tests
administered to inmates. In 1949, he concluded that less than ten percent of
African American boys possessed “normal” intelligence, and recommended that
most black inmates be moved to an institution for the mentally retarded.
Interestingly, Turman had tested the entire black inmate population, comprising a
third of the total, yet had tested only samples of the Anglo and “Latin”
populations.291 The Youth Council urged the construction of a Jim Crow school
for delinquent boys, while Turman on several occasions tried but failed to refuse
admittance to what he habitually called “feeble-minded Negroes.”292 When the
Youth Council installed an academic high school program in Gatesville, it did not
bother to include blacks because of their supposed lack of intellect. The
intelligence tests provided a basis for separate educational plans, with black youth
tracked into vocational rather than academic classes. Latino youth fared little
better, often diagnosed as possessing “borderline” intelligence.293 The
significance of these figures was that they represented the majority of the inmate
population. Long a sizable minority in Gatesville, black and Latino inmates
outnumbered whites for the first time in 1955. The rate of increase for black
inmates was three times that of the combined rate for white and Latinos.294 The
outcome of the Johnson incident was a reform program that maintained prisonlike conditions for the growing number of nonwhite inmates while attempting to
ensure rehabilitation for the shrinking white population.
291

First Annual Report, 51-54.
“Report from Youth Council Meeting,” The Key (agency newsletter), October 1950.
293 Second Annual Report, 42-52.
294 Sixth Annual Report, 23-24.
292

175

As the Gatesville story unfolded, the Youth Council faced an equally
damaging scandal at the school for white girls at Gainesville. In January 1952,
school superintendent Maxine Burlingham stood accused of torturing, drugging,
and abducting a sixteen-year-old girl inmate. The charge caught most observers
by surprise. A former supervisor of girls for the Tarrant County (Fort Worth)
juvenile probation department, Burlingham had built a solid reputation as a
progressive reformer. Hired the same month that the Youth Council came into
existence in March 1949, she exemplified the agency’s principles, making an
abuse scandal all the more damaging. “Maxine Burlingham brings new deal to
girls,” raved the Fort Worth Star-Telegram; she removed the school’s barbed wire
fences, abolished punishments for running away, replaced most of the staff, and
inaugurated a new program of “vocational training and social adjustment.”295 An
open house showcased home economics, glee club, cosmetology, and floristry
programs. The girls staged a fashion show and a dance that culminated in the
crowning of a “May Queen.” Describing the effects of the floristry program, one
girl expressed the school’s larger goal: “We have created a love for beautiful
things, have improved mental health, and have learned to think beautiful
thoughts.”296 Newspapers lavished Burlingham with praise that accompanied
photographs of idyllic scenes of smiling girls in career prep classes, casual
basketball games, and drum and bugle corps exercises that featured pristine
uniforms and the flags of the United States and Texas. The aim was to create a
295 “New Look in Juvenile Correction Paying Off,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 5/7/1950. TYC
Scrapbooks.
296 Mimeographed program, Gainesville State School for Girls open house, 5/26-5/27/1950;
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“normal” high school atmosphere while teaching the girls practical skills. In one
telling anecdote, she explained that cooking classes instruct girls in the
preparation of “stick-to-the-rib meals” because “most of the girls will marry
laborers” with “different food requirements.” When one girl admitted to a visiting
reporter that she had never cooked an egg, Burlingham took the occasion to
observe that “we forget just how underprivileged some of these girls are when
they enter the school.”297
The girl inmate who shattered this well-crafted image of benevolence had
spent 186 of 210 days isolated in a six-by-nine-foot steel room, prohibited from
speaking or reading. Burlingham would later claim that the girl was a regular
rulebreaker who had attempted escape by jumping out a second-story window.
Her mother, a waitress from Houston, filed a lawsuit in January 1952.
Burlingham’s response was to dose the girl with Nembutal, a depressant known
on the street as a “yellow jacket,” and secretly commit her to a state hospital in
Wichita Falls. Before a court order could arrive at Gainesville, Burlingham
personally drove the girl to the hospital; a Houston reporter alerted attorneys to
the girl’s whereabouts. In court, the “attractive, strawberry-blonde” girl stared
down Burlingham while describing girls who cut themselves with glass “to
relieve boredom,” lashings administered by male attendants under Burlingham’s
supervision, and solitary confinement’s “mental torture.” The case provoked an
immediate torrent of outrage. Representatives of the Houston Housewives League
297 “Gainesville State School Girls Learn Practical Subjects in Study Courses,” Austin AmericanStatesman, 10/11/1949; “’Goof Balls’ and ‘Yellow Jackets’: They Put 16-Year-Old in Gainesville
as Delinquent,” Houston Chronicle, 12/28/1950; “Reform School at Gainesville Helps Girls Help
Themselves,” Dallas Morning News, 1/3/1951. TYC Scrapbooks.
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attended the hearing and telephoned Texas Governor Allan Shivers to demand an
investigation. Harris County’s judges and state representatives issued a joint
condemnation of Gainesville. But perhaps the most damning indictment came
from girl inmates themselves: “We want to live like normal girls instead of in an
institution.”298 One runaway, who vowed to commit suicide rather than return to
Gainesville, gave the following testimony:
I’ve been punished enough. Gainesville is not a corrective institution. It’s
a place of punishment. I’ve seen girls as young as twelve and thirteen
suffer treatment that shouldn’t be given to a hardened criminal... You’re
not there long before you learn a lot of things that can hardly be called
corrective. I needed help, not punishment. I was emotionally upset.299
These incidents at Gainesville and Gatesville challenged the narrative of
compassionate reform put forth in the Youth Council’s early years. In both cases,
the solution seemed to lie down well-trod pathways of reform: more scientific
diagnosis, more rigid classification, more strict monitoring of punishments.
Attempts to improve the training schools proceeded in a piecemeal fashion
against a backdrop of declining budgets and rising inmate populations. Its
reformist energies spent, the Youth Council increasingly justified its importance
by its maintenance of existing conditions in the juvenile training schools. At
Gatesville, the new classification regime failed to stem the tide of juvenile
inmates; only four years removed from the Walter Johnson scandal, a Fort Worth
Press reporter visited the facility and found over six hundred inmates facing a
298
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staff intended for about a third of that number.300 A series in the Austin Statesman
documented the crumbling buildings and crowded sleeping spaces at Gatesville,
which had become the second largest juvenile training school in the nation.301
Over a decade after the scandal that rocked Gainesville, Burlingham continued to
draw praise from reporters, this time for persevering with a short-handed
workforce.302 Hamstrung by a stingy legislature in its first decade of existence, the
Texas State Youth Development Council had created expectations that largely
went unfulfilled. Old problems festered and eventually became ossified in
bureaucratic routine, setting the stage for a new round of scandals in later years.
II. Expansion and Investigation, 1957-1969
On 9 March 1958, James Turman, newly minted director of the renamed
Texas Youth Council, addressed a gathering of the state’s top law enforcement
officials on the subject of juvenile crime. He called for tougher laws allowing the
certification of violent juvenile offenders to adult courts. “It is my personal
conviction,” he intoned, “that in some instances [they] are... overprotected... at the
expense of society.” To compensate for the influx of juvenile inmates to already
overcrowded training schools, particularly Gatesville, Turman proposed a new
facility for offenders in the “twilight zone between adolescence and complete
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adulthood.”303 In 1962, just down the road from Gatesville, the Youth Council
opened its first high-security facility: the Mountain View School for Boys. This
action demonstrated Turman’s growing political pull in Austin as well as his
vision for juvenile rehabilitation. Turning away from the community-based
prevention programs that formerly had been at the top of the Youth Council’s
agenda, he expanded the use of large-scale institutions, moves that failed to please
critics. Coryell County (Gatesville) officials resurrected old complaints against
“remote control” restrictions on corporal punishment, while some state legislators
lamented that the training schools were “too much like country clubs.”
Meanwhile, the periodic revelations of abused inmates that had become a nearregular occurrence now brought mild threats of federal intervention.304 So focused
was Turman on the training schools that he found himself at odds with
prevention-minded members of the Youth Council’s board of directors, which
commissioned a survey of Gatesville from the Hogg Foundation in spring 1961.
Bert Kruger Smith, a social work professor, wrote a positive report but noted that
she was “never shown where the ‘others’ live, the bad boys and the Negroes.”305
Its emphasis on institutions put the Texas Youth Council out of step with
emerging collaboration between the fields of mental health and criminal justice.
By the mid-1960s, the legal profession was awash in debate over the definitions
303
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of criminal responsibility and insanity. One of the most influential figures was
Judge David Bazelon, who sat on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.306 Bazelon
insisted that the juvenile court practices of collecting social histories and
psychological diagnoses would allow for an orderly expansion of the then-narrow
definition of criminal insanity. In need of “treatment over punishment,” mentally
ill offenders were victims of the “essentially cultural” construction of the rational,
calculating criminal.307 In Bazelon’s eyes, however, the criminal court’s failures
paled before those of the juvenile court, where the adolescent status of offenders
had failed to mitigate a rush to punishment. Instead, as Bazelon told a
Georgetown University audience, “the myth of total individual responsibility”
continued to bring down adult punishments upon developmentally immature
offenders – for example, “the juvenile delinquent who risks years in jail by
grabbing a woman’s purse. Calculation of potential pleasures and pains is not for
him.”308
His active promotion of cooperation between law and mental health
brought Bazelon into contact with the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health. In
1964, Hogg director Robert Sutherland served with Bazelon on an advisory
committee to the National Association of State Mental Health Program
Directors.309 That same year, the Hogg Foundation co-sponsored the Southwest
306 For an overview of this debate, as well as its influence on the key federal court cases that
reshaped juvenile justice procedures, see Christopher P. Manfredi, The Supreme Court and
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Center for Law and the Behavioral Sciences, which was housed in the University
of Texas Law School. The Center worked in close cooperation with the leading
national proponents of community-based antidelinquency and antipoverty
programs: the Ford Foundation, the President’s Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency, and later the Office of Economic Opportunity. In addition to
providing numerous workshops to juvenile courts, police departments, and
probation officers across the state, the Center offered interdisciplinary college
courses on juvenile delinquency and criminal justice. By the end of the 1960s, the
Center had folded; however, in its place were new interdisciplinary degree
programs in public affairs, criminal justice, and urban studies. Clearly, academic
research had moved away from the paradigm of institutional rehabilitation to
which the Youth Council remained wed.310
The ferment over how to deal with the growing “urban crisis” and related
problems of poverty, crime, and delinquency inspired the state legislature to
reopen old questions about the Youth Council’s practices. In fall 1968, the Texas
House of Representatives established an Interim Committee on Juvenile Crime
and Delinquency. That December, two television journalists from Corpus Christi
convinced the committee to launch a full investigation into the training schools at
Gatesville and Mountain View. Committee members saw an advance screening of
a series set to air the following month. Panoramic shots of Mountain View’s
exterior, ringed by double barbed-wire fences and patrolled by uniformed guards
310
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on horseback, preceded graphic eyewitness accounts of physical abuse inside its
walls.311 The hearings opened on 3 January 1969 with testimony from the Corpus
Christi reporters and their key informants. The Reverend Frank Briganti had
worked as a chaplain at Mountain View from July 1964 to January 1965. His
testimony came from boys’ confessions and his own observations of staff
behavior. Guards administered beatings routinely and with breathtaking impunity.
One guard, fired for beating a boy, “came back every night for a week and beat up
the boy again and again until the guard who was letting the fired guard in was
himself fired.”312 Outraged, Briganti mounted a “crusade” to enforce existing
rules against corporal punishment, which resulted only in his own dismissal.
When Briganti took his case directly to Youth Council director James Turman, he
met with labored excuses for inaction.313 Similarly, Houston schoolteacher
Shirley Tyler had complained about the bruises and psychological injuries she had
noticed while tutoring “hundreds” of inmates. In his rebuttal, director Turman
dismissed these complaints as part of a self-interested “campaign to discredit the
agency.”314 He labeled Briganti a disgruntled ex-employee and Tyler a woman
with a score to settle; the Youth Council formerly had rejected her requests to
adopt juvenile inmates.
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Perhaps the most persuasive witnesses were the parents of Eddie Kellar,
Jr., a fifteen year-old inmate at Gatesville. His stepfather told the committee about
the day that he was called to the Gatesville infirmary to find Kellar covered in
bruises, a black eye and “a boot print on his chest.”315 So badly was Kellar injured
that he spent the next fifty-six days in the hospital, where he received extensive
care for a damaged kidney and “severely bruised genitals.” Gatesville officials
withheld all documentation from the family and lamely attributed Kellar’s injuries
to “two Negro boys with sexual motivation.” In Kellar’s own version of events, a
guard beat him, then forced him to “run several hours around a track, carrying
shovels of sand,” until he collapsed with exhaustion. According to his mother,
Kellar relived the experience aloud at night, moaning phrases in his sleep such as
“ain’t I worked enough for just a drink of water.” Adding insult to injury, Youth
Council officials insisted upon returning Kellar to Gatesville after his recovery.
Kellar’s stepfather recounted his next visit to Gatesville, where he met the
unapologetic guard - “settin’ there with his cowboy boots on” - who had beaten
his son.316
Insisting that doctors had found “not a scratch on him – not a one,”
Turman argued that juvenile inmates and their families were generally unreliable
witnesses. Parents who lodged complaints against the training school, he
explained, often were covering for their own abusive actions at home. “There’s no
need for us to kick them around,” he assured the committee. “They’ve been
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kicked around by experts before they ever come to us.”317 He also cast juvenile
delinquents as cunning hustlers versed in hoodwinking sympathetic but credulous
adults. None of these assertions satisfied the committee chairman, Vernon
Stewart, a Democratic representative from Wichita Falls in northwest Texas.
Convinced that Youth Council officials in Austin were ignorant of events at their
far-flung training schools, Stewart led a delegation on a surprise inspection of
Mountain View the day after testimony concluded. Juvenile inmates with bruises,
swollen faces, and black eyes told legislators stories that left them visibly
“shaken.”318 Boarding the return flight to Austin, chairman Stewart promised an
“extremely critical” report, to be issued within a week and followed by “a fullblown investigation” during the next legislative session.319
Leading the chorus of indignation was the committee’s only African
American member, Representative Curtis Graves of Houston, who shined a
spotlight on the plight of black teenagers. Graves was a veteran of the civil rights
movement who first ran for elective office in 1966, after a federal court ordered
the city of Houston to abandon an at-large districting scheme designed to prevent
black representation. In that election, his opponent had circulated an old police
mug shot resulting from Graves’ participation in a sit-in protest at a segregated
lunch counter.320 Given that black teenagers comprised a disproportionate
percentage of juvenile inmates (see Table 1), and that Harris County (Houston)
317
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sent by far more inmates to training schools than any other county, it comes as
little surprise that Graves fielded “hundreds” of constituent complaints about the
Youth Council. In 1968, the year before the investigation, African Americans
comprised nearly one-third of the inmate population, but only about one-tenth of
the high school age population of Texas.321

Table 1: Male Juvenile Inmates by Race and Ethnicity, 1958-1973.
Compiled from the Annual Reports of the Texas Youth Council, 1959-1974.

Determined to halt a wider investigation, powerful friends of the Youth
Council intercepted Graves and Stewart when they landed back in Austin. The
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leader of this group was Ben Barnes, the photogenic Speaker of the House. A
youngish politician on the rise, Barnes was basking in his recent election to the
office of lieutenant governor, and had no intention of angering longtime
legislators who had training schools in their districts. One day after Stewart’s
return, Barnes led his own “midnight inspection” of Mountain View with an
entourage that included Stewart, Youth Council officials, and Texas Rangers. The
same juvenile inmates who had confided tales of beatings now faced a more
hostile interrogation in the form of polygraph tests administered by uniformed
state police. Upon his return to Austin, Barnes held a well-attended press
conference in which he discredited the prior allegations of abuse. One boy
confessed that the beatings had occurred during an armed escape attempt. “We all
three had shivs or jiggers... made out of scrap metal,” quoted Barnes, in an
unconvincing blend of street argot and prep school grammar. “We made it up
among ourselves that should one guard catch us we were going to kill him.”322
Barnes illustrated this point by posing for a photograph next to an assortment of
“jiggers,” or hand-made knives.323 Citing the informants’ long rap sheets, he
scolded reporters for forgetting that juvenile delinquents “aren’t Little League ball
players who have run away from a Little League ball game.” Mountain View’s
clean and modern facilities, he declared, should inspire pride “in all Texans.”
Proclaiming that the House committee had overstepped its bounds, Barnes placed
power over the ongoing investigation in the hands of the Department of Public
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Safety, which sent Texas Rangers to Gatesville to administer lie detector tests to
“randomly singled out boys.”324
Undeterred by Barnes’ shenanigans, the Stewart committee prepared to
make good on its promise to deliver a harsh report on the training schools. A
series of heated behind-the-scenes negotiations ensued between the committee,
Barnes, and Youth Council director Turman. The committee’s proposed solutions
included transferring oversight of the training schools to the Texas Department of
Corrections, commissioning an evaluation from the progressive National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, and hiring police officers to monitor training school
guards.325 Taken as a whole, these suggestions seriously impugned the
competence and integrity of the Youth Council. Perhaps recalling the days when
Gatesville’s reputation for violence had turned juvenile judges against sentencing
boys to a term in training school, resentful officials protested that they had
received unfair treatment. One member of the board of directors, an Amarillo
juvenile judge, publicly exhorted his counterparts to harbor “no qualms
whatsoever” about committing boys to state custody.326
Barnes emerged from a six-hour closed-door session with the status quo
intact and an agreement to launch a new investigation headed by a “blue ribbon”
panel of Senators. Critics interpreted this announcement as a parliamentary
maneuver intended to remove Stewart and Graves from the center of the probe.
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Along with the liberal Texas Observer, Graves deplored the deal as a
“whitewash” and a “diversion” resulting from a quid pro quo arrangement
between the Youth Council and Austin powerbrokers. Events soon bore out this
analysis. In the next session, Speaker of the House Gus Mutscher officially
dissolved the juvenile delinquency committee, while the Youth Council
appropriated a huge sum for the construction of a new training school in
Giddings, a central Texas town that happened to be located in Mutscher’s home
district.327 Barnes’ actions similarly smacked of political opportunism rather than
principled concern. Privately, in a letter to a Gatesville parolee, Barnes described
juvenile delinquents in far different terms than he had in front of the cameras.
They were “not criminals,” he asserted, but confused teenagers “in need of
guidance, protection, and understanding rather than harsh punishment.”328
Such qualifications were the exception rather than the rule in the
newspaper reports that accompanied the investigation. Journalists often took the
Youth Council’s point of view without qualification, particularly the Houston
Post, which reprinted the official line so faithfully that it unintentionally exposed
some of its most basic contradictions.329 Youth Council officials, training school
superintendents, chaplains, and guards agreed that abuses had declined rather than
worsened in recent years. Several “Gatesville alumni” in the Texas prison system
concurred, according to George Beto, the director of the Texas Department of
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Corrections.330 The apparent cynicism of using adult prisoners to vouch for
Gatesville’s good work went unnoticed in articles that portrayed Youth Council
officials touting great strides while espousing a hunger to improve further. The
only

specific

improvements

were

cosmetic:

professional-sounding

job

descriptions, staff uniforms, improved physical facilities.331 Neither juvenile
inmates nor former employees were asked to comment on the efficacy of these
changes.
A slightly different analysis appeared in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram;
however, its reporters actually visited Gatesville and Mountain View. They
somberly described electric barbed-wire fences, uniformed guards, censored
newspapers, and simmering tensions between inmates and guards.332 Rebuffed in
their attempts to interview juvenile inmates, the Star-Telegram reporters
portrayed an atmosphere that conscripted boys and adults alike into a prison-like
culture of violence. When the Gatesville superintendent suggested that “it
depends on what you call brutality,” readers might well have wondered at the
more sunny portrait given by officials in Austin.333
On the opposite end of the spectrum was the Texas Observer, a liberal
weekly that published extensive interviews with former inmates.334 Their stories
consistently emphasized the use of violence to maintain a social order that
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revolved around race and ethnicity. Guards routinely directed racial epithets at
black and Latino boys, and punished any whites who dared fraternize with them.
In the segregated mess hall, one Anglo boy elicited a beating for sitting at a table
with nonwhites. Ronaldo Suarez recalled being beaten by a guard the day before
his parole. The guard, notorious among the boys for his hatred of Latinos, had
punched Suarez “twenty times on each leg from knee to thigh,” which left him
unable to walk without a limp for several days. Under threat of parole revocation,
Suarez had signed a false incident report stating that he “got hurt playing
football.” Such practices taught a terrible lesson, according to several of the
Observer’s informants. Frank Vargas, a nonviolent repeat offender from Houston,
had been part of the group of inmates interviewed by the Stewart committee. Ben
Barnes had given Vargas a central role in the escape “plot” used to discredit
claims of abuse and brutality. Vargas told the Observer a different story: “I
learned to hate... I wasn’t that way [before].” Fearing for their son’s safety after
the public blow-up, Vargas’ parents traveled to Austin to confront Youth Council
director Turman, who dismissed their concerns while issuing bland guarantees
that beatings were rare. This promise gave cold comfort to the Observer’s
interviewees; one parolee who had served a two year sentence in Gatesville could
not recall a single visit from Turman.
The circulation of these stories chipped away at the Youth Council’s
credibility on a number of fronts. The training school seemed little changed from
its earlier incarnations as a “little crime school” that brutalized rather than
rehabilitated juvenile delinquents. The plethora of first-hand testimonies from
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juvenile inmates, their families, and former employees further suggested a pattern
of abuse that was known to top officials. Moreover, the timing of this particular
scandal proved significant. In the early 1950s, similar revelations had prompted
limited public outrage and promises of reform; by 1969, however, the Youth
Council faced a less tolerant social climate. The civil rights movement had swept
across the South and the nation, raising awareness of the historic oppressions
visited upon African Americans and Latinos. Protest movements against
educational inequality and institutional racism in the criminal justice system
found their concerns combined in the juvenile training school. A growing “rights
consciousness” meant that juvenile inmates appeared not as passive recipients of
compassionate concern but as individuals whose civil rights had been violated.
Well-worn assertions of authority from the Texas Youth Council would not
satisfy its growing number of critics.
Created to stave off a public relations disaster, the Senate Youth Affairs
committee instead continued the work of the Stewart committee. Its June 1969
report investigated six individual claims of abuse, and found four of them to have
merit. Comparing Mountain View’s “strong climate of suppression, repression,
and fear” to that of a prison, the report scolded Youth Council officials for
presenting “the mere existence of unprosecuted investigations” as evidence of a
successful program.335 Noting that the Texas Rangers and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had visited Gatesville, it admonished that “law-enforcement
agencies should not be in the business of evaluating rehabilitation programs.”336
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Another barometer of the Youth Council’s woes came during its annual
budget hearing before the legislature. Youth Council director Turman appeared
before the Finance Committee in February, when negative headlines were still
fresh in legislators’ memories. Turman attempted to forestall criticisms by
distributing copies of a favorable outside evaluation of the Youth Council’s
facilities and programs. The author, Austin MacCormick, had helped design the
“youth authority” model in the 1940s, and had advised the reformers who created
the Texas State Youth Development Council in 1949. MacCormick later had
worked as a paid consultant for the Youth Council, showering the training schools
with praise in four evaluations since 1960. His latest report ranked the Texas
Youth Council second only to the California Youth Authority in quality. The
evaluation irritated critics; one juvenile court judge from Fort Worth compared it
to “Mary Poppins – perfect in every way.”337 Don Kennard, a senator on the
Finance Committee, accused Turman of “institutionalizing people rather than
treating them.”338 The Youth Council planned to devote over a quarter of its
budget to construction of the new Giddings training school, an amount that
exceeded the agency’s entire payroll and dwarfed its miniscule funds for
probation and prevention programs. Furthermore, the Youth Council had
exhibited no interest in small-scale, community-based facilities such as halfway
houses and group homes, innovations being tried in other states. Noting the
growing numbers of urban youth incarcerated in isolated rural villages, Kennard
argued that smaller facilities located in cities could prove cheaper and more
337
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effective than training schools located in remote backwaters.339 This suggestion
challenged entrenched beliefs in the moral and cultural superiority of small towns
over big cities. It also linked racism against black and Latino inmates to white
rural hegemony in state politics. State politicians supported the training schools,
in part, because they provided jobs to constituents. In the small town of
Gatesville, for example, the training school was the largest employer; several
guards worked to supplement family farms.
How important were these political dynamics? Consider the following
apocryphal tale: On 20 September 1969, the Acting Governor of Texas awarded
the Gatesville and Mountain View Schools for Boys a citation for “excellent
service.” The man who singled out these two singularly controversial reform
schools for high praise, J. P. Word, also happened to be the Texas state
representative from Gatesville.340
III. Breaking Into the Total Institution, 1970-1971
While the language of the Youth Council’s critics smacked of civil rights,
the official reaction evoked “massive resistance.” State officials evaded or
scorned concerns about the welfare of juvenile inmates. Training school
superintendents marched in lock-step, barring access and pleading ignorance to
journalists. Meanwhile, key political allies blocked meaningful action in the state
house. These maneuvers, however, failed to protect the Youth Council from a
new round of attacks that began innocently enough with a lawsuit against the
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juvenile court in El Paso, thousands of miles to the west of the training schools.
Within months, a small case against the local juvenile court mushroomed into a
federal class-action lawsuit, Morales v. Turman, which freed hundreds of juvenile
inmates and eventually led to the closing of Gatesville and Mountain View.341
The lead attorney in the case, Steven Bercu, headed the juvenile division
of the El Paso Legal Aid Society, an agency funded by the federal Office for
Economic Opportunity. A native of Dallas, Bercu had graduated from the
University of Texas law school in 1965 and obtained a Master’s degree in
International Relations in Denmark. His mother had served as the first female city
attorney in Dallas; upon her retirement in the early 1960s, she joined that city’s
legal aid office.342 In summer 1970, shortly after he began working in El Paso,
Bercu began receiving a steady stream of complaints from parents who had
committed their children to state custody and wanted them returned home. Bercu
soon discovered a sordid picture. Parents routinely turned to the county probation
office for assistance in disciplining their adolescent children. “Incorrigible” or
“ungovernable” teenagers might stay in the county juvenile detention several
times before the juvenile court stepped in and recommended commitment to a
state training school. It fell to the county probation officer to win the approval of
parents, a feat often accomplished through deception. Parents left these meetings
believing that they could retrieve their wayward children at their convenience,
341
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unaware that the decision lay entirely with the training school staff. As one
mother explained to Bercu,
I took him to [the detention center] because he was bad, and when he
came back home, he still didn’t mind me, so I took him back and Mr.
Raley sent him to Gatesville. ... [T]hey said when he got straightened out
we could get him to come back home. And I need him back home now to
do some work, and they’re telling me he can’t come home.343
Eager to rid themselves of their problem children, many parents were all
too willing to be misled about living conditions at the training schools. Probation
officers described Gatesville “as a prep school,” complete with “a swimming
pool... nice clothes and good food and a good education.”344 It would seem that
parents had little reason to believe such promises. The state training schools’
notoriety bordered on legend; closer to home, the county detention center struck
fear into teenagers for its run-down, vermin-ridden buildings, as well as its
abusive staff. The “D-Home,” as teenagers called it, had opened in 1950 with
input from the Youth Council’s traveling consultants. Seeking an alternative to
jail, the home’s founders hoped to provide education and nurture to “wayward
and underprivileged youths.”345 According to one brochure, the home operated
on a medical model of delinquency as “a behavior disorder... that is symptomatic
of emotional maladjustment.”346 This description would seem to call for a
therapeutic program run by psychologists and psychiatrists; however, the home’s
founders made the catastrophic decision to place it under the jurisdiction of the
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county juvenile probation department. On its watch, the home’s physical plant fell
into disrepair; classrooms went unused and finally served as makeshift storage
spaces; and “disgusting” isolation cells harbored long-vanquished diseases like
tuberculosis.347 Apparently ignorant of these conditions, parents used the “DHome” as a kind of babysitter; teenagers, for their part, learned to despise it. “I’d
rather be dead than go back to the D-Home,” exclaimed one girl upon her release.
“The way they treat you there, all it does is make you hate the person who put you
in.”348
The checkered history surrounding the “D-Home” extended to its
administrators, particularly Morris Raley, the chief of juvenile probation. In the
early 1960s, Raley had headed the Juvenile Patrol, a police task force plagued by
scandal. In 1966, forcible rape charges against two of Raley’s subordinates caused
the Patrol to be disbanded. The incident added to a resume that included stints as a
farm hand and a security guard. Upon becoming chief of juvenile probation,
Raley hired an unemployed truck driver for the position of superintendent of the
detention home. “95 percent of the kids that come through here don’t need
psychologists or psychiatrists,” he advised. “Most of them are just kids who can’t
talk things out.”349 His aversion to hiring employees with an iota of training or
experience in working with troubled teenagers, however, made it unlikely that
kids “talked things out” during their stays in the detention home. Indeed, as
Bercu’s case gained steam, the county’s child protective services division was in
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the midst of investigating charges that two of Raley’s employees had abused their
own children.350
The practice that landed Raley in court, however, was the “agreed
judgment,” which Bercu had learned about from the parade of parents who passed
through his office. This informal mechanism allowed parents to commit their
children to state custody without a hearing in juvenile court. Signed by the parent,
Raley, and the county judge, the document appeared to uninitiated readers as the
product of an actual courtroom proceeding. The agreed judgment was a boon to
the judge, allowing him to open his courtroom to juvenile cases a mere “one
afternoon every two weeks.”351 So routine was this practice that it accounted for
over one-third (24 of 70) of juvenile delinquency commitments from El Paso
County in the year preceding Bercu’s involvement. With only about three percent
of the high school age population in Texas, the county supplied almost fifteen
percent of new commitments to the Gainesville School for Girls alone.352
In October 1970, Bercu filed cases on behalf of several teenagers who had
been sent to the state training schools. He also raised a “furor” that slowly
gathered a great deal of attention. The El Paso Times ran an investigative series
that expanded on Bercu’s discoveries, won a Pulitzer Prize, and elicited a public
repudiation of agreed judgments from the district attorney. Parents’ reactions
ranged from “indifferent to moderately hostile,” according to Bercu: “I was
interfering with their little family decision that they wanted little Mary or little
350
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Billy ... gone for the problems they had caused.”353 The father of Alicia Morales,
the fifteen-year-old girl who became the lead plaintiff in the case, was an
alcoholic angered because his daughter refused to turn over her wages. Other
parents expressed guilt to reporters. “I don’t know why I sent her there,” mused
one mother, while another hoped her son could forgive her for sending him to “a
prison.”354
At least one parent decided to get involved on her child’s behalf. Martha
Brown had committed her fifteen-year-old son Johnny for reasons that were at
once unique and all too typical. Johnny had run away from home several times to
visit his sweetheart, a fourteen-year-old girl who had been deported to Juarez, just
across the border from El Paso. At her wits’ end, Martha had sent her son to the
“D-Home” more than once. But then Johnny threatened to marry his girlfriend,
sending his mother into a panic. She committed him to Gatesville based on
information given to her by probation officer Raley. However, she soon realized
that she had made a mistake and hired Bercu to secure his release. Shortly after
that, she received a letter from Johnny in which he described being beaten by his
caseworker. In January 1971, Martha Brown visited her son and found him
shaking and covered in bruises. Fearing more bad publicity, the Youth Council
immediately fired Johnny Brown’s caseworker, a move that angered the staff at
Gatesville. A week later, Martha witnessed her son and over one hundred other
boys flee the Gatesville complex while guards stood idly by: a staged escape. In
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the past, the Youth Council had reserved this tactic for frightening the public
away from investigations or reforms of the training schools. This time, however,
guards had acted alone in support of the fired caseworker. They sent a clear
message that the cost of such firings to the Youth Council’s public image could be
much steeper than the benefits. Unlike officials in Austin, rank and file guards
rarely felt the need to apologize for what they did. “I slapped that boy for his own
good,” explained the fired caseworker to a reporter. “That’s the way you have to
handle the boys.”355 The incident likely would never have occurred had it not
been for Martha Brown’s decision to publicize her son’s ill treatment, and to visit
Gatesville at that fortuitous moment.356
From the outset, the case in El Paso attracted the attention of the national
television media. In early October 1970, NBC News contacted Youth Council
director Turman. The network planned a feature on American juvenile justice and
wished to profile the Texas Youth Council. A representative assured Turman that
NBC viewed the Texas program as “among the best in the country.”357 On 1
November, Turman met NBC production coordinator Peter Freedberger at the
Austin airport and drove him to Gatesville for a guided tour. During the return trip
to Austin, Freedberger abruptly asked if he could film inside Gatesville. He
specifically wished to interview juvenile inmates from El Paso, even naming
individual boys for whom Steve Bercu had filed petitions for release. An angry
355
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Turman refused the request, suspecting a coordinated effort between NBC and
Bercu to draw the Youth Council into the El Paso lawsuit.358 Turman had become
aware of the El Paso case because Roland Green, the assistant attorney general for
the state of Texas, had flown to El Paso to assist with the county’s defense.
Spying the seeds of a larger case, Green warned Turman to “be on the lookout for
Mr. Bercu.”359
Although Bercu later denied any collaboration with NBC, he was well
aware of the training schools’ reputation. Moreover, he kept pace with debates in
expert circles over the definition of criminal responsibility, the efficacy of “total
institutions,” and the civil rights of children and adolescents. Just prior to filing
suit in El Paso, Bercu had traveled to Chicago to attend a conference on “juvenile
prison systems” co-sponsored by the OEO and the Youth Law Center. Formed in
the wake of In re Gault (1967), the pathbreaking Supreme Court case that set
forth strict rules for juvenile courts, the Youth Law Center served as a “back-up
center” for the OEO’s legal aid offices around the country.360 It joined other
newly formed organizations such as the Children’s Defense Fund in providing
academic research, political lobbying, public advocacy, and legal aid on behalf of
young people from poor and historically disadvantaged groups. When Bercu
realized that he had a major civil rights case on his hands, he called the Center for
assistance.361
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Not without reason, Turman came to view himself as under siege from all
directions. He continued to field requests from NBC News to film in Gatesville.
El Paso’s state senator forwarded a letter from NBC that trumpeted the film
credits of producer Martin Carr, which included the award-winning Hunger in
America and Migrant: An NBC White Paper.362 These films had dramatized the
plight of vulnerable groups and galvanized public action on their behalf. Hunger
in America, for example, came during a political fight for an expanded national
food stamp program.363 Carr’s resume doubtlessly confirmed Turman’s worst
fears. Although he refused to respond to NBC’s written requests submitted
between November 1970 and January 1971, Turman scribbled his answers by
hand in the margin spaces. These notes track Turman’s intransigence, as well as
his growing irritation with incursions into his control over information. Over the
course of the correspondence, the quality of his handwriting declined noticeably;
by the final letter, one can barely decipher Turman’s vehement objections and
invocations of state laws. Next to a paragraph requesting permission to shoot
exterior footage of Gatesville and Gainesville: “[We] agreed to this at the time of
[NBC’s] visit to Gatesville, they did not choose to do it!!!” Later: “NBC’s sole
interest has been to interview students, which state law does not permit according
to the attorney general!” (emphasis his)364 Turman ignored NBC’s first written
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request; the network sent it again by certified mail.365 When Turman finally
responded to NBC, he maintained his dismissive stance, acidly stating that “only a
court of competent jurisdiction” could order the Youth Council to allow
interviews.366
The biggest surprise was yet to come, however. While Turman sparred
with NBC, attorney Bercu had decided to seek personal interviews with his
juvenile clients, many of whom had no inkling of his efforts on their behalf. In an
El Paso courtroom, the state’s lawyer countered that Bercu’s clients preferred to
remain in training school. Bercu obtained a court order allowing him to depose his
clients; the Youth Council, in his recollection, “had no idea what was coming
next.”367 On 27 January 1971, Bercu and William P. Hoffman, Jr., of the Youth
Law Center arrived at the Gainesville School for Girls. They showed their court
order to superintendent Thomas Riddle (“some old football player”). Soon Bercu
and Hoffman found themselves in a conference call with Youth Council director
Turman and assistant attorney general Green. At Green’s suggestion, the attorneys
were permitted to interview their clients under Riddle’s supervision; two days
later, the same restrictions applied at Gatesville. Green unwittingly had given
Bercu and Hoffman what they had wanted all along – an opportunity to widen the
scope of the case. “We were pretty sure [that] we were going after the school as
soon as we went in,” recalled Bercu; “continuing the lawsuit” until they could
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find a way to expand it became their primary goal.368 Within weeks, they sought
an injunction in the district court whose jurisdiction included Gainesville, where
the presiding judge, William Wayne Justice, seemed most likely to be
sympathetic to the juvenile plaintiffs. At that time, Bercu and Hoffman also filed
a class action lawsuit to prevent juvenile judges across Texas from committing
minors to the Youth Council without due process.369
As its setbacks mounted in the courtroom, the Youth Council lost even
more ground in the area of public relations. In May 1971, NBC aired This Child is
Rated X on its Saturday night “White Paper” news magazine. The broadcast took
viewers to a Chicago juvenile detention center, an Indiana state juvenile training
school, and finally to El Paso. While the film offered critical yet mixed portrayals
of Chicago and Indiana, it reserved its harshest indictments for Texas. Two
former juvenile inmates from El Paso described their experiences in Gatesville.
While his father looked on, Philip Workman, a delicate-looking Anglo boy of
fifteen, recounted how guards “whipped” the arches of his feet with a steel rod.
Ricky Reed exited a bus after eight months in Gatesville and was greeted by NBC
cameras along with his family. According to Reed, guards weighing “close to
three hundred pounds” beat boys at random. He described a climate of terror in
which boys never knew when a guard might “jump on you.” Reed also spent time
in the isolation ward of the El Paso “D-Home,” which he described as “smelly...
with roaches everywhere, no one to talk to, you start to lose your mind.”

368
369

Author interview with Bercu.
Kemerer, William Wayne Justice, 147-148.

204

The story then shifted abruptly to El Paso probation chief Morris Raley,
whose appearance in the film surely ranked as a case study in unintentional selfdefamation. Of the “D-Home” he made the following observation: “It isn’t
intended as a resort vacation.” He gestured toward a large ball of string displayed
on his desk, the result of a boy who had unraveled his T-shirt while languishing in
solitary confinement. The interviewer suggested that the boy might have been
bored; Raley disagreed. “I don’t think so,” drawled Raley, who found “getting
back at any adult, especially his parents” a more likely explanation. For him, the
“coddling permissiveness” of parents represented a larger problem than the rough
treatment of youth in juvenile facilities.
The film’s devastating portrait of Texas juvenile justice culminated the
dismantling of images and narratives carefully constructed over a period of two
decades. Traumatized teenagers left the training school more in need of therapy
than when they entered it. Once connected with local communities throughout the
state, the Youth Council cut itself off from both the families of juvenile
delinquents and the professionals who shaped intellectual opinion. Wedded to
secrecy, the Youth Council struggled to protect its small bureaucratic fiefdom
through obfuscation and delay.
Conclusion: The End of A Consensus
As the legal case against the training schools grew, Youth Council director
Turman warned that only they could minister properly to “hurt, frightened
children.”370 He invoked rhetoric from the salad days of the 1940s, when
370
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reformers attempted to create an institutional home for therapeutic rehabilitation.
These gestures increasingly fell upon deaf ears. In its two decades of existence,
the Youth Council had presided over the growth of a juvenile gulag. It had
redefined juvenile delinquency as an emotional disorder and raised expectations
for the efficient measurement, management, and reduction of juvenile crime.
None of these measures were successful. Citizens continued to view juvenile
delinquents as dangerous criminals, even though most were guilty of nonviolent
or status crimes. Juvenile courts continued to operate according to local customs,
even flouting federal decrees that adolescents be afforded due process rights in the
courtroom. Perhaps most importantly, juvenile crime continued to rise throughout
the first two decades of the Youth Council’s existence.
The main reason for these failures was the continued primacy of the
juvenile training school. The Youth Council’s retreat from community-based
prevention programs coincided with the ascent of James Turman to the agency’s
directorship. As the agency’s clinical psychologist, Turman had shown a marked
preference for the status quo. In his eyes, the mobile clinic experiment of the early
1950s demonstrated not the usefulness of preventive counseling, but rather the
need for intake diagnosis at the training school. He used dubious diagnoses in
repeated attempts to expel African Americans from Gatesville. In the late 1950s,
when he advocated the separation of violent and nonviolent juvenile inmates,
Turman could have chosen to create community-based programs for less serious
offenders. Instead, he successfully lobbied for the construction of yet another
prison-like institution, the Mountain View School for Boys. Years of budget
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shortfalls did not prevent Turman from building expensive institutions. Facing a
legislative inquiry in 1969, Turman found funds for yet another training school,
this time located in the home district of a key political supporter.
By the time Steve Bercu began fielding complaints in his El Paso office,
the Texas Youth Council had become a bureaucratic island unto itself. His
adherence to institutions had left Turman isolated from his professional peers,
who were rethinking definitions of crime and delinquency. “Child mental health”
had helped give birth to the Texas Youth Council, yet it also gave rise to
expectations that would tear it apart. A consensus to trust the word of experts on
the subject had come to an end. The anguished testimonials of ordinary parents
and children displayed an incompatibility between the idea of rehabilitation and
the reality of the training school. Promising compassion, it had delivered pain;
promoting citizenship, it had produced inmates. Increasingly, the public lay the
blame for “hurt, frightened children” not with parents but with the Youth Council
itself, setting the stage for a full-scale assault upon the cultural definition of
juvenile delinquency in Texas and the nation.
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Chapter 5: Identity Crisis, Identity Politics: Creating a “Right” to
Adolescence, 1971-1988
On Labor Day morning in 1971, one day before opening testimony in the
Morales case, a “riot” erupted at Gatesville. The source of the disturbance was the
Sycamore unit, reserved for those high school age boys deemed “capable” of
working at academic grade level. Large numbers of boys began huddling together
during breakfast, which alarmed guards so much that they halted the day’s routine
and returned everyone to their separate dormitories. This action, however, came
too late. Within hours, a group of about ninety boys gathered on the athletic field
and marched off the grounds, while a guard supervisor tried in vain to dissuade
them. As the marchers approached a nearby highway, they met with a small
contingent of guards ready for a fight. In a response that was clearly rehearsed,
the boys laughed and casually walked around the blockade. Television cameras
arrived on the scene in time to witness highway patrolmen halt the march by
firing shotguns in the air. Mere hours after it had started, the protest came to an
end.371
Nevertheless, the boys had “accomplished their goal” of drawing attention
to their dissatisfaction with conditions in Gatesville. The timing was crucial; the
upcoming court hearing would decide on whether to expand the scope of Morales
v. Turman beyond procedural violations in the state’s juvenile courts to include
conditions of confinement. The protest march therefore irritated and worried
371 Statement of M. B. Kindrick, Superintendent, Gatesville School for Boys, “given shortly after
the riot on September 6, 1971,” submitted to the Texas Attorney General, 8/29/1972. Morales case
files.
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Gatesville supervisors as well as the top officials of the Texas Youth Council.
Where past generations of aggrieved inmates had sought escape or release on an
individual basis, the Sycamore insurgents had acted collectively; although no
information survives about specific participants, their sheer numbers suggest that
boys shelved longstanding rivalries and disputes on behalf of their shared interests
in gaining their freedom. Officials were also unnerved because the boys had
carried off a protest devoid of violence or property damage, which supported the
idea that they were at least partially innocent victims rather than hardened
criminals. The “peace march,” as officials privately referred to it, was more likely
to evoke a civil rights protest than a jailbreak. Hard-pressed to label the incident
an escape attempt, Gatesville officials instead called it a “riot.” They feared that
the inmates were taking over the proverbial asylum, not by force, but with the
assistance of activist attorneys and a sympathetic judge. As juvenile inmates
began to achieve a collective status as an oppressed social group, their jailors
began to worry. “[T]he riot was successful,” admitted the Gatesville
superintendent, M.D. Kindrick, and moreover, “the students now know it can be
done.” The protest galvanized even those inmates who did not participate, who
were heard cheering loudly while they watched coverage on the local evening
news.372
Equally as important, the protest confounded the outdated definitions of
delinquent behavior that had provided Gatesville officials with a framework for
understanding everyday episodes of defiance. In the 1960s, terms like juvenile
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delinquency, rehabilitation, and identity took on new meanings. Social scientists
increasingly turned their attention from the immediate causes to the cultural
definitions of juvenile delinquency. In an influential series of essays, sociologist
Howard Becker argued that “social labeling” sorted a range of practices and
behaviors into categories of “normal” and “deviant.” Too often, he claimed, adult
authorities interpreted youthful behaviors as “delinquent” without attempting to
understand the contingent meanings arising from their immediate social,
economic, and cultural contexts.373 The results: underprivileged young people
guilty of minor offenses were brought into the juvenile justice system, where they
often learned how to become the criminals that authorities already thought they
were. Labeling thus “tracked” teenagers into what the Chicago sociologist
Clifford Shaw decades earlier had called “delinquent careers;” it was a selffulfilling prophecy that helped fill the nation’s jails and prisons with “graduates”
of juvenile training schools. Joining Becker’s critique was federal judge David
Bazelon, already an advocate of treatment over punishment for adult offenders
suffering from mental illness. In his 1972 address to the National Council of
Juvenile Court Judges, Bazelon issued the following harsh indictment: “[I]n fifty
long years of juvenile court experience, we just have not learned how to ‘treat’
delinquents. As long as the community views you as a prevention agency and
refers its social and behavioral problems to you, the root problems will not be
attacked.”374 Bazelon rejected the notion that juvenile training schools could offer
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meaningful treatment to troubled adolescents. By pretending to do so, in his view,
training schools had allowed themselves to become dumping grounds for
countless numbers of truants, curfew-breakers, underage drinkers, and
“ungovernable” teenagers who often posed no immediate threat to anyone but
themselves.
Like the 1940s, proposals to replace large institutions with communitybased programs were gaining steam. An unprecedented level of frustration with
training schools accompanied them. Not only was the training school as much an
incubator of criminality as the adult prison, charged critics, it had subjected
generations of young people to all manner of physical and psychological abuse. It
fostered a more severe brand of labeling than society at large; in the Texas
training schools, this took the form of pseudoscientific diagnoses, stigmatizing
punishments, and degrading nicknames. Expert critics began to view abuse and
failure as the inevitable outcome of any training school, regardless of the qualities
of its physical plant, individual staff, or overall program. The training school, they
argued, was a “total institution” whose failings were immune to reform. The best
articulation of this viewpoint appeared in Erving Goffman’s groundbreaking book
Asylums (1964). Goffman had coined the term “total institution” to explain the
culture of “surveillance” that he observed during a participant-observation study
of a psychiatric hospital. The impetus for social control shaped virtually all
interactions between staff workers and patients (whom Goffman called “inmates,”
likening them to prisoners). Even well meaning workers, he found, were
compelled to subordinate inmate treatment to the orderly functioning of the
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institution. In prison, male inmates suffered a loss of individual identity, invasions
of privacy or “contaminative contact,” and assaults on masculinity. The yardstick
for evaluating “recovery” was the degree of individual conformity to the
institution’s rules, which meant that patients emerged from the hospital ill fitted
for the more fluid roles and relationships of the wider world.375 Goffman
influenced those critics who attacked the juvenile training school in mass-market
magazines by the 1970s. These articles often contrasted the ills of the training
school with emerging experiments with halfway houses, group homes, and
intensive work, education, and recreation programs. In Massachusetts, a young
professor of social work named Jerome Miller took the unprecedented (and never
repeated) step of shutting down all of the state’s training schools, which he called
“juvenile prisons.” He told U.S. News and World Report of “institutionalized kids
whose personalities became modeled on the institution – they were well-behaved
behind walls but troublemakers in the community when released.”376
Underscoring the urgency of the training school crisis was the fact that its
chief victims were adolescents, who were by definition “impressionable,”
malleable, and thus vulnerable. By the early 1970s, Americans had come to view
adolescence as a formative and precarious stage in the life course. Psychologists,
led by Erik H. Erikson, had firmly established adolescence as a time of
pronounced risk-taking, role experimentation, rebellion, and strong emotion.
These traits stemmed from an “identity crisis” detectable, so its proponents
375 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situations of Mental Patients and Other
Inmates (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1961), 1-124.
376 “End of Reform Schools? New Trend in Treating Delinquents,” U.S. News & World Report
(July 17, 1972), 44-46: 44. See also Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, “They’re Sending the Delinquents Back
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argued, in various cultures and historical eras. The resolution of this crisis
occurred “when each youth must forge for himself some central perspective and
direction, some working unity, out of the effective remnants of childhood and the
hopes of his anticipated adulthood; he must detect some meaningful resemblance
between what he has come to see in himself and what his sharpened awareness
tells him others judge and expect him to be.”377 Ideally, the outcome of this
psychological journey was a “positive conscience,” in which individual creativity
flowered within the limits imposed by social mores. Contrarily, an unresolved
identity crisis could lead to the assumption of a “negative identity,” personified by
juvenile delinquents, criminals, and monsters of history such as the Hitler Youth
Brigades.378
Regardless of its accuracy, the vast influence of identity theory across and
outside the social sciences was clearly an artifact of its historical moment. To
come of age in the 1950s was to experience opportunities and freedoms undreamt
of by earlier generations of youth. An unprecedented majority of American
adolescents attended high school, where their predecessors had been as likely to
be employed in full-time wage labor. Moreover, thanks to the “baby boom,”
young people represented a larger percentage of the overall population than in
past years. These conditions proved fertile for the development of a distinct
adolescent peer culture, a phenomenon that captivated social commentators as
well as merchants of mass culture. In the era of the “teenager,” young people
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suddenly had access to a new world of consumer goods, extracurricular activities,
media texts, cultural styles, and leisure pursuits. Erikson, for one, lauded these
new features of modern adolescent life. In his view, healthy adulthood depended
largely upon the existence of a “psychosocial moratorium,” or a period of delayed
adult responsibility, in which to “find” oneself. In the postwar era, this
moratorium took on the character of a national birthright; it was not only
“normal” but expected that teenagers would prolong their education, rebel against
adult authority, try on various identities, and eventually, mature into good adult
citizens.379
While popular culture portrayed them as misguided but typical teenagers,
in real life, juvenile delinquents rarely enjoyed the benefits of the psychosocial
moratorium. Juvenile training schools bred far more deviants and criminals than
they salvaged, as illustrated all too vividly in Morales v. Turman. For training
school inmates, role choices were few and unappealing; almost all fell into the
category of “negative” identities. Poorly educated guards applied harebrained
“diagnoses,” handed out degrading nicknames, assigned debasing and grueling
labor tasks, and devised numerous ways to torment and humiliate individual
inmates. The brunt of these practices often fell upon those inmates who
supposedly departed from traditional definitions of masculinity and femininity.
Delicate or smallish boys became “punks,” occupying the lowest level of a rigid
caste system, while many girls suffered an adult presumption of sexual
379
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“deviance” based upon their very presence in an all-girl training school. The sex
system affected greater numbers of girls but inflicted deeper wounds upon those
boys, especially those labeled “punks.” Masculinity was the currency of
psychological survival for boy inmates, many of whom lived in fear of physical
and sexual assaults from both other boys and adult guards.
As the word “punk” suggests, names and labels were embedded in the
institutional culture of the training schools. The meanings of even basic words
engendered heated arguments during the trial. Youth Council officials routinely
described as “children” or “students” those individuals referred to by opposing
attorneys as “inmates.” A facility that would be called an isolation ward in any
adult prison became a “security treatment center.” “Youth activities supervisors”
looked and behaved much like prison guards. Cigarette breaks stood in for
“recreational activities.” These terminological distinctions reflected three
decades’ worth of failed reforms. Seeking to install “child mental health” in the
training schools, the Youth Council instead had allowed half-started reforms to
languish and become a veneer of science, professionalism, and compassion. Past
hopes that “little crime schools” could become actual schools had surrendered to
the inexorable logic of the total institution, where the maintenance of order
squeezed out all other considerations, including meaningful education, recreation,
treatment, and rehabilitation. Dependent upon the training schools for its very
existence, the Youth Council found itself powerless to counter the most
penetrating dispute over nomenclature – that it ran not schools but prisons.
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Lawyers challenged the Youth Council in ways that revealed generational
and cultural divides. Section One of this chapter explores the myriad ways that
civil rights attorneys disrupted the everyday institutional cultures of the training
schools during the early stages of the case. Representatives of the American
Psychiatric Association, the United States Department of Justice, and the
University of Texas also visited the training schools. They sometimes turned the
tables on the staff, embarrassing them in front of inmates while emboldening
teenagers to defy rules and routines. “Hippie”-looking attorneys, themselves not
much older than their clients, flouted the usual rules of dress and decorum,
obtaining heroic status among most juvenile inmates. Among their number were
several assertive women attorneys who, in the course of carrying out their
lawyerly duties, became exemplars of independence for girl inmates whose
curriculum focused upon “traditional” women’s roles as homemaker, hairstylist,
or secretary.
Determined to prove that the training schools remade troubled teenagers
into lifelong inmates, attorneys solicited extensive testimonials from juvenile
inmates, expert witnesses, and Youth Council officials. Section Two demonstrates
that the use of punishments, labor details, and solitary confinements bludgeoned
inmates into conformity with the rules, a process that cost many individuals their
self-respect and dignity as well as a “healthy” identity. Section Three suggests
that the historical importance of the Morales case was that it combined a plural
and contingent notion of identity with the developmental and hence universal
model of identity formation. Evidence of racist and homophobic practices
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prompted arguments that a healthy realization of the identity crisis depended upon
the official encouragement of “cultural,” racial, ethnic, and sexual identities.
According to the final decision, a constitutional “right to rehabilitation” mandated
that troubled teenagers and juvenile offenders alike receive individualized
treatment that also recognized identity-based differences. To achieve such lofty
standards, the decree called for the deinstitutionalization of most of the state’s
juvenile delinquents. It promulgated massive reforms at the national, state, and
local level, intended to protect adolescents from abuse, that have provoked debate
among recent scholars. In the conclusion, I explore the unintended consequences
of Morales v. Turman. By attempting to elevate juvenile rehabilitation to the
status of a civil right, it hoped to extend the privileges of the “psychosocial
moratorium” to the least privileged adolescents in American society. In other
words, it sought to make juvenile delinquents into teenagers rather than inmates.
And yet, subsequent decades have seen the increasing “adultification” of young
offenders, with juveniles tried and sentenced as adults, and depicted as
sophisticated criminals in the mass media. Legal scholars have portrayed a lethal
combination of a discredited juvenile justice system and a sharp increase in
violent juvenile crime. Equally important, I contend, was the erosion of public
faith in the idea of rehabilitation, as well as the understanding of adolescence on
which it was based. Ironically, the push to expand the protective envelope of
adolescence to include the least among us helped engender the opposite effect.

217

I. Disrupting Institutional Culture
The Sycamore “riot” highlighted the growing disruption of daily life at the
training schools. Only two months earlier, in July 1971, Judge William Wayne
Justice, the district judge who presided over Morales v. Turman, had mailed a
questionnaire to all 2,500 training school inmates. An enclosed letter informed
inmates, many for the first time, that the Youth Council was standing trial.
Inmates were assured that their responses would be kept confidential, in keeping
with the court’s interest in protecting their “legal rights.”380 The questions focused
upon whether inmates had received a court hearing or counsel before being
committed to the Youth Council. Of the 2,294 respondents, 863 had hearings but
not attorneys, while 280 saw neither a judge nor a lawyer; in other words, officials
had broken the law in their commitments of nearly half of all inmates.381 As if
these revelations were not damning enough, about fifty respondents scribbled on
the back of their questionnaires handwritten descriptions of abuses suffered at the
hands of staff workers. In November 1971, over state objections, Bercu obtained
permission to conduct one-on-one interviews with all 2,500 inmates in the
training schools.
In January and February 1972, over one hundred attorneys and law
students from the University of Texas and Southern Methodist University
conducted hundreds of interviews in school gymnasiums. The interviews became
occasions for minor but revealing clashes between staff workers and aspiring
young attorneys. For example, guards who routinely permitted, even encouraged,
380
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the act of smoking cigarettes protested when interviewers offered them to
inmates. One irate Gatesville guard confiscated a pack of cigarettes from an
attorney after she had offered several of them to inmates. Youth Council officials
viewed the incident as an example of the pernicious, peer-like influence of
Bercu’s youthful assistants.382 But the school guards made unconvincing
opponents of teen smoking. So pervasive was smoking in the training schools that
a visiting psychiatrist later singled out “seeing young teenage girls through a thick
cloud of cigarette smoke” as her “most vivid memory.”383 Cigarettes long had
been integral to the system of rewards and punishments; some dormitory
supervisors even recognized smoking as a “recreational” activity. Why, then, the
objections to smoking during interviews with attorneys? Already a threat to the
guards’ authority, lawyers who passed out cigarettes unwittingly seized control
over a key element of the reward structure. Cigarettes were as much a form of
currency in juvenile institutions as they were in adult prisons, and guards feared
that boys would associate the pleasure of smoking with the deposition process.
Youth Council lawyers collected other evidence suggesting that the
interviews cultivated disrespect for staff. One Gatesville caseworker recalled
being informed by a boy that the “staff was not qualified as correctional workers
nor did the program rehabilitate boys.”384 Staff expressed fear that inmates who
believed their release imminent would defy rules and backslide from their path
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toward rehabilitation. Others, particularly at Gatesville, claimed to have unearthed
intimidation tactics during interviews. An inmate who refused to describe the
cleanliness of his meals as anything other than “all right” supposedly goaded his
interviewer into a confrontation. When he was accused of lying, the boy allegedly
shoved the meeting table into his questioner’s chest, then stalked out of the gym.
In another interview, an “annoyed” law student demanded that a boy “quit lying”
about his treatment from guards. The response, in this telling: “I don’t have to
answer any questions from you, you long-haired S.O.B.”385
The use of women interviewers seems to have exacerbated the sense of
injury among staff. At Gatesville, this merely underscored one similarity between
the training school and the prison. Boys who never had learned how to behave
around girls were unlikely to learn in an all-male environment where survival
often depended upon exaggerated displays of masculinity. And yet no reports
surfaced of sexual impropriety. The presence of female professionals seems to
have disturbed the adult guards far more than the supposedly hypersexual boys.
Well-educated and assertive, women interviewers who offered cigarettes to boys,
then argued about it with guards, probably posed a threat to authority beyond the
mere disruption of established smoking schedules. The effect was quite different
with girl informants, who sometimes viewed female attorneys as role models
worthy of the kind of respect never given to school staff. One Gainesville girl,
given cigarettes contrary to a written order from her father, emerged from her
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deposition proclaiming her disdain for staff and her desire to “wear pants” like the
woman who interviewed her.386
As much as the staff resented the incursion of female attorneys, they
clearly despised their male colleagues even more. At Gainesville, Bercu’s
unannounced appearance in a cosmetology class “terribly excited” trainees, who
quickly abandoned the haircuts they were in the middle of giving. The flustered
instructor then found herself fielding questions from Bercu about her
qualifications to teach hairstyling.387 Ironically, Bercu’s own long hair and
“hippie” appearance deeply offended Youth Council attorneys, officials, and staff
workers. To many of the inmates, however, Bercu’s look was a breath of fresh air
in a landscape of crew cuts and uniforms. “We looked like rock stars to [the
kids],” says Bercu, who “made a point” of irritating the staff by wearing long hair,
beard, blue jeans, and unbuttoned shirts on his visits to the training schools.388
Boys “thought it was pretty cool,” while girls “loved it;” employees, meanwhile,
struggled to re-establish order after Bercu visit. At Gainesville, girls became
“extremely defiant” and “unusually abusive” toward their captors. Angry claims
to “rights,” tirades against “God damned M.F. state people,” and threats to have
the school closed down resulted in a tripling of the number of girls placed in
solitary confinement.389 Equally exciting to inmates was the fact that Bercu
wielded real power:
386 Statement of Wanda Wallace, Dorm Supervisor, Gainesville School for Girls. 5/21/1971.
Morales case files.
387 Statement of Dorothy Moore, Instructor, Gainesville School for Girls. 8/4/1972. Morales case
files.
388 Author interview with Bercu.
389 Statement of James L. Braswell, Director, Security Treatment Center, Gainesville School for
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The main thing... [was] that we could push these guys around. These were
their tormentors. When we came in, everyone got deferential immediately.
As far as the kids were concerned, it was... unbelievable. We would come
in there, a bunch of hippies basically, and everybody would back off.390
While Bercu’s appearance angered officials and excited inmates, it
apparently meant little to Judge William Wayne Justice. Only one year before the
start of Morales v. Turman, Justice famously had overturned a ban on long hair at
Tyler Junior College, a ruling that town fathers had warned would “destroy the
college.”391 A native of Tyler, Texas, and an appointee of President Lyndon
Johnson, Justice had ordered Robert E. Lee High School in Tyler to replace the
school song, “Dixie,” and the school flag, the confederate stars and bars that many
Southern schools and government buildings had erected in response to courtordered desegregation. In another case, Justice agreed with plaintiffs that Tyler
High School cheerleader selection practices were discriminatory. He issued
several unpopular but key decisions that garnered him a reputation as a judicial
activist and, according to his biographer, a defender of individual freedom and
dignity against incursions from the state.392
In recognition of Justice’s concerns, Youth Council attorneys claimed that
legal aid attorneys were exploiting their juvenile clients for personal and strategic
gains. For evidence, they produced letters from inmates. “All they do is lie and try
to get all the money they can before they say they cannot help you,” stated one
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handwritten note from a Mountain View inmate.393 In fact, officials had
manipulated the situation to produce such letters. Tom Dixon, an associate of
Bercu’s from Dallas, had filed a series of release petitions in fall 1971. In
response, Dallas district attorney Henry Wade informed Dixon in February 1972
of his intention to fight each writ in court and re-file charges against juveniles
who already had won release. Dixon was forced to solicit funds from inmates’
families for court costs, a difficult task given that some parents were less than
eager to see their children released from training school. “Your mom says they
simply don’t have it,” explained Dixon in one letter, “and I don’t think she wants
anything to do with me anyway. You’ll need to talk this over with your father in
person.”394 Inmates who hailed from the Dallas area received a letter informing
them that Dixon would be unable to secure their release, as he had promised.395
Casting further suspicion on inmate complaints, training school staff had censored
outgoing mail to legal aid attorneys, in defiance of a court order, but encouraged
letters to Youth Council lawyers.396 It was not unusual for refraining from writing
to attorneys to be included on the list of inmates’ “treatment goals.” “As long as I
write you,” one Gainesville inmate later told Bercu, “is as long as I am going to
stay.”397
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Staff workers believed that inmates were better off in the training schools.
“So many of the girls’ parents are too permissive,” advised one trainee from
Texas Woman’s University.398 Her viewpoint typified that of the Youth Council,
including its director, James Turman. He once had lectured Dixon that he “should
be less interested in releasing these kids and more interested in their dispositions.”
But Dixon did indeed worry about the fate of his clients should they be released;
many of them, he conceded, had “no place to go.” In November 1971, he
requested permission for representatives of Dallas-area “halfway houses and
religious agencies” to discuss placement options for his juvenile clients. Turman
never replied to this inquiry.399 Turman’s staff fed him information designed to
squelch any interest in cooperating with Dixon. From Gatesville came retainer
invoices and written affidavits from boys. According to these documents, Dixon
charged exorbitant fees and encouraged his clients to “mess up” or run away. “I
don’t give a shit what happens,” Dixon supposedly boasted, “I can get you
out.”400
These shenanigans confirmed Erving Goffman’s observation that rankand-file staff at the “total institution” carefully controlled the “flow of
information” between inmates, “higher staff levels,” and the outside world.401 It is
hardly surprising that training school staff intimidated inmates and censored
communications with attorneys. The packaging of documents for Youth Council
398
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director Turman, ostensibly a defender of his own institutions, displayed a
remarkable degree of concern for controlling information. Additionally, big-city
district attorneys awaited any released inmates with new arrest warrants for old
offenses. Several inmates returned to the training schools, where they were
recruited to swear out complaints against Steve Bercu. “I misrepresented the truth
because I was desperate to be released,” claimed one Gainesville girl who
“want[ed] to tell the truth this time.”402 The momentous offense for which she had
landed in Gainesville in the first place: writing bad checks. Letters from parents
sympathetic to the Youth Council portrayed legal aid attorneys as meddlers in the
disciplining of disobedient youth. “I sincerely cannot understand why they are
doing these things,” wrote one parent; “I believe that they will only hurt the kids
more than help them.”403
II. Courtroom Testimony: Abuse and Brutality
More influential in the courtroom were those parties who believed the
opposite was true, that juvenile delinquents suffered far more harm in a training
school than they would at home. Judge Justice invited the Justice Department to
join the case, resulting in the deployment of FBI agents to inspect and photograph
the Texas training schools. The Mental Health Law Project, a nonprofit legal aid
firm, joined on behalf of the American Psychiatric Association and the American
Psychological Association. The influx of such prestigious participants allowed
Bercu to solicit key testimony from a range of well-known experts on youth and
402
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corrections. It also helped convince Judge Justice to order participationobservation studies of daily life in the training schools. Gerda Hansen Smith, a
psychiatry instructor at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, led
a team of researchers who spent two weeks living at the Gainesville School for
Girls. Smith was “appalled” by both the physical conditions and the use of
language to paper over them. According to the Youth Council’s published
literature, inmates lived in “home-like cottages” with “private rooms.”404 The
word “cottage,” observed Smith, implied “something... warm and cozy,” while
“private room” suggested “a teenager’s room... my daughter’s and my son’s
room.” The interior of the cottage resembled nothing more than a cell block:
“dark, narrow corridors with teenage girls looking out a slightly opened door that
was chained.” Each “private room” contained “a cot projecting from a concrete
block wall with a heavy wood door, with a little peephole up at the top, [and] with
a window that looked out that had a heavy screen on it.”405
Similar contradictions bedeviled longstanding descriptions of “house
parents” who “functioned much like parents in a home.”406 In any other setting,
the brand of parenting that actually existed in the training schools would have
drawn charges of child abuse – even in the 1970s. The primary sources of
information, the juvenile inmates themselves, who testified in open court and
gave depositions in closed-door meetings. The Youth Council long had insisted
on the untrustworthiness of such statements, claiming they were tainted by the
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obvious prospect of release, an innate proclivity for lying, and adolescent
immaturity. These arguments fell flat, in large part due to the efforts of Jerome
Miller, who helped convince Judge Justice of the value of inmate testimony. The
Texas Youth Council and its training schools looked all too familiar to Miller. He
had just completed four controversial years as director of the Massachusetts
Department of Youth Services, where he had rocked the world of criminal justice
by summarily closing down all of the state’s institutions for juvenile delinquents.
In the process, Miller had developed an unsparing and incisive critique of
institutions that gained much of its power from the fact that he was no ideologue,
but a pragmatist whose views were borne of experience.
Miller came to Massachusetts with experience as a psychiatric social
worker in the Air Force, counselor to troubled adolescents, and professor at Ohio
State University.407 Brought to Massachusetts to clean up the state’s scandalridden juvenile facilities, Miller quickly became frustrated in attempts to enact
even mild reforms. Veteran workers accustomed to a prison-like program of
control and custody proved unable or unwilling to learn new methods of
treatment. Their staff association, a powerful lobby at the state legislature,
demanded that politicians rein in or oust Miller. Community groups, fearing the
prospect of delinquents let loose, lodged their opposition to anything that might
reduce the size of the inmate population. Miller soon discovered several groups
with a vested interest in the maintenance and even expansion of the status quo.
407
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They had become “feeder” institutions to the larger “prison-industrial complex”
that, as scholars such as Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Christian Parenti contend,
emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century.408 Like prisons, juvenile
institutions were not going away; instead, they were expanding. As the nation
abandoned its poor populations, its investments skyrocketed for the construction
of prisons – an economic shift that Gilmore calls “carceral Keynesianism.”409 The
tide of prison growth carried juvenile institutions in its wake; for their proponents,
both symbolized scientific as well as social progress. Recall that in 1949
(Crockett), 1962 (Mountain View), and 1969 (Giddings), the Texas Youth
Council had touted bigger and more “modern” training schools in precisely such
language, even as they downplayed their economic benefits to specific individuals
and groups.
Jerome Miller confronted a similar situation in Massachusetts, where
individual institutions were entangled in political patronage and the local
economy. Politicians whose districts contained training schools regularly obtained
jobs for their relatives and friends. Why, one might ask, would such a traditionally
unattractive job require the imprimatur of a powerful connection? The answer is
that the labor market was in the midst of a historic shift. In a time when industrial
jobs were leaving the unionized Northeast for the unregulated Sun Belt, the
Massachusetts training schools hired large numbers of unskilled and semiskilled
service workers – even for positions that seemingly would require professional
408 Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “Globalisation and U.S. Prison Growth: From Military Keynesianism to
post-Keynesian Militarism,” Race and Class, 40 (1998/99), 171-188; see also Christian Parenti,
Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in an Age of Crisis (New York: Verso, 1999).
409 Gilmore, “Globalisation and U.S. Prison Growth,” 174.
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training. Few of them structured their daily routines around juvenile
rehabilitation, and so had no use for Jerome Miller’s attempts to retrain staff or to
demote the maintenance of order to a lower place on their list of priorities. Only
after years of failed reforms did Miller reluctantly opt for a wholesale closing
down of the institutions, some of which dated back to the early nineteenth
century. Hundreds of juvenile delinquents became residents of halfway houses
and group homes, which were staffed largely by college students eager to
contribute to Miller’s “Massachusetts Experiment.” Many other delinquents
participated in therapeutic, recreational, and educational programs while living at
home. The experiment attracted international attention from such luminaries as
Ivan Ilich, the Russian advocate of deinstitutionalization, and Michel Foucault,
the French philosopher-historian who went on to write a provocative account of
the birth of the prison in Western civilization. Harvard sociologist Lloyd Ohlin
launched what would become a multi-year study to determine the experiment’s
impact on the juvenile crime rate.410
Closer to home, however, Miller found himself attacked as an “anarchist”
by politicians and reporters, sabotaged routinely by members of his own staff, and
driven out of the state by January 1973, when he became director of the Illinois
Department of Child and Family Services.411 His decision to visit Texas brought
410
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Miller the enmity of his professional peers. That June, a meeting of the National
Conference of Superintendents of Training Schools and Reformatories voted
overwhelmingly to censure Miller. A few weeks later, as Miller addressed a New
Orleans meeting of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, an emissary
of the Texas attorney general surreptitiously recorded his comments.412
Undeterred, Miller visited the Mountain View School for Boys twice in
summer 1973. On his first visit, he received a guided tour from school officials.
Certain that he had not seen everything, he approached a boy who was hoeing in a
grove of peach trees on the side of a hill. The boy told Miller to look on the other
side of the hill, in an area not visible from the front entrance. There, Miller found
boys “all in a line in these uniforms, hoeing at the open ground in a useless sort of
fashion, in unison, [like] the old chain gang.”413 In the isolation ward, he found
battered, bruised, and terrified boys, only a few of whom would even whisper
their complaints aloud for fear of retribution. Days before the start of the trial
phase of Morales v. Turman, Miller returned with Judge Justice in tow, taking
him straight to the isolation ward. Any doubts Justice may have harbored about
the veracity of inmate testimony paled in the face of what he saw. Miller’s former
informants, shaking with fear and covered in fresh bruises, begged him to leave. It
was all too obvious what had taken place since Miller’s last visit. According to
Justice’s biographer, “it was a very unsettling experience” for him; most of the
boys looked hardly a day over fourteen years old.414 Clearly, for an inmate, to
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testify was to take great risks to life and limb. “All of the pressures are on him not
to say anything,” argued Miller. In Massachusetts, it was typical for a boy to
confide privately to Miller about abusive treatment. “[W]hen we got to taking a
formal statement, with his knowledge that generally he’s going to be in that
system awhile, face to face with the people he’s accusing,” however, the average
inmate did the “prudent” thing: “clam up.”415
During the trial, juvenile inmates feared for their safety, despite
reassurances from representatives of the Texas Attorney General. The crowds that
filled the courtroom, which included reporters and Youth Council officials, added
to their trepidation. Occasionally, when witnesses seemed too paralyzed with fear
to speak, Judge Justice cleared the courtroom. As their stories unfolded, observers
from the national media began to appreciate their courage. They gave
“astonishing testimony,” according to journalist Kenneth Wooden, made all the
more so because it indicted school guards and officials who often were sitting
only a few feet away.416
One of the signal promises of the Texas Youth Council when it came into
being in 1949 was that it would do away with physical violence in the training
schools. One witness after another demonstrated with devastating clarity that the
schools had become, if anything, more dangerous places than ever. One of the
worst stories was that of C.W., who had entered Gatesville at the age of fourteen.
New inmates such as C.W. were considered “fresh fish,” meaning they had to
415
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fight to win acceptance in the dormitory.417 One might expect to find an adult
staff that struggled to contain this practice and tolerated it only grudgingly.
Instead, guards turned out to be willing overseers of all manner of ritualized
fighting between inmates. After “about ten” fights, C.W. fled Gatesville but was
recaptured two months later. He stayed at the Gatesville Reception Center, a
temporary detention facility for boys awaiting placement in one of the seven
“schools” that comprised the Gatesville campus. One day, without warning, C.W.
and five other boys were put in handcuffs and leg irons, and herded onto a truck.
Their destination was Mountain View, the facility built for “violent and serious
offenders” but informally used as a form of punishment for boys who attempted
to run away from Gatesville. Even Gatesville inmates dreaded the prospect of
incarceration in Mountain View, which had a fearsome reputation.
Upon arrival, C.W. and his companions lined up against a concrete wall in
a supervisor’s office, while a group of guards loudly informed them of the rules.
Next to C.W., a Latino boy raised his hand; he spoke almost no English and had
not understood the rules. Not surprisingly, he also did not respond to an order to
lower his hand. What happened next shocked and frightened C.W. The supervisor
walked up to the boy and punched him several times while the others watched.
C.W. was escorted to his dormitory, where once again he was a “fresh fish.”
Again a guard looked on as C.W. fought with a fellow inmate. But his initiation
into Mountain View was only beginning. After halting the fight, the guard walked
C.W. into a side room, ordered him to stand against a wall with his hands in his
417 Testimony of “C.W.,” 16-year-old former inmate at Mountain View and Gatesville Schools for
Boys, 7/19/1973. Morales case files. C.W.’s testimony also receives brief mention in Judge
Justice’s final opinion, Morales v. Turman, 44.
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pockets, and punched him several times in the stomach. The “racking,” as this
practice was known, was so pervasive that it came up in the testimony of every
single Mountain View inmate. C.W.’s guard proved especially sadistic; the day
after the “racking,” he presided over a beating administered by eight boys that
lasted over an hour and ended long after C.W. was unconscious. One boy who
witnessed the incident recalled that the guard had intervened because he did not
want “a dead fish on his hands.”418
As one might expect, stomach-turning stories such as this one almost
always drew attention to the staff. What right-thinking adult, wondered observers
on all sides (including some members of the Youth Council’s own defense team)
could visit such horrors on adolescent boys, regardless of their offenses? How
could trained professionals, including some with doctoral degrees in psychiatry
and psychology, countenance such practices, which so obviously went against
practically everything they had learned about “child mental health?” The answers
begin, as they did in Massachusetts, in the area of political economy. The Youth
Council had recruited a nearly all white staff from Gatesville and other small
towns. For many guards, a job at Gatesville or Mountain View paid so little that it
served only to supplement income earned elsewhere, either from a second job or a
military pension. Several supervisors were “retired army people” from nearby
Fort Hood.419 Academic or professional training was the exception rather than the
rule. For example, Mack O. Morris, the assistant superintendent of Mountain
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View, held only a high school equivalency diploma. Like several of his
employees, Morris had taken a few courses in corrections at Sam Houston State
University, a growing center for the education of employees in the Texas prison
system.420 This curriculum choice betrayed the fact that much of the Youth
Council staff, as well as their superiors, viewed their work through the lens of
adult prison rather than juvenile rehabilitation. In any case, professional
qualifications mattered little for career mobility. Dwain Place, a former
accountant at Pan-American Petroleum Corporation, began pursuing a Master’s
degree in corrections long after he became the superintendent of Gatesville.421 In
1957, his right-hand man Morris had landed his first Gatesville job as a cook.
Within five years, he rose through the ranks of guard dormitory supervisor to
become assistant superintendent.422
Morris’ tenure was unusual; few workers stayed long enough to earn a
promotion. Guards clearly found few satisfactions in their jobs. They received
low pay, worked long hours, endured stressful situations that rarely got resolved
in the space of a single shift, and probably enjoyed little in the way of social
status outside the training school. These factors could have contributed to the
guards’ unforgivable actions. Their power over the boys may have afforded at
least some guards a kind of horrible compensation; “poor white trash” on the
outside, they became feared enforcers inside the training school. Few boys could
420 Deposition of George P. Pulliam, Chief Clinical Social Worker, Division of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry, University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, 5/22/1973. He
questioned the applicability of corrections training for staff in a youth-serving facility, scornfully
referring to such staff as “the so-called professionals” throughout.
421 Deposition of Dwain Place, Assistant General Superintendent, Gatesville School for Boys,
11/16/1972. Morales case files.
422 Ibid.
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hope to stand up physically to the average guard, despite Youth Council director
Turman’s insistence that “any seventeen-year-old kid in Mountainview (sic)...
with his bare hands can take any man there apart.”423 In one description that
echoed countless others, a guard who stood over six feet tall and weighed about
three hundred pounds attacked a boy less than half his size.424 Guards also
wielded symbolic power that derived in part from their black uniforms, cowboy
hats, and cowboy boots, an ensemble that caught the attention of experts who
visited Mountain View. “I found myself saying yes sir, and no, sir, and being very
polite,” recalled one visitor. “All I could see was the uniform.”425 Marking staff as
prison guards rather than counselors or mentors, uniforms put the lie to job titles
like “youth activities supervisor” and “house parent.” One child psychiatrist noted
that the Mountain View uniform could hardly promote rehabilitation in the
institutional context when it so clearly signified “control and punishment”
everywhere else.426
Physical abuse was part of a spectrum of punishments that enforced
conformity to an unforgiving regimen clearly modeled on the military boot camp.
Like today’s juvenile boot camps, boys wore crew cuts and uniforms, marched in
formation, and observed strict rules of conduct. Military practices sometimes
appeared in exaggerated and grotesque forms. Rule breakers were assigned to
work details conducted in enforced silence for several hours at a time. Unlike
423
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military work, or even prison labor, juvenile work details consisted of “makework” tasks so designed for maximum punishment that they failed even to
contribute to the upkeep of the institution or its grounds. Lacking any constructive
purpose, the scheduling of duties thus followed no set pattern; boys were just as
likely to “pull grass” one day as to shovel dirt pointlessly between two piles the
next. The most notorious exercise was “picking.” Boys in orange uniforms “lined
up foot to foot, heads down... were required to strike the ground with heavy picks,
swung overhead as the line moved forward.”427 Boys worked for hour and a half
stretches; during fifteen-minute breaks, they sat “in a line with their heads
between their legs, looking down; they were not allowed to look in either
direction or to talk.”428 When FBI agents arrived to photograph the work detail,
one boy remembered being ordered to “keep your head up, not down.”429
Uneducated they may have been, but the guards clearly made distinctions between
practices that seemed to require concealment and those that did not.
They also proved quite adept at devising and enforcing an intricate set of
regulations governing work details, many of which increased the likelihood of
violations. On a regular basis, boys collapsed after several hours of swinging a
pick, shoveling dirt, or pulling grass. C.W. testified that “at least ten times,” he
saw such boys taken to a supervisor’s office, only to return with visible bruises
and welts.430 Sixteen-year-old T.A. recalled one time that he had bent his knees
after several hours of pulling grass. For this “resting” violation, he was “racked”
427
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by a guard supervisor who outweighed him by nearly two hundred pounds. His
attacker then wrote out a bogus incident report and forced T.A. to sign it - another
indication that guards knew what they were doing was illegal if not immoral.431
Although it represented a form of punishment, the work detail also served
ideological purposes, and here we return to the question of how a well-educated
officialdom that theoretically should have known better could permit the
Mountain View regime. Youth Council officials viewed hard labor as essential to
rehabilitation, and defended punishments for boys who could not or would not
work. Deeply ingrained in daily life, hard labor had acquired meanings fluid
enough to accommodate a variety of explanations. To guards, work detail made
the time pass by quicker; “busy work [was] better... than doing nothing.”432
Officials restated this sentiment more bluntly. “Work is required,” asserted Youth
Council director Turman matter-of-factly; allowing some inmates to work less
than others, he warned, would be “untenable in any correctional institution.”433 In
this view, relieving boys who collapsed on the job would inspire others to feign
exhaustion or illness; soon, no one would be working. The worst crime a boy
could commit, refusal to work, brought out the harshest reprisals. Turman referred
to this act as a “mutiny” that had to be crushed immediately to prevent a mass
revolt.434 Inmates who engaged in solitary strikes against the work detail were
likely to be tear gassed. One supervisor admitted spraying Mace in a boy’s face
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while two guards held him down.435 In another case, a boy who attempted a
peaceful sit-down protest in his cell was locked in with an activated can of Mace.
Journalist Kenneth Wooden tracked down a former inmate nicknamed
“Tweetybird” at an insane asylum; his body was covered in chemical burns
caused by repeated gassings at close range. Privately, FBI agents told Wooden
they were “astounded” that the Youth Council would approve the use of Mace on
juveniles in a closet-sized isolation cell.436 Only Turman defended the practice,
citing training seminars for guards conducted by the Texas Department of Public
Safety. On the witness stand, however, Turman stubbornly refused to confront the
substance of such incidents:
Q: Have you ever been tear gassed, Dr. Turman?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Have you ever tried to work after you’ve been tear gassed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you able to work?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you able to work five hours with a pick axe in the manner that
I’ve described earlier, do you think?
A: I didn’t have to do a pick axe... but I had to work.
Q: Was it pleasant?
A: No.437
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All tear gas incidents at Mountain View transpired in the separate housing
for inmates on work detail – an isolation ward paradoxically named the Security
Treatment Center (STC). The typical cell was eight-by-ten feet, and contained
only an open toilet and a steel bed. The walls were painted black and lit only by a
lamp that resembled a car headlight except that it remained lit at all hours. Airconditioning was provided for guard stations but not cells, which reached
sweltering temperatures during the long hot Texas summers.438 Schoolbooks and
visitors were prohibited.439 The barren, uncomfortable cell that greeted a boy after
five or six hours of grueling labor invited him to collapse in exhaustion. But he
had to stay awake or suffer further punishment; rules prescribed that STC inmates
remain awake, in total silence, until ten o’clock at night. This presented problems
for the numerous inmates dosed with sleep-inducing drugs like Thorazine or
barbiturates, many of whom fell asleep early and earned themselves more time in
STC-work detail.440 Asked for his view of STC, Turman observed tartly that it
“[was] not a place for people to loaf.”441
It was, however, an easy place to gain entry. Among the transgressions
that landed boys in STC: “gambling for candy,” “writing love letters to a lady
academic teacher,” “throwing a bar of soap at a boy,” “laughing in church,” and
“calling Mr. Morris a rat.”442 Asked to explain such a wide range of infractions,
many of which seemed minor, Turman offered only anecdotes of extreme
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behavior that did not match up with any of the violations documented in the
Mountain View files.443 Although he claimed to have spoken with STC inmates
“every few days,” it was clear that Turman had no inkling of what had transpired
on his watch. Not once did he refer to a printed manual or handbook, because
none existed. Over the years, the Youth Council board had added rules and
regulations piecemeal, compiling them in a massive volume of handwritten notes
that Turman called “the minutes.” Judge Justice pored over these notes but found
nothing of value, concluding that the Youth Council suffered from “the very
evident absence of any central leadership, direction, or planning.”444
The process by which inmates got out of STC highlighted the illusion of
orderly procedure that had sustained Turman’s regime. Some inmates languished
for weeks and months in cells ostensibly intended for, at most, a few days’ stay.
Twice a week, a discipline committee composed of school officials considered
individual cases in meetings that were brief and perfunctory. Neither caseworkers
nor the boys themselves participated in these deliberations. Inmates appeared just
long enough to learn the committee’s final decision and received no explanation
of how it was reached. They were not permitted to address the committee, an
almost needless rule given the perverse ritual that preceded inmates’ appearance
at a hearing. Inmates ran barefoot from their cell to the meeting room, chased by a
guard who “racked” those who ran too slowly.445 Small wonder that inmate
witnesses in court could not identify rules of conduct or paths to being declared
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“rehabilitated” by their captors. Upon entering Gatesville, fifteen-year-old M.
learned from fellow inmates to “just go along, keep your mouth shut, and listen.”
These precepts helped M. survive daily life, though he “hadn’t figured out” how
to make parole.446
It was clear that the line between rehabilitation and punishment, if it ever
truly existed, had blurred beyond recognition in both theory and practice. One
thing that James Turman, the director of the Texas Youth Council, shared with
juvenile inmates was a seeming inability to offer a clear criterion for what
constituted rehabilitation. Expert witnesses were certain, however, that it could
not be found at Mountain View. Jerome Miller declared it “the most brutal
disciplinary unit” he had ever seen.447 Prison expert Howard Ohmart, in the midst
of a federally sponsored study that would portray Louisiana’s Angola State Prison
as the most brutal in the nation, visited Mountain View on behalf of the Justice
Department. In a devastating statement, he pronounced Mountain View as worse
than Angola. “Never have I seen a facility more deliberately designed to
humiliate, to degrade and debase,” he concluded.448
At one point during James Turman’s deposition, Steven Bercu paused to
marvel at the thoroughness with which Mountain View eradicated the individual’s
“privilege of deciding for himself.”449 This observation highlighted how
understandings of adolescence had changed since World War II. In the early

446

Testimony of “M.,” 15-year-old inmate, Gatesville School for Boys, 7/5/1973. Morales case
files.
447 Deposition of Jerome Miller.
448 Morales v. Turman, 203-205. See also Wooden, Weeping, 13.
449 Deposition of James A. Turman.

241

postwar era, even among psychiatrists and psychologists, the talk about teenagers
was of “adjustment.” Identity formation theory, a product of ego psychiatry,
emphasized the reconciliation of internal desires with cultural norms. By the late
1960s, however, a new definition emerged that was both more individualistic and
more attuned to racial, ethnic, gender, sexual, and “cultural” identities. The
central task of adolescence no longer revolved around “adjustment” to existing
social norms. Multifaceted categories of selfhood began to co-exist within the
universal experience of coming of age; the real conflict became that of
confronting rather than conforming to cultural attitudes. Traditional prejudices
now posed a threat to a “healthy” adolescence, as underscored in the Texas Youth
Council’s training schools, where diagnoses of “disorders” often became selffulfilling prophecies.
III. The “Control” System and the Construction of Deviance
One of the ways in which the state’s training schools most resembled its
prisons was in the use of what corrections experts called the “control model.” The
Youth Council emulated the version of “control” practiced in the Texas prison
system, which was among the largest in the nation. George Beto, the head of the
Texas Department of Corrections, had earned a reputation as a sort of corrections
guru for his refinement of the control model, which relied on strict regimentation
of daily life enforced in part by some of the inmates themselves. Functioning as
deputies to the guards, these “building tenders” enjoyed special privileges in
exchange for their services. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when prison riots in
New York and California made headlines, the Texas prisons seemed like models
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of efficiency and order. Years later, this image would be shattered by a prisoners’
rights case, Ruiz v. Estelle, that exposed abuses similar to those uncovered in the
juvenile training schools. Nevertheless, scholars have continued to debate the
merits of the control model. Its most vocal defender, criminologist John J. DiIulio,
viewed the era of the control model as a veritable “golden age” when prisoners
suffered little physical abuse, benefited from strict regimentation, and learned
skills that lowered recidivism. Other observers disagreed, arguing that the use of
building tenders helped conceal a host of abuses even as it more efficiently
delivered physical punishment to disobedient inmates.450
The counterpart to the building tender in the juvenile training school was
the “office boy,” who functioned in almost precisely the same way. The
resemblance was no accident; according to one study of Texas prisons, “some of
these same ‘office boys’ would go on to become building tenders.”451 They
supervised work details, administered punishments, doled out privileges, and
occasionally even performed more official duties such as writing incident reports.
Inmates feared office boys almost as much as the guards. Any inmate who chose
to speak with attorneys or visiting experts risked vengeance from the office boys,
who were on the lookout for “snitches.” Even Steve Bercu once found himself
cornered in a Mountain View bathroom by three large boys who were clearly
acting on orders from adult staff.452
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Attempts to enforce a code of silence during the court case revealed a
secondary role for the office boys as the rulers of an inmate caste system based
partly on race. Shortly after a visit from child psychiatrist Leonard Lawrence in
March 1973, over one hundred boys were involved in what inmates later
described as a “gang fight” between blacks and whites. Although interracial
fighting was common, this incident seemed different.453 According to J.H., the
fighting began when a “tall white boy” sucker-punched a black inmate for no
apparent reason. Afterwards, office boys wrote incident reports that penalized
black inmates.454 The fight was just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Office boys
often supervised work details without adults present, an opportunity that they used
to inflict pain upon black inmates; they “ kick[ed] them and beat them just like the
men.”455 Adult guards sanctioned and protected this behavior. One day Jimmy
Lee Jones, a gym instructor at Mountain View, complained to his superiors that
he had witnessed office boys beating black inmates outside his office window. He
was told to “find another job” if he disapproved of what he had seen. Jones was a
rarity among the Mountain View staff. He was younger than most teachers, and
he was African American. Moreover, Jones actually brought proper credentials to
the job for which he was hired. He held a bachelor’s degree in physical education,
had worked with boys at a YMCA youth center in Houston, and had served a tour
of duty in Vietnam.456
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The office boys operated within an institutional subculture that made the
training school into a conduit between the state’s urban neighborhoods and its
prisons. In 1969, the Texas Senate had warned of a “highly sophisticated...
contraculture” that reached “far beyond the confines of the training schools into
the urban communities and even, reportedly, into the Texas Department of
Corrections.”
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The notion of a contraculture drew upon older theories of a

“delinquent subculture” or, more recently, the “culture of poverty.” It ascribed
self-defeating behaviors and deviant values to a marginalized social group –
juvenile inmates – who themselves came from the lowest rungs of American
society. An oft-cited example of the delinquent subculture was the “counting
system,” in which those who “counted” belonged to and enjoyed the protection of
inmate gangs. Membership brought benefits, but it also placed inmates in
“abrasive and irreconcilable situations.” For instance, “a boy who is about ready
to be recommended for parole and who is a ‘counter’ is subjected to almost
unbearable pressures in efforts to induce him to ‘mess up’ ... his opportunity for
favorable parole consideration.”458 In this view, the inmate subculture prevented
rehabilitation and glorified crime; if inmates would only cooperate with the
program, order and salvation would follow. Adult staff expressed hopelessness
about the situation: “One caseworker said he had once discouraged boys from
trying to ‘count’ but no longer did so because he felt it met a need for some of
them.”459 This statement psychologized tangible benefits as emotional “needs”
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and rationalized away the role of adult guards in perpetuating the gang system.
They granted sweeping powers, allowing favored inmates to function with, if
anything, more impunity than a street gang. Whether they had been a response or
a spur to existing inmate gangs, the office boys clearly controlled “turf” and made
organization for self-protection a necessity for their fellow inmates.
An unofficial sexual classification system organized inmates in more
insidious and damaging ways. Guards were charged with the responsibility of
separating “punks” from the general inmate population. Starting in the early
twentieth century, the word “punk” has carried several meanings, according to
prisoner-turned-historian Stephen Donaldson. In prison usage, it has referred to “a
young, usually smaller and heterosexual, male who is exploited as a female
surrogate by older, tougher, more powerful... males, or ‘jockers.’” Outside the
prison, a “punk” was also “a juvenile delinquent, a young outlaw, a young
hoodlum” – precisely the kind of person who “ended up in jails and as the
youngest were particular targets for ‘turning out.’”460 To be a “punk,” then, was to
occupy the lowest rung of a social structure defined by physical size, strength, and
experience in “personal combat.” Most “punks” were first-time offenders
convicted for “nonviolent or victimless” crimes who lacked the necessary
attributes to survive without suffering rape. According to Donaldson, “juvenile
institutions” have contained a “high proportion” of “punks,” who have been
460 Stephen Donaldson, “Punk,” Wayne R. Dynes ed., Encyclopedia of Homosexuality, (2 vols.,
New York: Garland Publishers, 1990), vol. 2, pp. 1085-86. In 1972, after being jailed for
trespassing on White House property during an antiwar protest, Donaldson (known in prison as
“Donny the Punk”) was raped sixty times in two days. Imprisoned again in the early 1980s, he
contracted AIDS from being raped. Now deceased, Donaldson was a former leader for Stop
Prisoner Rape, an organization that has advocated on behalf of prisoners since 1980. See “Stop
Prisoner Rape: A Brief History,” <http://www.spr.org/>.
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misunderstood completely by adult officials. They were almost always unwilling
victims in a drama of masculine power that often expressed ethnic or racial
dominance as well. When “punks” succumbed to sexual assault and became the
property of a “daddy” or “jocker,” officials viewed this “survival driven” behavior
as willing consent and interpreted the rapist as an “aggressive homosexual” rather
than a heterosexual confined to a place without women.461
Virtually all of the practices described by Donaldson surfaced during
courtroom scrutiny of the boys’ training schools. Two “punk dorms” housed not
only all the allegedly “homosexual” inmates at Mountain View, but also boys sent
over by Gatesville staff. This practice was hardly a secret; the Fort Worth StarTelegram had reported it shortly before the start of Morales v. Turman.462
Moreover, as Donaldson has observed, “jailhouse sexuality” usually operated
openly, with full knowledge of guards, despite being forbidden by disciplinary
codes.463 In fact, at Mountain View, guards exercised hands-on control over it,
although they did so informally and without recourse to any written policy. They
placed “aggressive” and “passive” homosexuals in separate dormitories. A closer
look showed that all of the “aggressive homosexuals” were “larger, stronger”
black inmates, while their “passive” partners were “smaller” Anglo and Latino
inmates. Youth Council director Turman defended this pattern by citing “cultural”
differences in the expression of what he called “homosexual tendencies.” They
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had to be separated from one another as well as the general inmate population, he
asserted, to protect against their “strange form of jealousy.” 464 Asked to identify
the defining features of sexual “deviance,” Turman mumbled vaguely about
“aberrant behavior” with “symptoms.”465 The guards restated Turman’s views
more bluntly. “You can tell if they look like a queer,” one guard told an
incredulous Miller during his visit.466 Austin McCormick, one of the few experts
to defend the Youth Council, expressed his wish to “straighten out a few of them,
except that nowadays nobody wants to be straightened out. They want to be
accepted as homosexuals.”467
McCormick’s comment raised a secondary question: Was homosexuality a
legitimate identity choice during adolescence? The issue recently had divided the
membership of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), which was
considering the removal of homosexuality from the list of mental disorders
published in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders
(DSM).468 The previous year, in nearby Dallas, the APA annual meeting took the
controversial step of inviting gay rights activists to speak on the subject.469
Around the same time, the APA joined the Morales case on the side of the
juvenile inmates. This stance put the APA at odds with a longtime member of its
state and national chapters, Youth Council director Turman. It also suggested a
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rejection of the argument, advanced by many older APA members, that the DSM
deletion would “encourage” homosexuality in teenagers. Some clinicians
complained that they could not steer “sexually confused” adolescents toward a
normative heterosexuality unless homosexuality remained a disorder.470 Apart
from its deconstruction of the meanings of sexuality in a total institution, then,
Morales v. Turman also participated in the era’s debate over gay rights and
identity.
A nebulous term in psychiatric clinics, “sexual confusion” described an
even broader range of behaviors in a setting such as Mountain View. It included
activities that have come to typify the everyday lives of teenage boys:
masturbating, talking about sex, or comparing penis sizes. The backwardness of
diagnosing these as “homosexual” would be funny had it not brought such severe
consequences. “Deviant” boys usually were medicated and separated from the rest
of the inmate population. Some ended up in a “punk dorm;” others found
themselves placed in the isolation ward, which meant days spent on the grueling
work detail.
This dynamic of superficial diagnosis and physical separation also took
place, to a lesser degree, at the girls’ training schools. Gainesville staff harassed
girls who held hands, combed each other’s hair, or simply spent too much time
together. One girl, G.G., had acquired the nickname “Love Business” among
470 Ibid. Prior to the APA’s change of opinion, treatment of adolescent sexuality was guided by
studies such as Irving Bieber et al., Homosexuality: A Psychoanalytic Study of Male Homosexuals
(New York: Basic Books, 1962), which purported to “cure” some of its subjects. Bieber was on
the losing side of the APA decision on homosexuality, but went on to inspire the National
Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), an organization of mental
health professionals who continue to insist that homosexuality is a curable and damaging disorder.
<http://www.narth.com>.
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staff. Her caseworker had explained that “being a homosexual means you are no
longer concerned about boys. You’re always concerned about girls.”471 Another
girl, M., remembered a “house mother” who warned her about “lesbian
initiations” when she first arrived at Gainesville. No such thing ever took place.472
Scenes like “two girls walking down the hall with their arms around each other”
were enough to send staff into a panic.473 At both the Gainesville and Crockett
girls’ schools, the staff used a system of rules and rewards to discourage any
“queer” behavior. For example, the enactment of a dress code that allowed girls to
wear their own clothing rather than uniforms permitted only fashions and
hairstyles that “looked feminine.”474
Inmates recalled the awkward and painful feelings that came with being
labeled “homosexual.” G.G., for one, found it “hard to make friends or have
emotions” without needling from staff about “being an L.B.”475 For boys, a
“homosexual” diagnosis might come before or after a sexual assault; regardless, it
signified physical weakness and emasculation as much as a supposed preference
for other boys. To be designated a “punk,” remembered C.W., was to be told that
“you were small and everyone could run over you.”476 C.W. lived in the “punk
dorm” reserved for “passive homosexuals,” all of whom were “smaller boys” but
not self-identified homosexuals. The African American inmates who lived in the
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other “punk dorm” objected even more strenuously to their official diagnosis. One
of them, J. H., insisted that he was a “dude” rather than a “punk.” To draw the
distinction clearly, he mentioned “Slut,” a smaller boy to whom he attached the
pronouns “her” and “she.”477 The diagnosis had little to do with actual sexuality
and everything to do with the ability to protect oneself in Mountain View.
Adolescents so well versed in the sexual language of the prison presented
expert witnesses with textbook examples of the emotional damage wrought by the
training school. Too often, they argued, the “homosexual” tag became a selffulfilling prophecy. Boys placed in Mountain View’s “punk dorms” inexorably
“succumb[ed] to the defined situation,” and in so doing internalized an identity as
a “sexual deviant.”478 At Gainesville, “staff fear of homosexuality [made] it an
attractive form of rebellion,” giving rise to “an ‘underground culture’ with a
special jargon and ritual.”479 Youth Council staff misunderstood and distorted
expressions of the sexual curiosity that typified adolescence, according to child
psychiatrist Leonard Lawrence, who ran a residential clinic for children and
adolescents in San Antonio. Bans on even the most innocuous behaviors taught
that “thinking about sex” made one “a bad person,” a lesson that took on added
meaning in an environment where “legitimate decisions [about] sexual
preference” were impossible. Some inmates were victimized twice – first by
sexual assault, and again by the guilt feelings that arose from being stigmatized as
a “deviant.” In the guise of preventing sexual deviance, adult staff nurtured
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“negative identity formation,” with inmates believing that they were irredeemably
strange.480 Lawrence added that many “normal” boys had experimented sexually
with male and female partners, a claim known to psychiatrists, and indeed most
Americans (however much they may have disagreed), since the time of Alfred
Kinsey’s famous reports on male and female sexual behavior. Opposed to this
possibility, Youth Council director Turman insisted that youthful sexual
experimentation occurred only in “preadolescent puberty” – a bizarre invention,
given that the onset of puberty usually marked the beginning of the developmental
stage of adolescence.481
Perhaps the most arresting example of the Youth Council’s refusal to
acknowledge adolescent sexuality came in the sex education program offered to
girl inmates at Gainesville. Psychiatrist Gerda Hansen Smith, who had visited
Gainesville as part of the court-ordered participant-observation team, pronounced
the class “a sham” that substituted old-time moral absolutism for sound
reproductive information. Classes consisted of an instructor who nervously “just
kind of read a few newspapers” aloud. When a new girl described how she had
engaged in unprotected sex and worried that she might be pregnant, the teacher
turned knowingly to Smith and muttered about “the new permissiveness.”482
Another girl told Smith that she was unable to discuss sexual problems with her
caseworker without being exhorted to “put [her] faith in God.” Shortly after that
confession, Smith began to notice that Christianity played an inordinate role in the
480
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school’s program. She met several caseworkers who “only wanted to talk about
religion..., the love of the Christian life, and Christian attitudes.”483 Girls were
required to attend Sunday church, which for many of them constituted the only
outdoor activity of the weekend.484
Oddly enough, this religious climate was home to especially poor
treatment of girls who entered training school pregnant. Inmates approaching their
due date were furloughed in time for childbirth but returned within the month.
This policy separated young mothers from their infant children for periods that
could last as long as two years. Girls whose families could not or would not help
them found themselves in an untenable position; some considered putting their
newborns up for adoption. Youth Council officials expressed little remorse over
this situation; Austin McCormick blamed the girls’ “stupid and ignorant”
families.485 Lending a eugenicist cast to such statements were stories of abortions
induced through either the incompetence or connivance of Gainesville staff. The
evidence, though inconclusive, strongly suggested that induced abortions were an
informal but regular practice at Gainesville. Three girls testified that they
miscarried after the school nurse coerced them into ingesting unidentified white
pills.486 Other girls corroborated these claims; Gainesville’s use of the procedure
was “common knowledge” even in the home communities of parolees.487 G.A.,

483

Ibid.
Ibid.
485 Deposition of Austin H. McCormick.
486 Testimony of “T.”, 17-year-old inmate at Gainesville, 7/11/73. Testimony of “G.”, 17-year-old
inmate at Gainesville, 7/11/73. Testimony of “G.A.”, 7/11/73. Morales case files.
487 “M.” stated that she was “stunned” upon arrival to learn about the pills. Although they were
“common knowledge” among the girls, an unspoken rule forbade speaking with adults about them.
484

253

who was four months’ pregnant, took “ten white pills” under the threat of solitary
confinement. She began to bleed four days later, in a cruel irony, while
languishing in “pregnancy class,” and finally miscarried that evening. Although
allowed to recuperate in the Gainesville clinic for two weeks, G.A. saw no doctor
until a month after the miscarriage. Staff faithfully foiled G.A.’s attempts to
notify the fetus’ biological father. Her house mother confiscated G.A.’s mail and
placed it in her official file, informing her that she was “entitled to [her] opinion.”
Only because a caseworker took the initiative to summon G.A.’s mother did
Judge Justice hear a believable eyewitness account of the episode; he seems to
have discarded similar stories for lack of evidence, though transcripts show that
he found them persuasive.488 His final opinion gave no mention of the pills,
noting only that G.A., like other pregnant inmates, had received “inadequate”
medical attention.489
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Table 2: Gainesville Inmates by Race and Ethnicity, 1968-1974
Source: Annual Reports of the Texas Youth Council, 1969-1974. Courtesy of the
Texas State Archives and Information Service.

As the pregnancy issue suggests, Gainesville housed the older, “more
sophisticated” female offenders, many of whom were black or Latino (see figure
1).490 Inmates of color were subject to all manner of daily indignities, from the
casual use of racial epithets to the prohibition of the Spanish language. White girls
received special privileges that brought them into more frequent contact with
staff, who felt comfortable enough to vent their racial hostilities in what they
assumed was friendly company. One such girl, M., recalled hearing daily
complaints about black inmates who “got on their nerves.”491 White inmates who
490
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befriended blacks might be directed to “act like a white girl.”492 At the same time,
staff closely monitored black inmates who acted “too black,” a phrase that
referred to cultural or political expressions that might lead to individual or
collective rebellions. Black girls who entered Gainesville wearing an Afro or
plaited hair (cornrows) were “encouraged” to cut or straighten their hair.493 A
directive from the Gainesville superintendent prohibited the circulation of Black
Panther literature; staff were ordered to take “preventive measures” against any
“advocation (sic) of black power or Chicano power.”494 One such measure
prevented black girls from sitting together during meals in groups larger than two,
even though the cafeteria tables only seated four.495
G.G. complained frequently enough about these practices to be labeled a
“troublemaker.” In return, her “house mother” prevented visits from her actual
mother, whom she called “an unfit bitch.” When Youth Council consultant Austin
McCormick visited Gainesville, G.G. informed him of her troubles; his only
response was to call her “a damn liar.”496 G.G. reserved her deepest bitterness,
however, for the four older African Americans who worked at Gainesville in the
positions of caseworker, recreational supervisor, and house parent. In court, G.G.
explained why they were no better than their white counterparts:
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Q: Would you feel better if there were more black staff at Gainesville?
A: Yeah, if they act black.
Q: Would you feel better if there were more black house parents?
A: Same goes for them. If they act black.
THE COURT (interjecting): Maybe you can explain to me what you mean
by that.
WITNESS: Well, they think they’re better than us black girls. They think
they are so high up.497
The divide was both generational and regional; the fact of shared skin
color could not overcome barriers of experience. Older, rural blacks were almost
as likely as their white co-workers to overreact to black teenagers from large and
mid-sized cities who were assertive and listened to “loud music.”498 The
superintendent of the Crockett School for Girls, Pete Harrell, was a case in point.
Until 1965, Crockett had served as the Jim Crow school for black girls, and
Harrell had been the lone black official of any stature in the Youth Council
hierarchy. During his court testimony, he warned of a “more sophisticated, more
destructive, and more vicious” generation of juvenile delinquents.499 But a glance
at the statistics on offenses in the early 1970s showed that violent crime was the
exception rather than the rule for juveniles. While only five percent of boy
inmates were violent offenders, over sixty percent of girls were committed for
“disobedience” to parents or school officials.500 Surprisingly for a time when
many American parents were fuming at the rise in drug use among teenagers, the
497
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Youth Council kept no figures on drug-related arrests. However, one can
speculate that many adolescent girls who found themselves in a training school in
the early 1970s were charged with “cultural” offenses – precocious sexuality,
drug experimentation, nonconformity in dress or music taste, or simply a more
pronounced rebellious attitude toward adults. Arriving at a place like Gainesville,
such girls likely confronted a staff that, if anything, seemed even more out of
touch with their problems than their own parents and teachers had been on the
outside.
Gainesville employees who could not speak the language of youth cultures
proved even less adept at communicating with Spanish-speaking inmates, who
comprised between one-fourth to one-third of the inmate population (see figure
1). In fact, they did not have to try. A longstanding English-only policy covered
every conceivable interaction between inmates and workers. In court, the
Gainesville superintendent defended this policy as an educational tool to promote
English language facility; in practice, it was all too clear that the ban’s function
was to prevent Mexican American inmates from secretly mocking staff,
conspiring to commit mischief, or holding any kind of truly private
conversation.501 Girls caught speaking Spanish were subject to disciplinary action.
Gainesville’s discipline records for 1969-1973, which were turned over to the
court, suggested that the ban provided endless opportunities for punishment. At
the same time, individual offenses were so routine-sounding that one suspects the
ban proved unenforceable at times. Entries for one girl included offenses such as
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“called me a puta & then denied it,” “talking in Spanish, dirty talk,” and “sassy &
impudent.” This particular girl was placed in isolation several times, without any
specific reason, suggesting that it was a last resort for exasperated workers.502
Another girl, cited five times in two weeks for speaking Spanish, received after
school detention and had her smoking privileges revoked. Only when she was
caught “lying about” speaking Spanish was she placed in isolation.503
Again, it is important to underscore that the staff’s shortcomings merely
reflected those of their lettered superiors. William M. Lovejoy, a psychiatrist
employed part-time at Gainesville, admitted that he long had struggled in one-onone sessions with Mexican American girls because he could not speak Spanish.
His only exposure to the language came from Spanish instructional cassettes
played during weekly drives between his Dallas psychiatric clinic and
Gainesville.504 For the professionals, the language barrier was only the most
visible aspect of a larger cultural gulf separating them from the adolescents they
purported to help. Lovejoy, an elderly psychiatrist trained in the 1930s, seemed
well intentioned but incapable of relating to girl inmates of color. His assurances
that he understood “black dialect” and “poor ghetto families,” as well as
“Mexican American culture,” rang hollow.505 Similarly, Austin McCormick had a
“hard time relating to Chicanos... [and] Blacks;” he further conceded that he could
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only “guess” at their treatment, a statement that seemed to severely undercut his
ringing praise for the Texas training schools throughout the preceding decade.506
Youth Council officials all but admitted that they were unable or unwilling
to take seriously the variety of identities that juvenile delinquents brought into the
training schools. They presided over institutions that cast some boys as “punks,”
most girls as lesbians, and teenagers of color as inherently inferior. Even
“normal” white inmates received a severely restricted brand of education. Girls
learned to cook, clean, and care for the babies of working-class men, even as they
were denied information about their own reproductive systems. For boys, the
Texas prison system cast a huge shadow over every aspect of their experiences.
Most of the worst features of adult prison appeared in some form in Gatesville
and Mountain View: military regimentation, hard labor, inmate rape, racially
motivated gang violence, and extended solitary confinement. At Gainesville, girls
learned what they likely already knew, that their life choices were extremely
limited and tethered to a man. The boys received a harsher education seemingly
intent on making them into inmates rather than citizens, a process made all the
more offensive by the lack of remorse shown by those who administered and
benefited from it. Founded on the principles of “child mental health,” and steered
by experts trained in psychiatry, psychology, and social work, the Texas Youth
Council somehow had gone terribly awry. In fact, the Youth Council’s failures to
live up to its own therapeutic precepts had brought about its downfall.
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Conclusion: From “Adjustment” to “Identity”
By August 1974, when Judge Justice issued his final opinion, the case
against the Youth Council had become ironclad. The previous September,
Gatesville staff had permitted an inmate riot with the obvious complicity, if not
the direction, of top Youth Council officials. Soon after, several key officials
resigned, including longtime director James Aubrey Turman. They saw the
writing on the wall; the case would not be decided in a way that would allow the
old regime to continue. The “boring regularity” of training school scandals finally
had caught up with the Texas Youth Council.507
Judge Justice’s opinion drew significantly upon recent scientific theories
of adolescent identity formation; he decried not only the “physical” but also the
“psychological” damage inflicted upon juvenile inmates. “An adolescent must
have a sense of identity,” he declared. “Many delinquents... have a distorted sense
of identity; they feel that they are bad – the outcasts and rejects of the community.
The acquisition of a positive self-image is thus one of the primary tasks of
adolescence.”508 On its face, this statement did not depart significantly from the
Youth Council’s original mission. What had changed was the inclusion of
behaviors and identity choices that formerly had been viewed as illegitimate. The
boundaries of social norms to which a given adolescent had to “adjust” had
expanded, and in that sense “adjustment” remained an important component of
rehabilitation. However, it had become less other-directed, less bound to
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dominant cultural traditions, and more tied to individual self-realization. In his
view, the individual delinquent had a right to genuine treatment and rehabilitation.
The decision inaugurated sweeping changes, most notably the closing of
Mountain View (1975) and Gatesville (1979). To Judge Justice, “evil” was so
ingrained in the very walls of the institutions that they could never be reformed.
This opinion stemmed not only from expert testimony but from the judge’s firsthand observations of Mountain View, which he had seen “with the eyes of Jerome
Miller,” whose impact on the case was decisive.509 Judge Justice ordered the
Youth Council to move toward smaller, community-based facilities located in the
urban areas that most delinquents called home. Staff hirings were to be based
upon professional training, psychological testing, and racial and ethnic diversity.
Institutions that long had functioned according to separate and inconsistent rules
were to share well-delineated guidelines for diagnosis, treatment, and parole. The
court abolished corporal punishment, tear gassing, and stoop labor; it also
restricted solitary confinement to days rather than weeks, and specified the few
situations where it was appropriate. Ron Jackson, who replaced Turman as Youth
Council director in 1974, enacted almost all of these changes over the next several
years. So complete was the transformation that by 1988, according to most
measures, the Texas juvenile system had become one of the best in the nation.510
Other reforms occurred around the time of the Morales decision in 1974,
suggesting that it had helped spur action at both the state and national levels. The
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state legislature passed the Texas Family Code, which set forth guidelines for the
treatment of adolescents in courts, training schools, and other custodial facilities.
The U.S. Congress created a new agency, the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), to oversee the dizzying number of public and
private programs across the nation. For troubled teenagers who were not serious
offenders, the case would have a more immediate legacy. “For decades,” recalled
Steve Bercu, “thousands and thousands of kids... didn’t get shipped to these
places that would have under the prior regime.”511 An era of adult punishments
for juvenile delinquents seemed to have come to a merciful end. The word
“teenager,” and the social privileges that it implied, were to include adolescents
unfortunate enough to have been born poor, black, or Latino. As we shall see,
however, something quite different happened in subsequent years.
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Chapter 6: Reclaiming Adolescence: Kids in Court Today
May 5, 2003, was a typical morning at the Travis County Juvenile Justice
Center in south central Austin, Texas.512 In the noisy reception room, guards
waved visitors through a metal detector, while attorneys advised nervous parents
and quiet, intense looking teenagers about their pending cases. Some of them
began filing into the main courtroom, a spacious chamber with a high, domed
ceiling, and a large picture window that framed the judge’s bench. Off to one side,
where one might expect a jury to sit in a criminal court, social workers led a few
teenagers dressed in orange uniforms to their seats. A well-dressed, young public
defender walked around the chamber, chatting up several of the kids and their
families. He gave words of encouragement to one glum-looking girl whose
parents “didn’t show up – again,” then exchanged elaborate “street” handshakes
with three uniformed African American boys. His gestures were echoed by
virtually all of the adult staff workers present for these tense minutes before the
opening of the day’s proceedings. The atmosphere gave off a powerful feeling of
compassionate concern; the trained professionals as well as the lawyers clearly
cared about these teenagers and wanted the best possible outcome for them, which
usually meant keeping them out of a state training school facility.
The tone became more formal, although no less reassuring, when Judge
Benesch entered and began to hear cases. Tall, blonde, and bespectacled, she
conveyed a distinct air of maternal interest, even as she breezed through cases at
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an average speed of fifteen minutes apiece. The scene seemed little changed from
a century ago, when nationally known judges such as Ben Lindsey of Denver and
Mary Barthelme of Chicago had popularized the idea of a separate “kid’s
court.”513 Like her Progressive-era predecessors, Judge Benesch had prepared for
the day’s cases by reading lengthy “social histories,” psychological profiles, and
records of prior offenses. These documents helped her engage young defendants
in informal, unrehearsed conversations that varied in tone. She shared a laugh
with a twelve-year-old Mexican American girl who had completed a sentence of
community service, and issued a stern warning to an African American boy who
had missed anger management classes stipulated in his parole. Some cases
required the judge to intervene in bitter disputes between parents and their
adolescent children. Consider, for instance, the case of a pregnant fourteen-yearold Latina who was on home probation for a minor drug charge. Her parents
refused to allow the baby’s father in their home, and so the girl had violated
probation to see him. Clearly rural, working-class, and overwhelmed by the
situation, the parents asked that their daughter, who looked tough and streetwise,
be committed to a state facility for delinquents. The girl’s attorney countered that
her family lacked “proper parenting skills.” This scene, too, was eerily
reminiscent of the not so distant past, when immigrant parents often used the
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juvenile court to control their “Americanized” daughters’ sexual behavior.514 At
one time in Texas, the typical judgment would have sent the girl off to a juvenile
training school for “rehabilitation;” she would have received a brief furlough to a
hospital for childbirth and then been returned to the institution. The infant could
live with relatives or become a ward of the state. Different priorities governed the
outcome of today’s case, however. Visibly irritated with the parents, the child,
and the attorneys, the judge declared her intention to act “in the interests of the
unborn baby.” The girl was to be held in juvenile detention until her social worker
could find a facility specially designed for teenage girls who are both pregnant
and delinquent – a tall order but a classic example of the intended function of the
juvenile court as a purveyor of “treatment” tailored to individual needs.
The defendants in Judge Benesch’s court room looked much younger than
I would have expected; I doubted any of them were older than fifteen or sixteen
years old. Their outward expressions varied wildly. A few of them, like the
pregnant girl, wore a “cool” exterior that seemed well-cultivated for city streets
and high school hallways but may have masked anxiety about being sent to a
juvenile lockup facility with larger, tougher, more adult-like kids. Many others
looked openly scared, sitting hunched forward with eyes bulging. Some simply
stared ahead vacantly, seemingly intent on revealing nothing. Nearly all of them
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Social Portrait of the First Reform School for Girls in North America, 1856-1905 (Cambridge,
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1983); Ruth M. Alexander, The “Girl Problem:” Female Sexual
Delinquency in New York, 1900-1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); and Anne
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were black or Latino, and I wondered, as the cases flew by, how it was that no
white kids had landed themselves in court that day. The same pattern had emerged
when I had toured the county juvenile detention center a couple of weeks earlier:
a few white children amidst a sea of black and brown faces, an adult staff clearly
concerned for their well-being. Although we Americans take this demography of
crime and delinquency as a given today, the nonwhite majority has become so
pronounced that it retains the power to stun.
Teenagers of color have come to dominate juvenile justice statistics over
the past several years. According to the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, in 2001 African Americans comprised just 17% of the
juvenile population but 43% of all juvenile arrests.515 This stunning figure,
however, tells only part of the story, according to researchers from the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency. In a May 2000 study, black juvenile
offenders were significantly more likely than whites to be referred to court,
detained while awaiting trial, incarcerated in juvenile facilities, and sentenced as
adults. Even when blacks and whites committed identical crimes, they received
different treatment in the system. In drug cases, for example, whites comprised
nearly two-thirds of cases but stood only a one in three chance of being waived to
adult court. By contrast, black drug offenders made up just over one-third of cases
but two-thirds of those tried as adults. These disparities are made all the more
striking because the precise number of Latino offenders remains unknown. Crime
reporting at the local, state, and national levels continues to count Latinos as
515
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“white,” even though the U.S. Census discontinued the practice over two decades
ago. Overall, then, African American youth, and to a lesser extent Latinos, today
experience a “cumulative disadvantage” that renders American juvenile justice
“separate and unequal.”516
Why do these disparities exist, and how can they take place so routinely?
The policy explanation is rather straightforward: Between 1990-1996, forty states
passed legislation that expanded the numbers and types of juvenile cases that
could be transferred to the adult court, a shift that disproportionately affected
young black males from America’s inner cities.517 Numerous white teenagers also
find their way into the system, but many do not, and few of them attract the kind
of stereotyped attention that black and Latino youth receive in the media.
Other observers point to the reactions to school shootings such as those at
Columbine and Jonesboro, contending more broadly that Americans fear young
people, regardless of their race or social class. Mike Males, a sociologist at the
University of California-Berkeley, even labeled teenagers in the mid-1990s a
“scapegoat generation” unfairly blamed for a host of social ills ranging from teen
pregnancy to drug use.518 While this argument may have merit, its lumping
together of very distinct sets of young people into a single “generation” fails to
516 Eileen Poe-Yamagata and Michael A. Jones, “And Justice for Some” (Buildings Blocks for
Youth, April 2000) <http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org>. On Latino juvenile delinquents, see
Francisco Villarruel and Nancy Walker, “Donda Esta La Justicia? A Call to Action on Behalf of
Latino and Latina Youth in the U.S. Justice System” (Building Blocks for Youth, July 2002). On
the counting of Latinos in the census, see Margo J. Anderson, The American Census: A Social
History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 223-229.
517 M.A. Bortner et al., “Race and Transfer: Empirical Research and Social Context,” Jeffrey
Fagan and Franklin E. Zimring eds., The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of
Adolescents to the Criminal Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 277-320.
518 Mike A. Males, The Scapegoat Generation: America’s War on Adolescents (Monroe, ME:
Common Courage Press, 1996).

268

account for the separate discourses that govern the way we talk and think about
two groups: “teenagers” and “delinquents.” Where social scientists, psychologists,
and psychiatrists once viewed the two categories as parts of a continuum, today
they exist in almost parallel worlds.
Consider, for instance, the terrible events of April 20, 1999, when two
Columbine High School students used automatic weapons to murder twelve of
their classmates and one teacher before turning the guns on themselves. Time
magazine labeled Eric Harris and Dylan Kliebold “the monsters next door” - two
teenagers whose deep alienation from their peers lay buried beneath a veneer of
middle-class normality. As similar incidents began to surface in other high
schools, Time focused almost exclusively on “troubled kids” suffering from
various forms of depression. Writers also highlighted Harris and Kliebold’s tastes
in popular culture. They played “Doom,” a video game whose graphic violence
already seems tame by today’s standards, in which players must shoot their way
through virtual public spaces. Jim Carroll, the author of The Basketball Diaries,
and Marilyn Manson, a rock musician, received so much criticism for their
alleged influences on Dylan and Kliebold that they felt moved to defend
themselves publicly. A few critics worried about the trend toward medicating
teenagers at the slightest sign of alienation or depression. “What if Holden
Caulfield had been taking Prozac?” wondered one writer. The imagery
accompanying such reports is also striking. One cover features a white teenage
boy with a crew cut staring into the camera sullenly, alongside the words “How
To Spot a Troubled Kid.” Another photo displays only a blue backpack (not those
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see-through ones required at many inner-city schools) with a handgun sticking out
of it, symbolizing innocence lost (see figure 12).519

519 “The Monsters Next Door: A Special Report on the Colorado School Massacre,” Time 153:17
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2001), p.32-35.
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Figure 12: Cover of Time magazine, March 19, 2001.
The reaction to Columbine expressed the fear that violent behaviors thought
confined to the “underclass” could surface in well-to-do children.
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The images recall the juvenile delinquency scares of the 1950s, when the
U.S. Senate had told Americans that “the delinquent may be any child you know,
even your own,” and movies such as Rebel Without a Cause had portrayed
troubled teenagers who “came from ‘good’ families” rather than the expected
urban slums. “Thousands of delinquents come from good homes, good
neighborhoods, and good families,” warned Richard Clenenden, then the
executive director of the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency, which spent much of the 1950s investigating the culture industry for
its supposed role in corrupting the minds of American youth.520 The appearance
of these new forms of popular culture could not have been worse, suggested
experts, because young minds were more vulnerable than ever before. The
suburban home that brought new prosperity, security, and comfort to so many
postwar families was thought to also nurture dysfunctional childrearing habits.
“Maladjusted” teenagers of the 1950s were thought to be products of “defective”
parenting, particularly in mothers, who were thought to have emasculated their
sons with “suffocating affection, initiative-smothering guidance, and solicitous
overprotection.”521 The specter of “Momism” loomed over a generation of young
men whose stifled masculinity supposedly sought outlets in crime and
delinquency. How prevalent was this idea? Consider Rebel Without a Cause, a
hugely popular film credited with helping launch an entire genre of filmmaking –
520
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the “teenpic.” James Dean plays Jim Stark, a boy whose parents so closely mirror
that era’s notions of “Momism” that they seem almost caricatures.
In the twentieth century United States, the “discovery” of adolescence
gave birth to two divergent yet related figures. The teenager, “troubled” or
otherwise, was a creation largely of sweeping national changes, while the juvenile
delinquent remained, until very recently, a sustained subject only for intellectuals,
professionals, and the occasional reporter or politician. In Texas, most citizens
encountered “actual” juvenile delinquents in the pages of their local newspapers,
on the television news broadcasts, or in local chapters of national civic groups.
They learned about delinquency from popular culture, which itself often borrowed
from scientific theories; experts, in turn, used popular media to disseminate their
prescriptions for social action on behalf of troubled youth. Perhaps because of
this, professional reformers tended to play to their imagined audiences, painting
the reasons for delinquency in terms that flattered or were inoffensive. An honest
description of the juvenile delinquent lacked sex appeal, for the day-to-day work
with an individual adolescent is often slow, difficult, and unglamorous. Moreover,
suggesting that social inequality and unfairness were partly responsible for a
young person “going wrong” was courting disaster, particularly in a conservative
state such as Texas. As we have seen, mental health experts, settlement house
activists, and community program administrators moved gingerly through the
political minefield that surrounded their work.
Their basic premises, however, bore fruit in the lawsuit that forever
changed the Texas Youth Council. The definition of rehabilitation relied largely
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upon the notion of a “healthy” coming of age as a right of American citizenship.
The pathway to a “normal” adolescence lay not in incarceration in a “total
institution,” but rather in a mixture of treatment, education, and recreation in
one’s home community. Programs for delinquent youth such as the halfway house
or the group home borrowed liberally from the experiments of child guidance,
settlement house, and “community action” program. How could it have been
otherwise? For all of their faults, these “in between” institutions were the only
ones to provide a home to representations of the juvenile delinquent that generally
countered social stigma, bigotry, and fear.
All programs for at-risk or delinquent youth remain underfunded and, as a
result, understaffed. These shortages should be remedied if we are to put any truth
to rhetorical promises to “leave no child behind” or create a “village to raise a
child.” It seems undeniable that one of the reasons for the paucity of resources
stems from the population to be served – almost all poor or working-class, mostly
brown and black. For all of their prejudices, the reformers of the past generally
believed that adolescents deserved special attention, both because they were
emotionally different from adults (something we now know with more certainty)
and because they were still unfinished products capable of rehabilitation. In the
current moment, rehabilitation stands as a privilege at best, and certainly not as a
right. We gladly sentence adolescents to adult prison terms or the death penalty,
but grouse about the cost of preventing them from ending up there. In the end, our
disinterest in disadvantaged adolescents represents nothing less than a collective
decision, a silent judgment that we can surely improve upon.

274

Bibliography

Archival Collections
Harbach (Franklin I.) Papers. Houston Metropolitan Research Center. Houston
Public Library.
Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, 1940-present. Barker Center for American
History. University of Texas at Austin.
Hogg (Ima) Papers. Barker Center for American History. University of Texas at
Austin.
Houston Community Chest and Council. Houston Metropolitan Research Center.
Houston Public Library.
Morales Case Files, Records. Archives and Information Services Division. Texas
State Library and Archives Commission.
Sutherland (Robert L.) Papers. Barker Center for American History. University of
Texas at Austin.
Texas Youth Commission Collection. Archives and Information Services
Division. Texas State Library and Archives Commission.
Newspapers and Periodicals
Austin American-Statesman
Commonweal
Congressional Quarterly Governing Magazine
Dallas Morning News
El Paso Times
Fort Worth Star-Telegram
275

Houston Chronicle
Houston Defender
Houston Post
Houston Press
Los Angeles Times
Newsweek
New York Times
Parents
San Antonio Express-News
The Saturday Evening Post
Texas Monthly
Texas Observer
Time
U. S. News and World Report
The Weekly Standard
Online Sources
Building Blocks for Youth <http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org>
Handbook of Texas Online <http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook>
Government Sources
Annual Reports of the Harris County Juvenile Probation Department. Houston,
TX: 1951-1970.
Annual Reports of the Texas State Youth Development Council. Austin, Texas:
1949-1957.
276

Annual Reports of the Texas Youth Council. Austin, Texas: 1958-1974.
Citizens in Action: Report on State and Local Action to the Midcentury White
House Conference on Children and Youth, December 3-7, 1950.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951.
“Juvenile Arrests 2001.” OJJDP Bulletin. December 2003.
Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 1974 U.S. Dist. August 30, 1974.
Proceedings of the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth,
December 3-7, 1950. Raleigh, NC: Health Publications Institute, Inc.,
1951.
Reference Guide for Texas Juvenile Court Reporting. Austin: Texas State Youth
Development Council, 1952.
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York:
Bantam Books, 1968.
Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government
Operations. U.S. Congress. 90th Congress. 1st Session. November 1, 2, 3,
and 6, 1967. Part I. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967.
Services to Youth in Texas: Preliminary Report of the Senate Youth Affairs
Committee. 61st Texas Legislature. Austin, 1969.
Texas: General Social and Economic Characteristics, 1970. U.S. Bureau of the
Census. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.
Uniform Crime Reports for the United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1940-1970.
Vertical Files
Barker Center for American History. University of Texas at Austin.
Houston Crime and Criminals
Houston Neighborhood and Neighborhood Groups
277

Kerr, Walter K.
Reformatories
Texas Youth Council
Turman, James A.
Houston Metropolitan Research Center. Houston Public Library.
Juvenile Delinquency
Author Interviews and Correspondence
Steven Bercu, June 23, 2003.
Richard Evans, August 10, 2001.
Jim Gobin, April 28, 2003.
Wayne Holtzman, October 23, 2003.
Ira Iscoe, May 21, 2003.
Alex Pokorny, October 2003.
Unpublished Theses and Dissertations
Alvarez, Luis. “The Power of the Zoot: Race, Community, and Resistance in
American Youth Culture, 1940-1945.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of
Texas at Austin, 2000.
Kerr, Walter Kinsolving. “Juvenile Detention in Austin and Travis County.” M.A.
thesis. University of Texas at Austin, 1949.
Reddington, Mary Frances. “In the Best Interests of the Child: The Effects of
Morales v. Turman on the Texas Youth Commission.” Ph.D. dissertation.
Sam Houston State University, 1990.
Sutherland, Robert L. “An Analysis of Negro Churches in Chicago.” Ph.D. thesis.
University of Chicago, 1930.

278

Turman, James Aubrey. “A Comparison of Negro and White Teacher Attitudes
Toward Non-Segregation.” M.A. thesis. University of Texas at Austin,
1951.
Published/Secondary Sources
Addams, Jane. The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1909.
Addams, Jane. Twenty Years at Hull-House. New York: Penguin Books, 1961
(1910).
Adorno, Theodor et al. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper and
Row, 1950.
Aitken, Stuart C. Geographies of Young People: The Morally Contested Spaces of
Identity. London: Routledge, 2001.
Alexander, Ruth M. The “Girl Problem”: Female Sexual Delinquency in New
York, 1900-1930. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.
Anderson, Margo J. The American Census: A Social History. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1988.
Aries, Philippe. Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.
Austin, Joe, and Michael Nevin Willard eds., Generations of Youth: Youth
Cultures and History in Twentieth Century America. New York: New
York University Press, 1998.
Bayer, Ronald. Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of
Diagnosis. New York: Basic Books, 1981.
Beck, Bertram M. Five States: A Study of the Youth Authority Program as
Promulgated by the American Law Institute. Philadelphia: American Law
Institute, 1951.
Becker, Howard. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. 2nd ed. New
York: The Free Press, 1973 (1963).
Beers, Clifford W. A Mind That Found Itself: An Autobiography. Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1948 (1908).
279

Beeth, Howard, and Cary D. Wintz, eds. Black Dixie: Afro-Texan History and
Culture in Houston. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press,
1992.
Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the
Fifties. New York: Collier Books, 1961.
Bell, Howard M. Youth Tell Their Story: A Study of the Conditions and Attitudes
of Young People in Maryland Between the Ages of 16 and 24. Washington,
D.C.: American Council on Education, 1938.
Bieber, Irving, et al. Homosexuality: A Psychoanalytic Study of Male
Homosexuals. New York: Basic Books, 1962.
Blumin, Stuart M. The Emergence of the Middle Class: Social Experience in the
American City, 1760-1900. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Boyer, Paul S. Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
Bremner, Robert H. ed. Children and Youth in America: A Documentary History.
4 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970-1974.
Brenzel, Barbara M. Daughters of the State: A Social Portrait of the First Reform
School for Girls in North America, 1856-1905. Cambridge: The MIT
Press, 1983.
Brumberg, Joan Jacobs. Kansas Charley: The Story of a Nineteenth Century Boy
Murderer. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.
Bullard, Robert D. Invisible Houston: The Black Experience in Boom and Bust.
College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1987.
Bulmer, Martin. The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity,
and the Rise of Sociological Research. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984.
Carleton, Don E. Red Scare! Right-Wing Hysteria, Fifties Fanaticism, and Their
Legacy in Texas. Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1985.
Carson, Clayborne. In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s.
1981.

280

Clayson, William. “‘The Barrios and the Ghettos Have Organized!’ Community
Action, Political Acrimony, and the War on Poverty in San Antonio.”
Journal of Urban History 28:2 (January 2002), 158-183.
Cloward, Richard A. and Lloyd E. Ohlin. Delinquency and Opportunity: A
Theory of Delinquent Gangs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
Coates, Robert B., et al. Diversity in a Youth Correctional System: Handling
Delinquents in Massachusetts. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1978.
Cohen, Albert K. Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang. Glencoe, IL: The
Free Press, 1955.
Cole, Olen, Jr. The African-American Experience in the Civilian Conservation
Corps. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999.
Cole, Thomas R. No Color is My Kind: The Life of Eldrewey Stearns and the
Integration of Houston. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997.
Courtwright, David T. Violent Land: Single Men and Social Disorder from the
Frontier to the Inner City. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996.
Cushman, Philip. Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A Cultural
History of Psychotherapy. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1995.
Davidson, Chandler. Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan
South. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1972.
Davis, Allison, and John Dollard. Children of Bondage: The Personality
Development of Negro Youth in the Urban South. Washington, D.C.:
American Council on Education, 1940.
Degler, Carl. In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism
in American Social Thought. 1991.
De Leon, Arnoldo. Ethnicity in the Sunbelt: A History of Mexican Americans in
Houston. Houston: University of Houston, 1989.
Demos, John. A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

281

Demos, John. Past, Present, and Personal: The Family and the Life Course in
American History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Denning, Michael. The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the
Twentieth Century. London: Verso, 1997.
Deutsch, Albert. Our Rejected Children. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company,
1950.
DiIulio, John J. No Escape: The Future of American Corrections. New York:
Basic Books, 1991.
Dugger, Ronnie. Our Invaded Universities: Form, Reform, and New Starts. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1974.
Dynes, Wayne R., ed. Encyclopedia of Homosexuality. 2 vols. New York:
Garland Publishers, 1990.
Edwards, Newton. Equal Educational Opportunity for Youth: A National
Responsibility. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1939.
Erikson, Erik H. Childhood and Society. New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1950.
Erikson, Erik H. Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1962.
Erikson, Erik H. Identity, Youth, and Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1968.
Evans, Richard I., ed. The Making of Social Psychology: Discussions with
Creative Contributors. New York: Gardner Press, 1980.
Fagan, Jeffrey, and Franklin E. Zimring, eds. The Changing Borders of Juvenile
Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the Criminal Court. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2000.
Fairbanks, Robert B. “Public Housing for the City as a Whole: The Texas
Experience, 1934-1955.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly (April 2000),
402-424.
Fass, Paula S. The Damned and the Beautiful: American Youth in the 1920s.

282

Feagin, Joe R. Free Enterprise City: Houston in Political-Economic Perspective.
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988.
Ferguson, Ann Arnett. Bad Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black
Masculinity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.
Fine, Gary Alan ed. A Second Chicago School? The Development of a Postwar
American Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York:
Pantheon Books, 1977.
Frazier, E. Franklin. Negro Youth at the Crossways: Their Personality
Development in the Middle States. Washington, D.C.: American Council
on Education, 1940.
Frederickson, George M. The Inner Civil War: Northern Intellectuals and the
Crisis of the Union. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
Friedman, Lawrence J. Identity’s Architect: A Biography of Erik H. Erikson.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Fuermann, George. Houston: Land of the Big Rich. Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1951.
Fuermann, George. Reluctant Empire. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957.
Gaines, Kevin K. Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in
the Twentieth Century. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1996.
Gans, Herbert J. The Levittowners: Ways of Life and Politics in a New Suburban
Community. New York: Pantheon Books, 1967.
Giedd, Jay, et al. “Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A
Longitudinal Study.” Nature Neuroscience (October 1999), 861-864.
Gilbert, James A. A Cycle of Outrage: America’s Reaction to the Juvenile
Delinquent in the 1950s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Gilmore, Ruth Wilson. “Globalisation and U.S. Prison Growth: From Military
Keynesianism to Post-Keynesian Militarism.” Race and Class 40
(1998/99), 171-188.
283

Giroux, Henry A. Fugitive Cultures: Race, Violence, and Youth. New York:
Routledge, 1996.
Goffman, Erving. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situations of Mental Patients
and Other Inmates. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1961.
Goodman, Mary Ellen. Race Awareness in Small Children. Cambridge: AddisonWesley Press, 1952.
Goodman, Mary Ellen. The Culture of Childhood: Child’s-Eye Views of Society
and Culture. New York: Columbia University Teacher’s College Press,
1970.
Gordon, Linda. Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of
Welfare, 1890-1935. New York: The Free Press, 1994.
Graebner, William S. Coming of Age in Buffalo: Youth and Authority in the
Postwar Era. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.
Grob, Gerald N. From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern
America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
Gross, Beatrice and Ronald eds. The Children’s Rights Movement: Overcoming
the Oppression of Young People. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1977.
Hale, Nathan, Jr. The Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in the United States:
Freud and the Americans, 1917-1985. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1995.
Hall, Helen. Unfinished Business: In Neighborhood and Nation. New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1971.
Halttunen, Karen, and Lewis Perry eds. Moral Problems in American Life. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Herman, Ellen. The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in an
Age of Experts. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
Hine, Thomas. The Rise and Fall of the American Teenager. New York: Avon
Books, 1999.
Hirsch, Arnold R. Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago,
1940-1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
284

The Hogg Foundation for Mental Health: The First Three Decades. Austin, 1970.
Holland, Kenneth, and Frank Ernest Hill. Youth in the CCC. Washington, D.C.:
American Council on Education, 1942.
Horn, Margo. Before It’s Too Late: The Child Guidance Movement in the United
States, 1922-1945. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989.
Humes, Edward. No Matter How Loud I Shout: A Year in the Life of the Juvenile
Court. 1996.
Iscoe, Louise. Ima Hogg: First Lady of Texas. Austin: Hogg Foundation for
Mental Health, 1976.
Isserman, Maurice, and Michael Kazin. America Divided: The Civil War of the
1960s. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Jackson, Walter A. Gunnar Myrdal and America’s Conscience: Social
Engineering and Racial Liberalism, 1938-1987. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1987.
Johnson, Charles S. Growing Up in the Black Belt: Negro Youth in the Rural
South. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941.
Jones, Kathleen W. Taming the Troublesome Child: American Families, Child
Guidance, and the Limits of Psychiatric Authority. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1999.
Jones, Maxwell. The Therapeutic Community: A New Treatment Method in
Psychiatry. New York: Basic Books, 1953.
Justice, Blair. Violence in the City. Texas Christian University Press, 1969.
Kasson, John F. Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in
America, 1776-1900. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.
Kellar, William Henry. Make Haste Slowly: Moderates, Conservatives, and
School Desegregation in Houston. College Station, TX: Texas A&M
University Press, 1999.
Kelley, Robin D.G. “Yo’ Mama’s Dysfunktional! Fighting the Culture Wars in
Urban America. New York: New York University Press, 1996.

285

Kemerer, Frank R. William Wayne Justice: A Judicial Biography. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1991.
Kett, Joseph F. Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America, 1790 to the Present.
New York: Colophon Books, 1977.
Kliebard, Herbert M. The Struggle for the American Curriculum, 1893-1958. New
York: Routledge, 1995.
Kluger, Richard. Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and
Black America’s Struggle for Equality. New York: Random House, 1976.
Knupfer, Anne Meis. Reform and Resistance: Gender, Delinquency, and
America’s First Juvenile Court. New York: Routledge, 2002.
Kotz, Nick. Hunger in America: The Federal Response. New York: The Field
Foundation, 1979.
Lacy, Leslie Alexander. The Soil Soldiers: The Civilian Conservation Corps in
the Great Depression. Radnor, PA: Chilton Book Company, 1976.
Lash, John, et al. Texas Southern University: From Separation to Special
Designation. Houston: Texas Southern University, 1975.
Leab, Daniel J. I Was a Communist for the F.B.I.: The Unhappy Life and Times of
Matt Cvetic. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
2000.
Lewis, Oscar. Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty.
New York: Basic Books, 1959.
Lindenmeyer, Kriste. “A Right to Childhood”: The U.S. Children’s Bureau and
Child Welfare, 1912-1946. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1997.
MacLeod, Anne Scott. American Childhood: Essays on Children’s Literature of
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1994.
Males, Mike A. The Scapegoat Generation: America’s War on Adolescents.
Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1996.
Manfredi, Christopher. The Supreme Court and Juvenile Justice. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 1998.
286

Martin, Steve J., and Sheldon Ekland-Olson. Texas Prisons: The Walls Came
Tumbling Down. Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1987.
Matthews, Fred. Quest for an American Sociology: Robert E. Park and the
Chicago School. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977.
Matusow, Allen J. The Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the
1960s. New York: Harper and Row, 1984.
Mazon, Mauricio. The Zoot-Suit Riots: The Psychology of Symbolic Annihiliation.
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984.
McArthur, Judith N. Creating the New Woman: The Rise of Southern Women’s
Progressive Culture in Texas, 1893-1918. Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 1998.
McComb, David G. Houston: A History. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981.
Mead, Margaret. Coming of Age in Samoa. 1928.
Mechling, Jay. On My Honor: Boy Scouts and the Making of American Youth.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Mennel, Robert M. Thorns and Thistles: Juvenile Delinquents in the United
States, 1825-1940. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1973.
Menninger, William C. Psychiatry in a Troubled World: Yesterday’s War and
Today’s Challenge. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948.
Miller, Char, and Heywood T. Sanders eds. Urban Texas: Politics and
Development. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990.
Miller, Jerome. Last One Over the Wall: The Massachusetts Experiment in
Closing Reform Schools. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press,
1991.
Moore, Bernice Milburn, and Wayne Holtzman. Tomorrow’s Parents: A Study of
Youth and Their Families. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965.
Morgan, Edmund. American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial
Virginia. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975.

287

O’Connor, Alice. Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor
in Twentieth Century U.S. History. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001.
Odem, Mary E. Delinquent Daughters: Protecting and Policing Adolescent
Female Sexuality in the United States, 1885-1920. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1995.
Palladino, Grace. Teenagers: An American History. New York: Basic Books,
1996.
Pfister, Joel, and Nancy Schnog eds. Inventing the Psychological: Toward a
Cultural History of Emotional Life in America. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1997.
Platt, Anthony. The Child Savers: The Invention of Juvenile Delinquency.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.
Poe-Yamagata, Eileen, and Michael A. Jones. And Justice for Some. Washington,
D. C.: Building Blocks for Youth, 2000.
Prescott, Peter S. The Child Savers: Juvenile Justice Observed. 1981.
Rainey, Homer P. How Fare American Youth? New York: D. Appleton-Century
Company, 1938.
Ray, Edgar W. The Grand Huckster: Houston’s Judge Roy Hofheinz, Genius of
the Astrodome. Memphis, TN: Memphis State University Press, 1980.
Reiman, Richard A. The New Deal and American Youth: Ideas and Ideals in a
Depression Decade. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992.
Richardson, Theresa R. The Century of the Child: The Mental Hygiene Movement
and Social Policy in the United States and Canada. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1989.
Riesman, David et al. The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American
Character. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
Riney-Kehrberg, Pamela. “Growing Up in Kansas.” Kansas History: A Journal of
the Great Plains 26 (Spring 2003), 50-65.

288

Rosenquist, Carl M., and Edward I. Megargee. Delinquency in Three Cultures.
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969.
Rossinow, Douglas C. The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and
the New Left in America. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
Rothman, David J. Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives
in Progressive America. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1980.
Ruggles, Steven. “The Transformation of American Family Structure.” American
Historical Review (February 1994), 103-128.
Ryan, Mary P. Cradle of the Middle Class: The Family in Oneida County, New
York, 1790-1865. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Sabo, Don, et al., eds. Prison Masculinities. Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 2001.
Sands, Bill (Wilbur Powell Sewell). My Shadow Ran Fast. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1964.
Schlossman, Steven L. Love and the American Delinquent: The Theory and
Practice of “Progressive” Juvenile Justice, 1825-1920. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1977.
Schneider, Eric C. Vampires, Dragons, and Egyptian Kings: Youth Gangs in
Postwar New York. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Scott, Daryl Michael. Contempt and Pity: Social Policy and the Image of the
Damaged Black Psyche, 1880-1996. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1997.
Scott, Elizabeth S. and Laurence Steinberg. “Blaming Youth.” Texas Law Review
81:3 (February 2003), 799-841.
Shaw, Clifford R. The Jack-Roller: A Delinquent Boy’s Own Story. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1966 (1930).
Shelton, Beth Ann, et al. Houston: Growth and Decline in a Sunbelt Boomtown.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989.
Sugrue, Thomas J. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in
Postwar Detroit. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
289

Sutherland, Robert L. Color, Class, and Personality. Washington, D.C.:
American Council on Education, 1942.
Sutherland, Robert L. Essentials of a Community Mental Health Program:
Tentative Guideposts for Community Planning. Austin: Hogg Foundation
for Mental Hygiene, 1945.
Sutherland, Robert L., and Wayne Holtzman. The Unfolding of an Idea. Austin:
Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, 1958.
Sutherland, Robert L., and Julian L. Woodward. Introductory Sociology. 1st ed.
Chicago: J.P. Lippincott and Company, 1937.
Szreter, Simon. “The Idea of Demographic Transition and the Study of Fertility
Change: A Critical Intellectual History.” Population and Development
Review. 19:4 (December 1991), 659-693.
Takaki, Ronald. A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America. Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1993.
Thomas, William I., and Florian Znaniecke. The Polish Peasant in Europe and
America. New York: Dover Publications, 1958 (1920).
Trachtenberg, Alan. Reading American Photographs: Images as History,
Matthew Brady to Walker Evans. New York: Hill and Wang, 1989.
Trolander, Judith Ann. Professionalism and Social Change: From the Settlement
House Movement to Neighborhood Centers, 1886 to the Present. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1987.
Tsanoff, Corrine S. Neighborhood Doorways. Houston: Neighborhood Centers of
Houston and Harris County, 1958.
Unger, Irwin. The Best of Intentions: The Triumphs and Failures of the Great
Society Under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. New York: Doubleday,
1996.
Uys, Errol Lincoln. Riding the Rails: Teenagers on the Move During the Great
Depression. New York: Routledge, 2000.
Vaz, Edmund W., ed. Middle-Class Juvenile Delinquency. New York: Harper and
Row, 1967.

290

Villarruel, Francisco, and Nancy Walker. Donda Esta La Justicia? A Call to
Action on Behalf of Latino and Latina Youth in the U.S. Justice System.
Washington, D.C.: Building Blocks for Youth, July 2002.
Wertham, Frederic. The Circle of Guilt. New York: Rinehart, 1956.
Whyte, William F. Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum
of Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943.
Whyte, William H., Jr. The Organization Man. Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1956.
Wilson, William Julius. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The
Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1987.
Winslow, W. Thatcher. Youth, A World Problem: A Study in World Perspective of
Youth Conditions, Movements, and Programs. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1937.
Winslow, W. Thatcher, and Frank P. Davidson eds. American Youth: An Enforced
Reconnaisance. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940.
Wooden, Kenneth. Weeping in the Playtime of Others: America’s Incarcerated
Children. 2nd ed. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2000
(1976).
Wright, Richard. Native Son. New York: Harper and Row, 1940.
Wright, Richard. Black Boy: A Study of Childhood and Youth. New York: Harper
and Row, 1945.

291

Vita

William Sebastian Bush was born in New York City on September 8,
1967, to Maria Frances Russo Bush and Mitchell Kenneth Bush. After a brief stint
studying at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago, he traveled and worked a
variety of jobs, several of which related to the visual and performing arts. He
obtained his B.A. in History from the University of New Orleans in 1995, and his
M.A. in History from the University of Nevada-Las Vegas in 1997.

Permanent address:

2104-A Pompton Drive, Austin, Texas, 78757

This dissertation was typed by William Sebastian Bush.

292

